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Software-defined Networking (SDN) promises to redefine the future of networking.
Indeed, SDN-based networks have unique capabilities such as centralized control,
flow abstraction, dynamic updating of forwarding rules and software-based traffic
analysis. SDN-based networks decouple the data plane from the control plane,
migrating the latter to a software controller. By adding a software layer between
network devices and applications, features such as network virtualization and
automated management are simpler to achieve.
In this dissertation, we show how SDN-based deployments simplify network
management at multiple scales such as campus and transport networks, as well as
future Internet architectures. First, we propose OpenSec, an SDN-based security
framework that allows network operators to implement security policies in campus
networks. Second, we propose the eXtensible Traffic Engineering Framework
(XTEF) to enable application-driven traffic engineering and provision transport
network resources using on-demand Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM)
tunnels. Third, we demonstrate how SDN can be used to dynamically create intra-
domain cut-through switching tunnels to bypass the routing layer in MobilityFirst.
Finally, we propose how to extend the cut-through capabilities to inter-domain
routing in MobilityFirst.
In our work, we run experiments on the GENI testbed (Global Environment
for Network Innovations), the ORBIT (Open-Access Research Testbed for Next-
Generation Wireless Networks) and Mininet. The results show that SDN can be
used to simplify policy-based network management, virtualize an entire WAN
as a single switch, create Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) tunnels on
demand and create inter-domain tunnels using techniques that scale better than
traditional distributed methods.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Networks of the future need to be flexible and dynamic to accommodate the
expected demand. For example, global mobile data reached 2.5 exabytes per
month at the end of 2014 [5] and a growth of more than 50% is expected till
2019, where the data load could reach 24.3 exabytes. By the same token, the
Large Hadron Collider (LHC, the world’s largest particle accelerator), is capable
of sending data at a rate of 10 gigabytes per second for processing at facilities
worldwide [6]. Clearly, networks need to provide sufficient bandwidth to transfer
such huge amounts of data. However, they also need to be dynamic and flexible
so that data transfers can be initiated when needed. To illustrate this, imagine that
the LHC generates 10 gigabytes but it takes two days to create a circuit in order
for a scientist in New York to receive the data. By then, it is already faster to ship
two DVDs by mail.
Networks of the future also need to be manageable. As the complexity of
network deployments increases, the number of devices deployed increases as well.
Manual configuration of such devices is error-prone and time-consuming. As a
consequence, one expectation of future networks is to provide mechanisms to the
operators to simplify network management, reduce the amount of time needed to
configure devices and minimize configuration errors.
2Software Defined Networking (SDN) [7] is an increasingly popular paradigm
that decouples the data plane from the control plane, migrating the latter to a
software controller. The motivation is to move the complexity away from the
hardware and to allow for flexibility and innovation in the software. As a result,
hardware tends to become simpler and focus only on forwarding traffic. In
contrast, the software becomes responsible for managing the network and how
devices forward traffic. SDN deployments have inherent capabilities that allow for
innovative ways to manage networks. First, control of the network is centralized,
since a software controller is responsible for managing all forwarding devices.
Second, all traffic is abstracted as a flow, independently of whether it carries data
over IP, Ethernet or lower layers. Third, in SDN forwarding rules can be updated
dynamically, thus providing great flexibility to network management. Fourth, SDN
facilitates software-based analysis of traffic traversing the forwarding devices. This
allows the centralized controller to use multiple software techniques for detection
and pattern identification. All these capabilities have enabled a significant body of
research focusing on how SDN can redifine the way networking is done today.
OpenFlow [8] is the most commonly used SDN protocol. It standardizes how
a software-based controller and an OpenFlow-compliant Ethernet switch should
communicate. The protocol contains an extensive list of messages that are used by
the controller and the switches to exchange information. For instance, it allows a
switch to notify the controller of an incoming packet for which no forwarding rule
matched. Similarly, it specifies how the controller can send a message to the switch
requesting to add a new forwarding rule in the flow table that will match the
incoming packet. These are only two examples of messages that can be exchanged
through the OpenFlow channel, a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection
established between the controller and the switch to exchange data.
31.1 Motivation
The motivation of this dissertation is to analyze how SDN can be used to sim-
plify network operation and create flexible and manageable deployments. By
adding a software layer between network devices and applications, a great deal
of simplification can be achieved. However, it is also true that anything that can
be done using SDN can also be achieved without it. The challenge, thus, is to
justify how SDN-based deployments are more flexible and manageable compared
to traditional networks.
When OpenFlow was proposed, it was considered a tool to enable network
innovation in campus networks. The benefit of using OpenFlow was to allow
researchers to run novel experiments on real hardware without disrupting pro-
duction traffic. As a consequence, an effort to simplify network management
at campus scale resulted in OpenSec [9], the first product of this dissertation.
OpenSec is an SDN-based security framework that allows network managers to
implement security policies in the network.
When the popularity of SDN increased, so did the scope of SDN-based deploy-
ments. In particular, the deployment of an entire backbone network at Google
using OpenFlow [10] was a demonstration that an SDN-based wide area network
(WAN) was possible. Our motivation to shift to the WAN was driven by our
interest in the optical layer. As a consequence, we focused on how SDN could sim-
plify transport networks and we proposed the the eXtensible Traffic Engineering
Framework (XTEF) [11] to provide application-driven traffic provisioning using
on-demand Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) tunneling in SDN transport
networks.
Finally, our collaboration with the MobilityFirst team motivated us to look into
4the role of SDN in the Future Internet. MobilityFirst is a Future Internet architec-
ture project funded by the National Science Foundation that decouples network
addresses and identifiers to better support mobility. To achieve mobility-awareness,
the MobilityFirst network must be capable of fine-grained, per-flow routing to pro-
vide mobility support while staying efficient for large flows that traverse the core
network. Consequently, we designed an SDN-based routing framework for Mobili-
tyFirst that benefits from the traffic analysis and centralized control capabilities of
SDN to ensure mobility-aware, efficient routing in MobilityFirst.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Software Defined Networking and OpenFlow
Since this work focuses heavily on SDN and OpenFlow, an entire chapter (Chapter
2) is devoted to provide a detailed explanation of the topic. This chapter includes
a brief description of the historical background of programmable networks and
the reasons why OpenFlow was more successful than previous attempts. The
chapter also provides a detailed description of the OpenFlow protocol, starting at
the specification 1.0. Finally, we survey innovative work using OpenFlow, as well
as current large scale deployments based on SDN.
1.2.2 Future Internet Architectures and MobilityFirst
Future Internet Architectures (FIAs) are research projects aimed at re-designing
the Internet. The common thread of all projects is the identification of limitations
of the current Internet, such as the lack of support for mobile devices or the lack
of security. Also, they highlight that the Internet was designed to enable com-
munication between one client and one server, whereas nowadays Internet traffic
5is content-oriented independently of the location of the required content. These
projects were born in 2010 when the National Science Foundation (NSF) created
the FIA project and funded novel initiatives to propose clean slate architectures
for the Future Internet. Projects such as Named Data Networking (NDN) [12],
MobilityFirst [13], Nebula[14] and ChoiceNet [15] are currently funded by the NSF
as a result of the initiative. We are part of the MobilityFirst team and we collaborate
on investigating how MobilityFirst can benefit from SDN and optical networks.
Detailed review on MobilityFirst mechanisms such as globally unique identifiers
(GUID), global name resolution system (GNRS) and hop-by-hop transmission is
given in Chapter 5.
1.3 Contributions
The first contribution of this dissertation is a survey on network innovation using
OpenFlow, published in the IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials online
journal [7]. To the best of our knowledge, this work was the first comprehensive
survey to describe the difference between SDN and OpenFlow, as well as the
capabilities, applications, challenges and deployments of SDN-based networks
using OpenFlow.
The second contribution of this dissertation is OpenSec, an SDN-based frame-
work that allows network operators to write human-readable security policies and
implement them automatically in the network. Through this work, we reinforced
the idea of moving middleboxes away from the main datapath of a LAN to improve
scalability and reliability. Furthermore, we proposed a new policy specification
language that is simpler than the ones proposed by the related work. Our work
was published in the proceedings of IEEE GLOBECOM 2014 [9] and a journal
6submission is currently under review.
The third contribution of this dissertation is the eXtensible Traffic Engineering
Framework (XTEF), a WAN framework capable of creating dynamic, on-demand,
end-to-end circuits in transport networks. XTEF uses OneSwitch, a WAN abstrac-
tion model, to expose the WAN as a single switch to external tenants. Using
XTEF, the tenants can request bandwidth or latency guarantees and XTEF uses
dynamic WDM tunnels to provision the network and allocate such demands. An
implementation and evaluation of OneSwitch was published in the proceedings of
IEEE/OSA OFC 2015 [16]. A description of the main challenges in WAN for scien-
tific flows was published in the proceedings of the SDN Workshop for Scientific
Computing at Super Computing 2015 [17]. The XTEF work was submitted to a
conference and is currently under review [11].
The fourth contribution of this dissertation is the implementation of an OpenFlow-
based control plane for MobilityFirst with intra-domain cut-through switching.
The motivation for this framework is to perform efficient data transfer in Mobility-
First for flows with static end-points. To avoid the overheads of the routing layer,
the proposed framework creates Ethernet-layer tunnels for improved efficiency
and flow aggregation. This work was published in the proceedings of IEEE ANTS
2013. An extended version of the paper was also published in the Photonic Com-
munication Networks Journal special issue consisting of selected papers from IEEE
ANTS 2013.
Finally, the fifth contribution of this dissertation is to extend the MobilityFirst
SDN framework to an inter-domain scale. To this end, we first model and solve an
optimization problem to minimize the total transfer time of flows across domains.
Next, we propose a routing framework that enables domain controllers to exchange
topology information and communicate to create inter-domain tunnels. This is an
7important contribution to the SDN field because it proposes a novel mechanism to
create inter-domain tunnels that is scalable and uses fewer messages than current
protocols such as the label distribution protocol (LDP). This work was submitted
to a conference and is currently under review.
1.4 Dissertation organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, Chapter 2 provides
detailed background on SDN and OpenFlow. Next, Chapter 3 introduces OpenSec,
a framework that enables network operators to implement security policies in
a campus network. After that, Chapter 4 describes XTEF, a WAN provisioning
framework. After that, Chapters 5 and 6 address the topic of cut-through switching
in MobilityFirst using OpenFlow at intra-domain and inter-domain scale. Finally,
we draw our conclusions and describe future work in Chapter 7.
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Software Defined Networks and OpenFlow
2.1 Introduction
A recent approach to programmable networks is the Software Defined Networking
(SDN) architecture. SDN consists of decoupling the control and data planes of a
network. It relies on the fact that the simplest function of a switch is to forward
packets according to a set of rules. However, the rules followed by the switch
to forward packets are managed by a software-based controller. One motivation
of SDN is to perform network tasks that could not be done without additional
software for each of the switching elements. Developed applications can control
the switches by running on top of a network operating system, which works as an
intermediate layer between the switch and the application. Another motivation
is to move part of the complexity of the network to the software-based controller
instead of relying only on the hardware network devices.
OpenFlow [8] was proposed to standardize the communication between the
switches and the software-based controller in an SDN architecture. The authors
identify that it is difficult for the networking research community to test new
ideas in current hardware. This happens because the source code of the software
running on the switches cannot be modified and the network infrastructure has
been “ossified” [8], as new network ideas cannot be tested in realistic traffic
9settings. By identifying common features in the flow tables of the Ethernet
switches, the authors provide a standardized protocol to control the flow table of a
switch through software. OpenFlow provides a means to control a switch without
requiring the vendors to expose the code of their devices.
Table 2.1: Example OpenFlow-compliant switches.
Switch Company Series
Arista Arista extensible modular operat-
ing system (EOS), Arista 7124FX
application switch
Ciena Ciena Coredirector running
firmware version 6.1.1
Cisco Cisco cat6k, catalyst 3750, 6500 se-
ries
Juniper Juniper MX-240, T-640
HP HP procurve series- 5400 zl, 8200
zl, 6200 yl, 3500 yl, 6600
NEC NEC IP8800
Pronto Pronto 3240, 3290
Toroki Toroki Lightswitch 4810
Dell Dell Z9000 and S4810
Quanta Quanta LB4G
Open vSwitch Software switch. Latest version:
1.10.0
OpenFlow was initially deployed in academic campus networks [8]. Today,
at least nine universities in the US have deployed this technology [18]. The
goal of OpenFlow was to provide a platform that would allow researchers to
run experiments in production networks. However, industry has also embraced
SDN and OpenFlow as a strategy to increase the functionality of the network
while reducing costs and hardware complexity. Table 2.1 shows a list of several
OpenFlow-compliant switches available in the market. The Open Networking
Foundation (ONF) [19] was founded in 2011 by Deutsche Telekom, Facebook,
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Google, Microsoft, Verizon, and Yahoo to promote the implementation of SDN and
OpenFlow-based networks. Currently, ONF has more than 95 members including
several major vendors.
OpenFlow networks have specific capabilities. For example, it is possible to
control multiple switches from a single controller. It is also feasible to analyze
traffic statistics using software. Forwarding information can be updated dynami-
cally as well and different types of traffic can be abstracted and managed as flows.
These capabilities have been exploited by the research community to experiment
with innovative ideas and propose new applications. Ease of configuration, net-
work management, security, availability, network and data center virtualization
and wireless applications are those that have been investigated the most using
OpenFlow. They have been implemented in different environments, including
virtual or real hardware networks and simulations. Researchers have also focused
on evaluating the performance of OpenFlow networks and on proposing methods
to improve their performance.
OpenFlow offers great opportunities for network innovation but it also faces
challenges. The fact that the availability of the network depends on a single
controller at a given time, creates scalability and availability problems. There are
security concerns regarding the fact that all the network information is contained
in one single server. Compatibility issues must also be taken into consideration.
Questions remain about future directions of OpenFlow research as well. We discuss
the extension of this technology to network-layer devices such as IP routers, as
well as the deployment of OpenFlow in wide area networks (WAN).
In this chapter we describe the capabilities, applications, deployments and
challenges of OpenFlow networks in local and wide area environments. We also
describe SDN and alternative standards such as ForCES [20]. We explain how
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OpenFlow has received major attention among SDN technologies but we also point
out the difference between SDN and OpenFlow.
We begin by giving a background of programmable networks and describing
SDN in Section 2.2. We explain the OpenFlow specification in Section 2.3. Then
we present the capabilities of OpenFlow networks in Section 2.4 and we survey
how they have been exploited in different applications in Section 2.5. We describe
deployments of OpenFlow-based networks in Section 2.6. Next we discuss studies
that have evaluated the performance of OpenFlow in Section 2.7. Then we discuss
the challenges faced by OpenFlow in Section 2.8. We conclude by proposing future
research directions in Section 2.9.
2.2 Background of programmable networks
In this section we present several contributions to programmable networks prior
to SDN and OpenFlow. One of the first approaches was SOFTNET [21], an
experimental multihop packet radio network that introduced the idea of adding
commands to the contents of each packet. The goal was to modify a network node
during operation time, using commands written in the SOFTNET language. The
motivation of the authors in creating this network was to enable experiments with
different network protocols. SOFTNET was deployed as a proof of concept. There
were no further large scale deployments, but the idea behind it was the motivation
for Active Networks [22, 23].
The main idea of Active Networks (AN) was to allow packets to contain
programs that could be executed by the network devices that they traversed. The
concept of active network is due to the fact that switches perform computations
on the data of the packets flowing through them and the users can inject programs
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into the network [22]. A survey on AN research is available in [24]. Although
AN became an active field of research, it ultimately failed at being widely used.
Recently, NetServ [25] was proposed as ActiveNetworks 2.0. The authors argue
that NetServ contains all the necessary elements to be deployed.
SOFTNET and ActiveNetworks did not use software components to control the
network devices. The programmability of the network was achieved by adding
source code to the payload of the packets. More recent approaches proposed
separating the control plane from the data plane by moving the first one to general
purpose servers. We describe SoftRouter [26], ForCES [20] and finally we focus on
OpenFlow [8]. They are all based on software defined networking architectures,
where the network devices are controlled by software components.
2.2.1 Software Defined Networking
The difference between SDN and the previous approaches is that a software
component running on a server or a CPU is added to the architecture of the
network. In SDN, the software component is responsible for the control plane of
the network. This is why we say that SDN decouples the control and data planes,
as this distinction was not as clear in previous approaches.
One important feature of SDN is its ability to provide a network wide abstrac-
tion. Keller et al. [27] discuss the idea of the “platform as a service” model for
networking. According to the authors, it is a common trend to decouple the infras-
tructure management from the service management. In this model, the underlying
physical network and the topology are hidden to the user. Instead, the abstraction
presented to the user is a single router. According to them, the customer is mostly
interested in being able to configure policies and defining how packets are handled.
We will see during the rest of this chapter that a large number of publications aim
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at hiding the complexity of the network and providing an easier way to configure
a service. Using names instead of IP addresses, or high level policies instead of
access control configuration files are examples of this abstraction.
Network operating system is a key concept in SDN. It comes from the idea of
abstracting the complexity of the underlying network. Lazar [28] explains how an
early approach to programmable networks introduced the term of kernel in terms
of networking. The idea was precisely to draw a parallel between the network
operating system and the typical operating system. In an operating system, the
abstraction includes the hardware components of the CPU. In a network, the
abstraction hides the topology and the network devices. Therefore, the network
operating system is responsible for the abstraction provided by SDN to its users.
Another important advantage of SDN is that it enables innovation and flexibility.
If the control and data plane are managed by a hardware network devices, there
is little room for innovating and experiment, as the software or firmware of
those devices cannot be easily modified. Instead, by having access to a software
component to manage the control plane, many ideas can be explored.
2.2.2 Standardizing the communication between the control plane and the
data plane
SDN provides network-wide abstraction to the user and any software-based tech-
nique can be used to manage the control plane. However, we have not discussed
how is the communication between the control and data plane standardized. Next
we describe how several researchers have proposed to standardize this communi-
cation.
One early proposal is the IEEE P1520 Standards Initiative for Programmable
Networks Interfaces [29]. The authors identify the need of abstracting the complex-
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ity of the network to the user as well as the necessity of a programming interface
to define the network. They also discuss the need of having a protocol to access
the network elements.
The SoftRouter architecture [26] allows dynamic binding between the network
element running the data plane and the control element (software-based). This
architecture was proposed for network-layer devices that can be controlled by
standard purpose servers. The software component does not need to be wired to
the network device and a network element can have more than one control element
across the network.
ForCES (Forwarding and Control Element Separation) [20] was created by the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). ForCES was proposed to standardize the
way that controlling elements communicate with network elements. However, this
standard did not experience widespread adoption by the vendor community. The
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) has also undertaken efforts regarding SDN.
The Software Defined Networking Research Group (SDNRG) [30] aims to identify
SDN approaches that can be used in the nearby future, as well as to identify future
challenges. It also aims at providing a forum to SDN researchers [31].
OpenFlow [8] came next and was based on the same motivation: how to
standardize the communication between the control plane and the data plane.
It describes how software applications can program the flow table of different
switches. OpenFlow quickly became an active research topic and we describe it in
detail in the next section. Before, we briefly compare ForCES and OpenFlow.
The IETF documented the differences between ForCES and OpenFlow [32].
According to this document, both standards decouple the control and data planes
and they both standardize the communication between the two planes. Regarding
the architecture of the network, one difference can be found between ForCES and
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OpenFlow. ForCES defines networking and forwarding elements and how they can
communicate with each other. The architecture of the network remains unchanged.
On the other hand, OpenFlow modifies the architecture in the sense that data
plane elements become simple devices that forward packets according to rules
given by the control element. ForCES allows multiple control and data elements
within the same network and the logic can be spread through all the elements.
OpenFlow aims at having a centralized control plane.
Due to the emergence of OpenFlow as the SDN architecture that has received
major attention, we focus this chapter on network innovation using OpenFlow.
Figure 2.1: OpenFlow components.
2.3 OpenFlow specification
The OpenFlow specification describes an open protocol to allow software applica-
tions to program the flow table of different switches. An OpenFlow architecture
consists of three main components: an OpenFlow-compliant switch, a secure
channel and a controller, as shown in Fig 2.1. Switches use flow tables to forward
packets. A flow table is a list of flow entries. Each entry has match fields, counters
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and instructions. Incoming packets are compared with the match fields of each
entry and if there is a match, the packet is processed according to the action
contained by that entry. Counters are used to keep statistics about packets. The
packet can also be encapsulated and sent to the controller.
The controller is a software program responsible for manipulating the switch’s
flow table, using the OpenFlow protocol. The secure channel is the interface
that connects the controller to all switches. Through this channel, the controller
manages the switches, receives packets from the switches and sends packets to
the switches. An OpenFlow-compliant switch must be capable of forwarding
packets according to the rules defined in the flow table. Figure 2.2 shows a
high level description of how a network device processes a packet. First, the
communication between the switch and the controller is possible through flow
table rules. Internally, a switch uses Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM)
and Random Access Memory (RAM) to process each packet.
Figure 2.2: Elements of an OpenFlow-compliant switch.
Different versions of the OpenFlow protocol specification are available. The
first version was the OpenFlow version 0.2.0 released in March, 2008. Versions 0.8.0
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and 0.8.1 came next in May, 2008. Version 0.8.2, released in October, 2008, added
the Echo Request and Echo Reply messages. Then, version 0.8.9 was released
in December, 2008. It included IP netmasks, additional statistic information and
several other updates. OpenFlow 0.9 was released in July, 2009. Finally, OpenFlow
version 1.0, the most widely deployed version, was released in December, 2009.
Next, we focus on versions 1.0.0 [33], 1.1.0 [1], 1.2 [34] and 1.3.0 [35], as previous
versions are now deprecated. A detailed list of changes included in every version
is available in the OpenFlow 1.3.0 specification document [35].
Table 2.2: Match fields of a flow table entry in an OpenFlow 1.0.0 switch.
Ingress Port
Ether src
Ether dst
Ether type
VLAN id
VLAN priority CoS
IP src
IP dst
IP Proto
IP ToS bits
TCP/UDP src port
TCP/UDP dst port
2.3.1 OpenFlow 1.0.0
Currently, the most widely used specification is the version 1.0.0. A switch
supporting OpenFlow specification 1.0.0 uses 12 header fields present in the
header and payload of the Ethernet packets coming into the switch. Table 2.2
shows all the header fields.
A packet can be matched to a particular flow entry in the flow table by using
one or more header fields of the packet. A field in the flow table can have the
18
Figure 2.3: How a packet is processed and forwarded in an OpenFlow 1.0.0 switch.
value of ANY and it will match all packets. If the forwarding table is implemented
using Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM), ANY can be implemented
in the switch hardware using the third masking state of the TCAM.
In Fig. 2.2 we showed the main elements of an OpenFlow switch. Figure 2.3
shows the details of the data plane in an OpenFlow 1.0.0 switch. In step 1, the
Ethernet packet entering the switch goes to a packet parsing system. In step 2, the
header fields are extracted and placed in a packet lookup header, as they are used
for matching purposes. In step 3, the packet lookup header generated is sent to
the packet matching system. In step 4, the packet lookup header is compared to
the rules defined for each flow entry in the OpenFlow flow table. Note that the
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flow entries in the table are present in the descending order of priority. Therefore,
the comparison of the packet lookup header is done starting from the first flow
entry on the flow table. If a match is found, the actions in the matched flow entry
are performed on the packet (step 5B). Otherwise, the first 200 bytes of the packet
are sent to the controller for processing (step 5A).
Table 2.3: Match fields of a flow table entry in an OpenFlow 1.1.0 switch.
Ingress port
Metadata
Ether src
Ether dst
Ether type
VLAN id
VLAN priority
MPLS label
MPLS EXP traffic
class
IPv4 src
IPv4 dst
IPv4 proto / ARP
opcode
IPv4 ToS bits
TCP/UDP/SCTP src
port. ICMP Type
TCP/UDP/SCTP dst
port. ICMP Code
2.3.2 OpenFlow 1.1.0
In the OpenFlow 1.1.0 specification, a switch contains several flow tables and a
group table, instead of just one single flow table, as in OpenFlow 1.0.0. Figure
2.4 shows the main components of the OpenFlow 1.1.0 switch. The match fields
are also different, as shown in Table 2.3. We have highlighted in bold the added
cells. The metadata field is used to pass information between the tables as the
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packet traverses through them. It is a register used to carry information between
the tables. The Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) fields are used to support
MPLS tagging.
The processing of a packet entering the switch has changed as there are multiple
flow tables available in the switch. The flow tables in the switch are linked to each
other through a process termed as pipeline processing.
Figure 2.4: Components of an OpenFlow 1.1.0 switch. Source: [1].
Pipeline processing involves a set of flow tables linked together to process the
packet coming in. When the packet first enters the switch, it is sent to the first
table to look for the flow entry to be matched. If there is a match, the packet gets
processed there and if there is another table that the particular flow entry points
to, the packet is then sent to that flow table. This happens until a particular flow
entry does not point to any other flow table.
The flow entries in the flow tables can also point to the group table. The group
table is a special kind of table designed to perform operations that are common
across multiple flows. This means that actions belonging to a set of flows are
grouped together. Also, the set of flows is controlled to perform various actions
collectively under a single group. Complex forwarding actions such as multipath
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and link aggregation are enabled through the group table.
Finally, specification 1.1.0 introduces instructions instead of actions. Previously,
an action was associated to each flow table entry. That action could be to forward
the packet or to drop it, as well as processing it normally as it would be in a
regular switch. Instructions are more complex and they include modifying a
packet, updating an action set or updating the metadata.
2.3.3 OpenFlow 1.2
The OpenFlow specification version 1.2, was released in December 2011 and it
includes a few major features. First of all, support to IPv6 addressing is added.
Matching could be done using the IPv6 source and destination addresses. Another
important feature supported is the possibility of connecting a switch to multiple
controllers concurrently. The switch maintains connections with all the controllers
and these can communicate with each other to do hand overs. Having multiple
controllers provides faster recovery during failure and it is also possible to achieve
load balancing.
2.3.3.1 OpenFlow 1.3.0
The OpenFlow specification version 1.3 was released in June 2012. Some of the
improvements over version 1.2 are listed next. It is possible to control the rate of
packets through per flow meters. Also, auxiliary connections between the switch
and the controller have been enabled. Another improvement is that cookies can be
added to the packets sent from the switch to the controller and specific durations
field have been added to most statistics. A complete list of changes is available in
the specification’s document [35].
Table 2.4 compares specifications 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.2 and 1.3.0.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of OpenFlow specifications.
Specification 1.0.0 1.1.0 1.2 1.3.0
Widely de-
ployed
Yes No No No
Flow table Single flow
table
Multiple
flow tables
Multiple
flow tables
Multiple
flow tables
MPLS
matching
No Yes Yes Yes, bottom
of stack bit
added
Group table No Yes Yes Yes, more
flexible
table miss
support
IPv6 sup-
port
No No Yes Yes, new
header field
added
Simultaneous
communi-
cation with
multiple
controllers
No No Yes Yes, aux-
iliary con-
nections
enabled
2.3.4 Implementing applications using OpenFlow
In order to run applications on top of a single controller to manipulate the flow
table of a switch, a network operating system is required (see Fig. 2.1). It acts
as an intermediate layer between the OpenFlow switch and the user application.
The network operating system communicates with the switch using the OpenFlow
protocol and notifies the application of network events. Nox [36], Beacon [37]
and Maestro [38] are examples of network operating systems. Recently, Big
Switch released Floodlight [39], an open source Java based controller. Foster
et al. [40] proposed Frenetic, a network programming language that simplifies
the development of applications on top of network operating systems. NEC
proposed Trema [41] to develop OpenFlow applications using Ruby and C. Finally,
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DreamersLab developed Node.flow [42], a package to build a JavaScript based
flow controller using Node.js [43]. Table 2.5 summarizes comparative data for the
OpenFlow controllers that we have mentioned.
There are at least four possibilities to implement OpenFlow-based applications.
First, an OpenFlow-compliant hardware switch can be used. We have provided a
list in Table I. It is also possible to implement an OpenFlow-compliant software-
based switch using Open vSwitch [44, 45]. A third option is to deploy virtual
networks using Mininet [46], a virtual environment developed by the Stanford
University that can be used to simulate multiple hosts in virtual network within
one single host machine. Finally, a NetFPGA platform can be used. It consists of
a PCI card that provides four 1G Ethernet ports, static RAM and other network
functionalities [47]. The NetFPGA is also available with four 10G Ethernet ports.
Since physical and virtual switches can be used to deploy an OpenFlow net-
work, it is important to note some similarities and differences between them.
The advantage of a virtual switch is definitely the cost. Open vSwitch can be
downloaded for free and it can be installed using commonly used virtual machine
tools. A virtual switch performs the operations shown in Fig. 2.2 and Fig. 2.3
in software. Therefore, its main drawback is the performance. Hardware based
switches perform data plane operations faster.
It is worth mentioning that debugging network applications is not a common
technique yet. However, a first prototype of a debugger has recently been proposed
by Handigol et al. [48].
Using OpenFlow, experimental and production traffic can share the same
OpenFlow switch. The action of a flow table entry of an OpenFlow switch can be
to send the packet to the switch data path. On the other hand, a different flow
entry can be defined for experimental traffic. This way, experimental traffic can
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Table 2.5: OpenFlow controllers.
Controller Language Created by Comments
NOX C++ Nicira Networks NOX was donated to the re-
search community in 2008.
It has several branches at
Stanford University, such as
classic NOX, new NOX and
POX. New NOX is the ver-
sion that will be further
developed. POX supports
Python and it is used for ed-
ucational or research appli-
cations [49].
Beacon Java Stanford University Supports both event-based
and threaded operation.
Mostly used for research
and experimentation [37].
Maestro Java Rice University Licensed under licensed un-
der LGPL v2.1. Not as
common as other controllers
such as NOX [50].
Floodlight Java Big Switch Networks Forked from Beacon and ex-
tended for enterprise usage.
Apache-licensed [39].
Trema Ruby and C NEC Supports Linux applications
only [41].
Node.Flow JavaScript DreamersLab Works on top of Node.js, a
platform built on Chrome’s
JavaScript runtime [42, 43].
be tested without interfering with the production traffic [8]. In order to further
enhance this, Sherwood et al. proposed FlowVisor [51]. Using this technique, it is
possible for several single controllers to share the control of a switch. A centralized
OpenFlow- based controller “slices” the network and acts as an intermediate layer
between the switch and all the OpenFlow controllers that manipulate the switch.
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2.3.5 OpenFlow: a specification, a protocol or an architecture?
OpenFlow can be viewed as a specification when it is in the context of an Open-
Flow switch. An OpenFlow switch is achieved by implementing the requirements
specified in the OpenFlow specification, in the device. For instance, in the Open-
Flow specification, it is required that the switch has to support the flood action
on the packets belonging to a particular flow. The flood action floods the packet
using the normal pipeline of the switch [1]. Whether or not to implement this
feature is a decision made by the vendor, but an OpenFlow switch must provide
this functionality.
The OpenFlow protocol deals with defining the format of the messages passed
between the control plane and the OpenFlow switch through the secure channel.
The format of the messages has to be understood as well as generated by both
the entities. This standard format of message passing is defined in the OpenFlow
protocol. In fact, the OpenFlow protocol is part of the OpenFlow specification and
it applies to the OpenFlow control plane as well as to the OpenFlow switch.
Finally, OpenFlow is viewed as architecture in the context of an entire network.
In an OpenFlow network, OpenFlow switches are being controlled by one or more
OpenFlow controllers. Such a network can be viewed as supporting the OpenFlow
architecture.
It is important to keep in mind that the data plane implementation of the
switch is vendor specific. As long as a switch can communicate with an OpenFlow
controller, the data plane can be implemented differently by each vendor. Therefore,
the fact that two switches are OpenFlow-compliant does not make them equal.
Actually, not all switches implement all the features of the OpenFlow specification.
It is possible that an OpenFlow-based application works using one switch but does
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not work using a different switch.
2.3.6 OpenFlow and SDN
Since OpenFlow has become the most popular SDN technology, some consider
these terms as synonyms. However, it is important to note the difference between
them. SDN consists of decoupling the control plane from the data plane, whereas
OpenFlow describes how a software controller and a switch should communicate
in an SDN architecture. SDN gives the user an abstraction of the network-wide
state and OpenFlow abstracts a network component. As an analogy, an operating
system provides a system-wide abstraction, just like SDN provides a network-wide
abstraction. On the other hand, just like the operating system communicates with
hardware through drivers, OpenFlow can be considered a driver to communicate
a single controller and a network component.
As an SDN technology, OpenFlow networks have specific capabilities that we
describe next.
2.3.7 Capabilities of OpenFlow
OpenFlow architectures allow centralized control of the network, software-based
traffic analysis, dynamic updating of forwarding rules and flow abstraction. In
this section we describe these capabilities and we give examples that illustrate how
they can be exploited.
2.3.8 Centralized control of the network
One important capability of an OpenFlow network is that the controller has
network-wide knowledge of the system. Several OpenFlow switches can be
connected to a single controller and it is then possible to make decisions in a
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centralized manner. Instead of having several network devices with a limited
knowledge of the network, a single controller can take decisions based on its
knowledge of a broader part of the network.
One example of this is Ethane [52], an architecture proposed for managing the
network of an enterprise. The key idea is to create a centralized policy that is
managed by the controller. The switches become simple machines that forward
and drop packets according to the rules defined by the controller. Using this
architecture, it is possible to manage the network policies using high-end names.
Routing decisions are also considered by the policy and finally, it becomes easier
to bind a packet to its origin.
Another example of this capability deals with link failure recovery. In a
traditional network, each switch has a limited knowledge of the network. When a
link fails, then routes get adjusted at each switch until new routes are found. In an
OpenFlow network, a centralized controller can find new paths in a much faster
and easier way.
A comparison between the Path Computation Element (PCE) [53] architecture
and OpenFlow is worth being mentioned when discussing this capability. Path
computation in large and complex networks may require cooperation between
different domains. The PCE architecture was proposed to address these challenges.
A PCE is an entity that is capable of computing a network path or route based
on a network graph [53]. A PCE architecture is not fully centralized. However,
a cooperation between different entities does exist. Nevertheless, it can also
occur that an entity does not have visibility over another element. Therefore, the
knowledge of the network is not full. In OpenFlow-based networks, the controller
usually has a broader knowledge of the network and therefore the control of the
network is centralized. On the other hand, OpenFlow controllers do not cooperate
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together as it happens in a PCE architecture. Giorgetti et al. [54] propose OpenFlow
and PCE architectures to control wavelength switched optical networks.
To illustrate the difference between PCE and OpenFlow architectures, we
describe how the OSCARS [55] (On-Demand Secure Circuits and Advance Reserva-
tion System) project provides a PCE module [56]. Through this module, researchers
can deploy PCE elements in the network in a distributed manner. Therefore, it is
possible to perform path computation without using a single centralized point. If
we compare this to an OpenFlow testbed, we will find that researchers deploy the
code on top of an OpenFlow controller and all computations are performed from
there.
Another centralized approach towards network management is the Bandwidth
Broker (BB) architecture [57]. A BB consists of one or more servers that perform
network functionalities such as quality of service (QoS), policy enforcement or
admission control. The data plane communicates with the BB modules. The
advantage of this architecture is that part of the complexity is assumed by the BB
and minimal configuration is required in the network device. This architecture can
be used at the edge of a network to control bandwidth allocation.
2.3.9 Software-based traffic analysis
Software-based traffic analysis is a powerful capability of OpenFlow networks. This
capability greatly enables innovation, as it is possible to improve the capabilities of
a switch using any software-based technique. Traffic analysis can be performed in
real time using machine learning algorithms, databases and any other software
tool.
As an example, a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) detection method
is proposed in [58] and it heavily relies in traffic analysis. The method is based
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on retrieving traffic data on periodic intervals and using self organizing maps
to classify traffic as normal or malicious. Because the traffic analysis is done by
software, there are more possibilities of using advanced features to perform the
analysis, such as neural networks.
Another application of this capability is source address validation. Yao et al.
[59] proposed checking the source address of each new flow. When a switch
forwards a packet to the controller because it does not match any rule in the flow
table, the controller can validate whether or not that source address corresponds
to a valid flow.
2.3.10 Dynamic updating of forwarding rules
Another capability of OpenFlow networks is that they allow dynamic updates of
forwarding rules. All kinds of changes in the topology can be performed in real
time, based on the decisions taken by a software controller. No human interaction
is required. This is possible because the controller can modify the flow table entries
at any time.
In [60], the controller is notified of a link failure and it modifies the entries of
the flow table to re-route the traffic. By doing this, the network can react to link
failures without requiring any action by the network administrator. The authors
also suggest that the controller can automatically allocate more or less bandwidth
according to the traffic load, to save energy.
Another application of this capability is load balancing. The controller can
assess the load of several servers and dynamically change the forwarding rules
to make sure that the load is properly balanced. Handigol et al. [61] proposed
Plug-n-Serve, a load balancer that can dynamically add new servers to the cluster
without interrupting the service.
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2.3.11 Flow abstraction
Finally, networks using OpenFlow abstract all traffic as flows. For each flow there
is an entry in the flow table. For each entry, different rules can be defined. One
flow could be all traffic using one specific TCP protocol. Another could be all
packets travelling between two defined MAC addresses or all data with one IP
address destination. One could also define a non standard header to identify traffic
of a specific entry. This allows managing different kinds of flows using the same
control element.
Merging packet and circuit networks in a single infrastructure has been studied
by several authors and it relies on this capability. Packet and circuit networks are
treated as two different flows but they can be managed by the same controller.
In the next section we survey how the capabilities described above have been
exploited in OpenFlow-based applications.
2.4 OpenFlow-based applications
In this section we survey studies that use OpenFlow for different kinds of applica-
tions. Ease of configuration, network management, security and availability are
examples of these applications. OpenFlow has also been used to achieve network
and data center virtualization, as we describe next.
2.4.1 Ease of configuration
OpenFlow-based applications can simplify the configuration of the network. Com-
mon approaches include access control lists and configuration files whose admin-
istration is time consuming and can lead to errors. By using SDN, it is possible to
use software to take care of this. Yamasaki et al. [67] proposed using OpenFlow
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Table 2.6: Comparison of security applications using OpenFlow.
Publication Problem ap-
proached
Description of
the solution
Implementation SDN capabili-
ties exploited
Suh et al.
(CONA) [62]
DDoS attack
detection
Frequency and
pattern of re-
quests are ana-
lyzed to detect
DDoS attacks.
NetFPGA-
OpenFlow
switches
Traffic analysis
and dynamic
rules updating
Braga et al. [58] DDoS attack
detection
Statistic infor-
mation in the
flow table is
used to clas-
sify traffic as
normal or mali-
cious.
Simulation of a
NOX based net-
work.
Traffic analysis
and centralized
control.
Chu et al. [63] DDoS attack
detection
Locator/ID
separation
protocol (LISP)
is used to iden-
tify authorized
and malicious
sources.
Small network
with one con-
troller and
two Open-
Flow switches.
Specialized
hardware sim-
ulates DDoS
attacks.
Traffic analysis
and dynamic
rules updating
Liu et al. [64] Covert channel
protection
The controller
uses a second
software node
that filters au-
thorized com-
munication.
Simulation of a
network using
a virtual Open-
Flow switch.
Dynamic rules
updating and
centralized con-
trol.
Yao et al.
(VAVE) [59]
Source address
validation
The controller
analyzes traffic
and calculates
the flow path
to decide if the
source address
is valid.
Simulation of a
network using
a virtual Open-
Flow switch.
Traffic analysis
and dynamic
rules updating.
Jafarian et al.
[65]
Moving target
defense
The controller
periodically as-
signs different
virtual IP ad-
dresses to hosts
to hide the real
IP addresses to
an intruder.
Simulation us-
ing Mininet.
Centralized
control, dy-
namic rules
updating.
Gutz et al. [66] Traffic isolation Network slices
are defined
through a
programming
language in-
stead of using
network-level
techniques.
A tool was
developed to
test whether
traffic isolation
was correct
Centralized
control
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to manage the VLANs of a campus network. They describe how the number of
VLAN ids is limited and how the configuration tasks are time consuming. In
their approach, the controller analyzes incoming traffic and detects if the commu-
nication should be allowed or not, based on virtual group ids (GID) instead of
VLANs. Using this approach, the number of VLANs limitation is overcome and
the configuration of the network is simplified.
Several authors have addressed how to ensure consistent network updates
using SDN. Reitblatt et al. [68] describe how to provide abstract operations that
allow updating rules across the entire network in one fell swoop. In another
paper, Reitblatt et al. [69] describe how updating network policies can lead to
inconsistencies when packets are processed by both the old and the new policy.
The authors note that achieving per-packet and per-flow consistency is critical to
avoid inconsistencies and they describe techniques to implement both features.
Also, Katta et al. [70] introduce algorithms that trade time against TCAM space in
order to do the updates in an efficient manner. McGeer [71] proposes a network
update protocol as well. His method uses boolean formulas and it ensures that
flows are treated consistently. As an example, if a ruleset 1 is updated to a ruleset
2, the protocol ensures that the packets that were being processed using ruleset 1
are conserved, then the update takes place in all routers and finally the packets are
released and processed by ruleset 2. Finally, Ghorbani et al. [72] propose a method
to migrate virtual machines in a consistent manner and respecting bandwidth
requirements. The authors have implemented an algorithm that outputs the
order in which virtual machines must be migrated in order to ensure that no
inconsistencies occur.
As we described earlier, Casado et al. [52] proposed Ethane, an SDN archi-
tecture explicitly designed to simplify the management of the network in an
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enterprise. Ethane relies on the idea that the network policy should be known
by the controller and enforced in all switches. The main requirement is that all
communications between two hosts require explicit permission. Instead of creating
configuration files for all the switches in the network, these devices are kept simple
and the rules are managed by the controller. An implementation of an Ethane
switch in hardware is described in [73].
Some common points can be extracted from these studies. We mentioned in
Section II that a user is interested in defining policies and configuring how their
packets are forwarded. Here we notice that the studies by Reitblatt et al. [69] and
by Casado et al. [52] focus on simplifying the creation of policies and hiding how
these policies are implemented underneath. The study by Yamasaki et al. [67]
provides another way of creating VLANs in such a way that the user must not
deal with troublesome configuration files.
2.4.2 Network management
Deploying OpenFlow-based networks has also motivated research on OpenFlow
management infrastructures. These studies aim at simplifying network manage-
ment through OpenFlow. Mattos et al. [74] implemented a user friendly interface
that allows the user to manage the network. Their implementation is based on
NOX. Several applications are developed on top of that network operating system
and a web based interface is provided to the user. Also, a multiagent system is
capable of autonomously perform management.
Gibb et al. [75] propose an architecture in which network appliances (middle-
boxes) are not located at points of the topology that are traversed by plenty of
traffic. They argue that these chokepoints are not suitable for middleboxes, as
performance and correctness issues arise. Instead, they suggest using processing
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units in waypoints of the network. An OpenFlow switch, located at the choke-
point, is capable of routing to the processing units only the traffic that needs to
be processed by the middlebox. By doing this, less traffic traverses the network
appliances and a much simpler hardware is used at the chokepoint of the network.
Defining and implementing network policies has also been addressed using
OpenFlow. Voellmy et al. [76] propose Procera, a controller architecture and a
high level network control language that can be used to reactively define network
policies. Regarding implementation, Fergusson et al. [77] propose an OpenFlow-
based method to perform policies delegation in SDN networks. Their idea consists
of creating delegation trees, where each path can be managed by different network
administrators. The authors create hierarchical flow tables that can be used to
delegate policies. An incoming packet is matched to these policies and processed
accordingly.
Finally, an innovative way of managing IP multicast in overlay networks was
proposed by Nakagawa et al. [78]. The authors propose using OpenFlow instead of
a more common approach such as Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP).
Two important contribution of their approach are eliminating periodical join/leave
messages and making use of multipath in the layer-2 network.
Outsourcing network functionality is another interesting innovation to simplify
the network management. Gibb et al. [79] propose Jingling, an architecture
that allows adding functionality to a network in an outsourced manner. Feature
providers can be located anywhere outside the network. Policies defined how
feature providers must be used and a network controller maps the policies to the
feature providers. Following the idea of having services outside the network, the
idea of Networking-as-a-Service (NaaS) has emerged. Raghavendra et al. [80]
propose using OpenFlow to manage networks in such a way that they are ready to
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user services provided as NaaS.
In this section, we notice that the common trend is to exploit how OpenFlow
can dynamically update the forwarding rules. Having a network-aware controller
allows the network manager to dynamically forward traffic according to specific
needs. Once again, we also note how several studies simplify the creation of
network policies.
2.4.3 Security
OpenFlow has also been used to create applications that provide security to the
network. Table 2.6 compares the problems approached, the solutions proposed
and the infrastructures used to test the implementations.
Methods to detect DDoS using OpenFlow have been proposed recently [62,
58, 63]. Suh et al. [62] proposed a content oriented networking architecture.
This approach relies on creating flows based on the identity of the client and
the type of content requested. A DDoS attack is detected when the server that
provides a given content type receives more requests than expected, based on a
pre-defined range. Chu et al. [63] proposed a method that analyzes the frequency
of traffic. If a threshold is exceeded, then the controller considers that a DDoS
attack is happening and it starts dropping packets. Finally, as we mentioned earlier,
Braga et al. [58] proposed a method that gathers traffic information and uses self
organizing maps to classify the traffic as normal or malicious.
Liu et al. [64] proposed an SDN architecture where nodes with different levels
of security clearance can exchange communication. The OpenFlow controller sets
up the rules so that traffic is authorized only when the requester has a higher
security clearance than the receiver.
Yao et al. proposed VAVE [59], an OpenFlow-based architecture designed to
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validate the address of all incoming packets. When the switch receives a packet
that does not match any rule, the packet is sent to the controller and the source
address is validated. If spoofing is detected, then a rule is created to stop that
traffic.
Jafarian et al. [65] propose a moving target defense (MTD) technique using
OpenFlow. The proposed defense assigns virtual IP addresses to hosts and the
controller maps virtual addresses to physical addresses. This is performed once
and again, in an unpredictable way such that the attacker cannot identify which
host is behind each IP address.
Finally, traffic isolation has been studied by Gutz et al. [66]. The authors argue
that current traffic isolation techniques such as VLANs increase the complexity of
the network configuration. They propose creating network slices at a higher level.
Under their approach, a network programming language should be able to create
this slices to isolate traffic. This way, slices are defined at a high level and then
forwarding rules are automatically added to the switches.
When it comes to security, we notice how the researchers heavily rely on the
ability of processing data in the controller. In all these publications, some kind
of intelligence is added to the switch through the controller. For example, Braga
et al. [58] use self organizing maps, which could not be implemented on regular
switches. Also, Yao et al. [59] exploit the idea that, since a given packet must
be analyzed by the controller, then a more rigorous address validation can be
performed. Once again, in the study by Gutz et al. [66], we note how more
capability is given to a higher layer. In this case, it is about isolating network traffic
using a programming language. This is a common trend in SDN: how to allow a
user to perform network tasks without needing full access to the network topology.
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Table 2.7: Comparison of network virtualization applications using OpenFlow.
Publication Problem ap-
proached
Description of the
solution
Implementation
Simeonidou et al.
[81]
Packet and circuit
network integration
An OpenFlow con-
troller is integrated
with a GMPLS con-
troller
No implementation
provided
Das et al. [82] Packet and circuit
network integration
An OpenFlow con-
troller is integrated
with a GMPLS con-
troller
Prototype network
using NetFPGA
switches that
emulates a WAN
Das et al. [83] Packet and circuit
network integration
An OpenFlow con-
troller is integrated
with a GMPLS con-
troller
Fully functional
hardware based
network. Used as a
proof of concept for
a demonstration.
Das et al. [84] Application aware
aggregation and
traffic engineering
in a circuit-packet
network
The capabilities of
SDN are exploited
in a circuit-packet
network to provide
application aware
routing.
Hardware based
network used to
emulate a WAN
Das et al. [85] Complexity of
IP/MPLS control
plane
The MPLS data
plane is controlled
by OpenFlow
instead of the tra-
ditional IP/MPLS
control plane.
Open vSwitch and
Mininet are used to
emulate a WAN
Ferkouss et al. [86] Flexibility of MPLS
nodes
An OpenFlow con-
troller is used to
dynamically modify
MPLS nodes
Hardware imple-
mentation that
exploits the pipelin-
ing of OpenFlow
1.1.0.
Kempf et al. [87] Supporting MPLS
forwarding in
OpenFlow 1.0.0
Additional match
fields are added to
the flow entry for-
mat and MPLS ac-
tions are added to
the OpenFlow 1.0
specification
NetFPGA-
OpenFlow switches
Sharafat et al. [88] MPLS implementa-
tion complexity
The centralized con-
trol capability is ex-
ploited to imple-
ment MPLS-TE and
MPLS-VPN in a
simpler way than
the traditional ap-
proach
Physical and
virtual switches
supporting the
MPLS section of
OpenFlow 1.1 and
simulation using
Mininet
2.4.4 Availability
OpenFlow-based applications have focused on providing availability to the net-
work as well, including load balancing and fault tolerance. Load balancing is
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a commonly used technique to distribute a working load between two or more
nodes. This improves the availability of a network since the system can support
one or several single failures. Fault tolerance refers to the property of a system to
continue operating when a failure occurs.
Load balancing: Handigol et al. proposed Plug-n-Serve [61], a load balancer
for unstructured networks that attempts to reduce the response time by taking into
consideration the load of the servers and the congestion of the network. The pro-
posed method displays the load of the network in real time. The software running
on the controller takes the load of the network and servers into consideration and
decides where to direct the traffic. Using this solution, it is also possible to add
new servers to the cluster and the software will dynamically detect them and add
them to the load balancing. An improved version of Plug-n-Serve, Aster*x was also
proposed in [89]. Aster*x runs on the Global Environment for Network Innovations
(GENI) infrastructure and it is used at a much larger scale than Plug-n-Serve.
Wang et al. [90] argue that Plug-n-Serve works by reactively creating forwarding
rules for incoming requests. They proposed a proactive approach, based on wild
cards. They divide the entire client address space into different rules. These
rules forward the traffic to specific servers. The controller knows what percentage
of traffic should be handled by each server and it creates the rules so that the
expected loads are respected. We can see that the approach by Wang proactively
creates the rules to make sure that each server handles the required percentage of
connections. This requires a smaller number of rules than the approach used by
Plug-n-Serve, which improves its scalability. On the other hand, Plug-n-Serve takes
into consideration the load of the server and the network and does not require
a specific percentage of traffic for each server and it is more flexible, since each
client can be handled individually.
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Fault tolerance: Sharma et al. [91] and Staessens et al. [60] have explored fault
tolerance using OpenFlow. In [91], the authors describe how failure recovery can
be implemented using OpenFlow. They explain how the controller can dynamically
change the routing rules when a failure is detected in a link. In [60], experiments
are designed to analyze if an OpenFlow based network can recover from a link
failure. The authors argue that carrier grade networks must be able to recover in
less than 50 ms. The experiments show that restoration is successful but that the
dependency on the centralized controller makes the goal of 50 ms challenging to
achieve.
Another way of ensuring availability is to verify that there are no configuration
errors that might cause a disruption. Khurshid et al. [92] propose VeriFlow to
check network invariants in real time. This includes loops in the routing tables,
unavailable paths and other problems that can be identified before deploying the
network. Moreover, the authors are interested in doing this in real time. VeriFlow
sits between the controller and the switch and monitors the communication be-
tween these two parts. By modelling the network as a graph, network invariants
are checked in the order of hundreds of microseconds.
Porras et al. [93] propose a policy enforcement mechanism that is also based
in analyzing the forwarding rules that are added to or deleted from the flow
table. The author introduce FortNOX and they aim at performing role based
authentication and security constraint enforcement. The application checks for
conflicting rules after every update of the flow table. When two rules incur in a
contradiction, then the rule defined by the user with the highest security clearance
is kept.
These studies have some common trends. First, the capability of dynamically
updating forwarding rules is heavily exploited. Load balancing is performed
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based on the ability of the controller to alter the forwarding rules. The fact that
the controller is network-aware is also helpful. In the studies by Sharma [91]
and by Staessens [60], finding new paths after a failure occurred is easily done
in a centralized manner, since the topology is known. Traditionally, this kind of
recovery is done by decisions taken by switches that are not network-aware and a
centralized method simplifies this task.
Network virtualization using MPLS and GMPLS: Network virtualization is an-
other research area where OpenFlow has been applied. Circuit and packet switched
networks are typically managed using separate infrastructure and this is costly.
Several authors have proposed OpenFlow-based architectures that could be used
to manage both packet and optical circuit networks using the same infrastruc-
ture [81, 82, 83, 84, 94]. Azodolmolky et al. [94] provide a good explanation on
how OpenFlow and GMPLS can be used together as an integrated control plane.
This approach relies on the fact that packet and optical circuit networks can be
managed as different flows in the switch’s flow table. In order to manage both
flows, a GMPLS controller is integrated to the standard OpenFlow controller. The
OpenFlow controller is responsible for managing the flow table. However, when a
flow corresponds to traffic over an optical circuit, then the GMPLS controller takes
care of the routing decisions and a flow entry containing the forwarding action
and the required wavelength is added to the flow table. This way, switches can
handle two kind of flows, one for circuit networks and one for packet networks.
MPLS and GMPLS have also been used in other applications. Kempf et al.
[87] add an extension to OpenFlow 1.0 that allows a switch to forward MPLS
on the data plane. Das et al. [85] proposed using MPLS in the data plane but
OpenFlow in the control plane instead of the traditional IP/MPLS control plane.
El Ferkouss et al. [86] argue that OpenFlow can be used to “deossify” an MPLS
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architecture. They show how an MPLS node can play multiple roles for different
MPLS domains, which provides greater flexibility to the nodes. Sharafat et al.
[88] implement MPLS-TE and MPLS-VPN using an OpenFlow controller to show
that centralized control makes the implementation easier. Table 2.7 compares the
different applications that use OpenFlow to virtualize networks using MPLS and
GMPLS. Centralized control, dynamic rules updating and flow abstraction are the
most commonly exploited capabilities for these applications.
The studies that we have mentioned exploit the circuit switching capability
of GMPLS and not the VLAN-switching capability. In summary, the research
direction regarding GMPLS and OpenFlow is to simplify the creation of end-
to-end circuits. Das et al. [95] discuss why GMPLS has not been as successful
as expected in the control plane and how combining it with software defined
networking is a more suitable approach.
Data center virtualization: Similar to network virtualization, virtualizing data
centers using OpenFlow has also been an active research area. SDN architectures
have been considered to meet the requirements of a data center: efficiency, agility,
scalability and simplicity [96]. Al-Fares et al. [97] proposed Hedera, a dynamic
flow scheduling method for data center networks. They proposed an OpenFlow-
based architecture that can dynamically modify the flows according to the traffic
load. The authors argue that this approach achieves a larger network utilization.
Rotsos et al. [98] also use OpenFlow to dynamically virtualize the network. They
argue that VLANs and MPLS can be used to create virtual networks in a static way.
However, the network utilization can be optimised if the network virtualization is
performed according to the traffic load.
Wide area network applications: A majority of studies have deployed their
experiments in local area networks. However, some studies address the possibility
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of deploying OpenFlow in a wide area network (WAN). First, in [85] the authors
show that OpenFlow could be deployed in a WAN by emulating this kind of
network. Studies such as [82, 84] show that OpenFlow could be used to control
this type of network.
Bennesby et al. [99] propose an inter-domain routing solution using an Open-
Flow architecture running on a NOX controller. The authors explain how the
different autonomous systems (or domains) interact with each other through the
Internet. They propose a routing scheme based on OpenFlow that would allow
autonomous systems to communicate with each other.
Wireless applications: OpenRoads [100] was designed to enable research in
mobile networks. It can be considered as the wireless version of OpenFlow. In
this architecture, a flow visor [51] (as introduced in Section III) controls network
devices through the SNMP protocol. Several controllers can be deployed on top
of the flow visor. Details of the OpenRoads architecture are available in [101]. A
deployment of OpenRoads in the campus of Stanford University is described in
[102]. Other works using OpenRoads include [103, 104].
There are also other wireless applications that do not use OpenRoads. Huang
et al. [105] proposed PhoneNet, an infrastructure which supports group commu-
nication among phones. A group of users can interact using their phones after a
multicast address is created so that it can be accessed by all the members in the
group.
Bansal et al. [106] propose OpenRadio, a design for a programmable wireless
network data plane to automatize how devices’ software is updated. They argue
that software updates have become more frequent (there used to be a release every
few years and now updates are available monthly). OpenRadio aims to providing
an infrastructure to update base stations of wireless systems via software. Without
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this approach, devices must be collected so that the software can be manually
updated. This frequent hardware collection is expensive and network software
updates are more adequate. As an example, they describe that in an urban
area, there could be one device per block to provide adequate coverage. In this
scenario, collecting the sensors every time an update must be installed would be
prohibitively expensive. OpenRadio enables updating the devices without having
to physically collect them.
Regarding wireless enterprise local area networks (WLAN), Suresh et al. [107]
propose Odin, a prototype SDN architecture that simplifies client management in
a WLAN. The network is given programmability and light virtual access points
are introduced. These access points are managed from an OpenFlow controller.
Other applications: OpenFlow has also been used in other areas not listed
above, such as routing and network congestion control. Liu et al. [108] proposed a
method to control congestion using queuing systems and a centrally controlled
network. Yap et al. [109] also consider network congestion, as well as bandwidth
reservation and multicast. Nascimento et al. [110] proposed QuaqFlow, a Quagga
implementation using OpenFlow. Quagga is a routing package that provides
implementation of TCP/IP routing protocols. RouteFlow [111], an architecture
that provides routing as a service, was proposed as an extended work of Quagga.
Rothenberg et al. [112] proposed an OpenFlow-based approach that allows the
introduction of advanced routing systems. This study was built by extending the
earlier RouteFlow [111]. Egilmez et al. [113] proposed an architecture to provide
routing for video streaming.
In the next section, we focus on larger-scale deployments rather than the
applications themselves.
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2.5 OpenFlow deployments
Deployments of OpenFlow-based networks mainly include campus networks and
testbeds, as well as deployments undertaken by the industry.
Stanford University has deployed an OpenFlow-based network in one of its
buildings. The network includes production, experimental and demonstration
traffic. It connects approximately fifty switches and around 25 users, both wired
and wireless. Details of the topology can be found at [114]. Other universities have
also deployed OpenFlow-based networks. The full list is available at [18] and it
includes Clemson University [115], Georgia Tech [116], Indiana University [117],
Kansas State University [118], Rutgers University [119], University of Washington
[120], University of Wisconsin [121] and Princeton University [18].
At a larger scale, the Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI)
[122] provides a research infrastructure where OpenFlow experiments can be
conducted. The OpenFlow core of this network consists of several interconnected
OpenFlow-compliant switches on both Internet2 [123] and National LambdaRail
(NLR) [124] networks. The connection to the NLR network is achieved through
HP6600 switches deployed at Sunnyvale, Seattle, Denver, Chicago, and Atlanta
and through NetFPGA switches in Sunnyvale, Houston, Chicago, and New York
[125]. Internet2 has OpenFlow-compliant switches installed in Los Angeles, New
York, Washington DC, Atlanta [126]. Campus networks can connect to the GENI
deployment to run larger scale experiments.
As of October 2012, Internet2 provides a nationwide 100G software defined
network [127]. The network is currently operational for member institutions
of Internet2. The deployment includes routers of the Brocade MLX family and
related Brocade NetIron platforms, as well as Juniper Networks MX Series routers
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Figure 2.5: Draft of the planned U.S. UCAN network using the Internet2 100G
deployment. (Source: [2]).
[128]. It also provides a 100G Ethernet network and a 8.8 Terabit per seconds
optical network. Internet2 will operate the U.S UCAN (United States Unified
Community Anchor Network) program [2]. Their goal is to use this software
defined network to provide a platform to interconnect research, educational and
health care institutions. Figure 2.5 shows a draft of the expected deployment.
Figure 2.6: Topology of the ANI OpenFlow testbed.
The Energy Science Network (ESnet) [129] is funded by the Department of
Energy (DOE) and operated at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. ESnet
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has also deployed an OpenFlow testbed, originally funded by the Advanced
Networking Initiative (ANI) [130]. ANI was an investment in next-generation
technology infrastructure to speed of scientific discovery. ESnet operates two
testbeds: the Long Island Metropolitan Area Network (LIMAN) and the 100G. The
LIMAN is a 10G testbed. It includes four NEC IP8800 OpenFlow switches [131].
The OpenFlow network operates on the VLAN 101. There are two ways of running
an experiment on the testbed. One option is to connect the controller directly to
the OpenFlow switches through the management VLAN. The second option is to
connect to the flow visor controller and getting a partition of the network to run
the experiments. The first option requires the researches to reserve the testbed
beforehand. The second option does not require any reservation of resources. The
flow visor configuration file has to be sent to the administrator to get connected.
The 100G testbed runs between the DOE Supercomputer centers in Argonne
National Lab (Chicago) and NERSC (California) through a 100G dedicated network
[132]. To deploy experiments using the 100G testbed, researchers must follow a
proposal process that includes writing a 1-2 page proposal and demonstrating
that the experiment is working in a small environment [133]. Figure 2.6 shows the
topology of the ANI OpenFlow testbed.
Figure 2.7: Topology of the ORBIT OpenFlow testbed.
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Another smaller deployment is the Open Access Research Testbed for Next-
Generation Wireless Networks (ORBIT) testbed [4], which is being developed and
operated by WINLAB, Rutgers University. It is intended to be used to test and
evaluate innovative protocols in real-world settings and it includes an OpenFlow-
based network. The deployment consists of an OpenFlow-compliant switch Pronto
3290 connected to nine nodes. Out of the 9 nodes, 7 of them are connected to one
NetFPGA each. Each of the NetFPGA is connected to the Pronto 3290 OpenFlow
switch through four 3GbE connections. All of the 9 nodes are connected to the
Pronto 3290 OpenFlow switch and they are connected to a control plane through
which the nodes can be accessed through telnet/ssh sessions by the experimenter.
Figure 2.7 shows the topology of the ORBIT OpenFlow testbed.
Similar testbeds have been deployed in Europe and Japan as well. Ofelia
is a project funded by the European Union that provides an OpenFlow-based
network with nodes in Belgium, Switzerland, UK, Spain, Germany, Italy and Brazil
[134]. Also, the Dynamic Network System (DYNES) project [135], funded by the
National Science Foundation (NSF), is exploring technologies such as OpenFlow to
interconnect campus, regional and backbone networks. Other future deployments
also include the Network Development and Deployment Initiative (NDDI) and the
Open Science, Scholarship and Services Exchange (OS3E) [135].
OpenFlow has also been deployed by several companies, as seen in the keynote
lectures of the 2012 Open Networking Summit [136]. As an example, Google has
deployed OpenFlow in the inter-datacenter backbone network that carries all the
traffic between the different datacenters [10]. Currently, this network is completely
OpenFlow based. According to the speaker, adopting OpenFlow has been the most
significant change in networking in the company [137].
By surveying OpenFlow-based applications and deployments, we have iden-
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tified some challenges faced by OpenFlow-based networks. We discuss these
challenges next.
2.6 Performance of OpenFlow-based networks
We have surveyed different OpenFlow-based applications and deployments. Next
we mention several studies that have designed experiments to evaluate the per-
formance of OpenFlow architectures. We also discuss publications that propose
alternatives to improve the performance of OpenFlow networks.
2.6.1 Measuring and modelling the performance of OpenFlow-based networks
Jarschel et al. [138] model an OpenFlow controller as a M/M/1 queuing system.
This model allows obtaining results regarding the total sojourn time of a packet
through the system. The model also captures the difference in terms of delay
between a packet that is processed by the switch and a packet that must go to
the controller. Also, the probability of dropping a packet because the controller
is under high load is studied. The results show that the sojourn time depends
largely on processing speed of the OpenFlow controller. Also, the authors are able
to conclude that the processing time of the controller lies between 220 and 245
µs. Another interesting result shows that current controllers cannot handle a big
number of flows in 10Gbps links.
Bianco et al. [139] compare the performance of OpenFlow switching, link
layer Ethernet switching and network layer IP routing. Experiments include using
packets of different sizes and comparing the results of single flows against multiple
flows. In all the experiments, OpenFlow achieves good results in comparison to
link layer Ethernet switching and network layer IP routing.
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Levin et al. [140] address the following question: “How does distributed
SDN state impact the performance of a logically centralized control application?”
[140]. The authors argue that the SDN network control plane cannot be fully
physically centralized because responsiveness, reliability and scalability issues
arise. One possible solution is to have a distributed control plane where a logically
centralized control plane operates. This design faces consistency challenges and
the authors study how much inconsistencies in the global network view affect
the performance of the network. The authors compare two applications: one
is ignorant to possible inconsistencies and the other takes inconsistency into
consideration when operating. This study concludes that optimality is significantly
affected when inconsistencies are not considered and that the robustness of an
application is increased when it is aware of the network state distribution.
Heller et al. [141] address two important questions regarding reliability, scala-
bility and performance. First, they analyze how many controllers are needed in
a network. Second, they discuss where in the topology should these controllers
go. The authors introduce these questions as an important part of the controller
placement problem. Regarding the number of controllers needed, the authors
analyze the latency of different topologies and they observe that one controller is
often enough to keep the latency at a reasonable rate. They also explain that, in
general, adding k controllers reduces the latency by a factor of k. However, they
also show examples where this is not the case and more controllers are required.
Regarding the placement of controllers, they show how this decision can also affect
the latency of the network. They also show that randomly selecting the location of
the controller yields results that are far from optimal.
Finally, the performance of OpenFlow has also been evaluated in the optical
networks domain. Liu et al. [142] evaluate the performance of an OpenFlow-
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based wavelength path control in transparent optical networks. They study two
different approaches for lightpath setup (sequential and delayed) and two ways
of lightpath release (active and passive). The experimental setup includes four
OF-PXCs connected in a mesh topology, with one OpenFlow switch and one client
node attached to each OF-PXC. A photonic cross-connect (PXC) devices switches
optical signals in an all-optical device. The results show that a path between two
clients (thus traversing two switches) can be provisioned faster using the sequential
approach. Also, releasing a path can be done faster if the active approach.
2.6.2 Improving the performance of OpenFlow-based networks
Several authors have also proposed modifications to OpenFlow or alternative ways
of using it to increase the scalability, reliability or performance of the network.
Yeganeh et al. [143] propose Kandoo, a framework that aims at reducing the
number of events that are received at the control plane of the network. To do
this, two layers of controllers are used. The upper layer maintains the network-
wide state. The bottom layer consists of several controllers that do not know the
network-wide state and that are not interconnected. The bottom layer handles
most of the events and reduces the overhead at the upper layer. This framework
also increases the scalability of an OpenFlow network.
At least two studies have proposed additional ways to take profit of a CPU
being connected to the switch. Mogul et al. [144] propose software defined
counters. Recall that an OpenFlow switch collects statistic data for each flow. The
authors explain that this data is stored in the switch using application specific
integrated circuits (ASIC). The propose keeping and processing information in a
CPU, where more variable and flexible statistics could be processed. The study
does not include implementation or simulation results, but the feasibility of
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software defined counters is analyzed theoretically.
Lu et al. [145] also propose combining ASIC and CPU processing. The authors
point out two limitations of current switches: a limited size forwarding table
and a limited size packet buffer. They argue that a their approach relaxes these
limitations by using a CPU. A prototype is developed and a 3.9Gb/s software
forwarding throughput is achieved. Also, large TCP traffic bursts are absorbed
without packet losses. The experimental setup consists of sending 50k bidirectional
TCP flows among four servers.
Vanbever et al. [146] propose HotSwap, a system that enables correct and
efficient upgrades of SDN controllers. The goal of HotSwap is to be able to change
from one controller to another (when upgrading the controller is needed) without
disrupting the network. They argue that stopping the old controller and starting
the new one introduces delays and can also create errors in the network. HotSwap
records relevant messages between the switches and the controller and bootstraps
the new controller by replicating previous network events. By the time the new
controller starts operating, the network state is the same as when the previous
controller was operating.
2.7 Challenges of OpenFlow-based networks
OpenFlow deployments face several challenges that must be taken into consider-
ation, including security [147], availability [60], scalability [148], reliability [149],
expenditure [150] and compatibility [151].
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2.7.1 Security
One principal challenge of an OpenFlow-based network is the dependence on the
controller. The controller becomes a component with a critical knowledge of the
network and a very attractive target for an attacker. Security measures must be
considered to ensure the availability of the controller. At the same time, since
this component has access to all the network, it must be strongly protected from
intruders.
The channel between the controller and the switches can also be vulnerable.
According to the OpenFlow specification, Transport Layer Security (TLS) can be
used to secure the communication. However, this feature is not a requirement and
it is also acceptable to communicate the controller and the switches using plain
text traffic. TLS can then provide security to the channel, but its usage depends on
the design of the network since it is not required.
The flow table is a component that could also present security risks, although
there are no published vulnerabilities yet. It is possible to manage a flow table
from two different controllers, where one of them is a production hardware and
the other one is just experimental. Since the latter one will be subject to lower
security controls, it is important to make sure that the consistency of the flow table
remains and that a malicious update coming from one controller will not tamper
other flow entries. Currently, the flow visor takes care of those considerations but
since OpenFlow is a recent protocol, this needs to be kept in mind.
A centralized software-based controller can also have security advantages. In a
distributed network, many vulnerabilities must be addressed in different protocols
and different devices. Having a software controller outside of the data plane
can simplify how security is enforced, as there is plenty of expertise on securing
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servers through hardening instead of securing network devices.
2.7.2 Availability
The dependence on the controller is also a challenge regarding availability. An
OpenFlow-compliant switch is capable of forwarding packets using cached rules.
However, the communication with the controller is eventually needed for any
kind of modification of the rules. One advantage of a traditional, distributed
network architecture is that if a switch fails, the availability of the network can be
maintained. In an OpenFlow network, the communication with the controller must
be ensured. As we mentioned in the previous subsection, the controller becomes a
single point of failure.
How to handle the delay needed to create new flows is also a challenge. When
an OpenFlow switch receives a packet that does not match any rule in the flow
table, then the first 200 bytes of the packet are sent to the controller. After this, the
controller can install a new forwarding rule. Therefore, the delay to process the
first packet is larger. If this delay is too large, then the availability requirements of
a network might not be met.
2.7.3 Scalability
The controller can also become a bottleneck. If too many packets must be forwarded
to the controller, then performance issues can occur. A well designed network
should ensure that the most part of the traffic can be handled by the switches
without needing to forward data to the controller. It is also important to assess
whether the controller will become a bottleneck when the number of nodes grows.
As we discussed in Section VII, authors have addressed this challenge while
evaluating the performance of OpenFlow. In particular, Heller et al. show how a
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single controller is usually enough to keep an acceptable latency. They also show
that introducing k controllers reduces the latency by k [141].
OpenFlow-based architectures also face two important scalability challenges: a
limited flow table size and hardware constraints. First, the number of flows that
can be contained in the flow table is limited. It is still a challenge to handle a
very large number of flows using an OpenFlow-compliant switch. Manipulating
packets at the control plane is slow as well. Therefore, end-to-end traffic control is
hard to implement if many different flows must be manipulated. Second, there
are hardware limitations on the speed at which flows can be added. For these two
reasons, it is still unclear if OpenFlow deployments can be used to control the core
of a network. Currently, OpenFlow is being used at the edge of a network instead.
2.7.4 Survivability
The dependency on the controller also creates reliability issues. One example can
be found in [60]. In this OpenFlow-based network, a link failure is reported to the
controller and a new path is found. According to the results, the network recovers
successfully but not quickly enough. The authors explain that the expected
recovery time is not met because of the time lost contacting the controller. A
common requirement by carriers is to achieve a network recovery in less than 50
seconds. In the study by [60], this goal is not met.
On the other hand, a centralized control also has advantages regarding network
recovery. In a distributed network, recovering from a broken path can be a slow
process. However, an OpenFlow controller is network-aware and it can find the
new path faster.
A multipath proposal for OpenFlow addresses how to recover faster from
failures. This proposal includes a fast reroute support, where backup flows can be
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installed in advance. If the switch detects that a specific port has lost connectivity,
then the backup flow is installed. This is a proactive way of dealing with link
failures and it has the advantage that the controller does not need to be contacted
immediately after the failure.
2.7.5 CAPEX and OPEX
It has been debated whether OpenFlow can reduce the capital and operational
expenses (CAPEX and OPEX) of an organization.
OpenFlow adopters argue that by moving the complexity to the software-
based controller, network devices become simpler and therefore, cheaper. This
would reduce the CAPEX. However, OpenFlow also has limitations and advanced
hardware is still required to operate a network. It does not seem likely that
network switches and routers will become simple commodities in the short term.
Also, ensuring the availability of the control plane can increase the CAPEX. It is
important that the controller remains reachable even in case of a failure in the data
plane. Achieving this could increase the costs of a deployment.
A similar trade-off occurs for OPEX. We have discussed several studies that
simplify the network configuration and management. Certainly, OpenFlow can
be used to reduce the number of human based configuration tasks that are time
consuming and error prone. This reduces the OPEX. On the other hand, mov-
ing the complexity of the network to the software control plane requires work.
Project administrators, software developers, testers, debuggers and other costs are
examples of expenses that must be incurred in an OpenFlow-based deployment.
Therefore, it is not clear either whether OpenFlow greatly reduces the OPEX.
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2.7.6 Compatibility
Another important challenge for OpenFlow deployments is that the network oper-
ating systems support specific versions of the OpenFlow specification. Currently,
most of them support OpenFlow 1.0.0. Even though OpenFlow 1.1.0 has been
available for several months, the network operating systems do not support specific
features of the newer version. The challenge is then to upgrade both the OpenFlow
specification and the software of each network operating system.
This compatibility issue also applies to the network devices, whose software
must be updated to meet the requirements of new OpenFlow specifications. For
instance, in the HP ProCurve switches series, modifying the packet header fields
(for example: IPv4 destination address) in the switch hardware is not supported.
But, it is possible to do the same in the switch software which is a slower path for
processing. Therefore, it is likely that switch vendors would fine tune their hard-
ware to support additional features in the switch hardware to improve efficiency.
This updating process must be taken in consideration when new versions become
available.
User developed applications face compatibility issues as well. We have shown
how there are significant differences between specifications 1.0.0 and 1.1.0. Another
example is that version 0.8.9 became deprecated when version 1.0.0 was available.
Therefore, it is important to consider if applications running under version 1.0.0
will still work on version 1.1.0 or if all affected developments must also be updated.
This scenario could occur again in further releases.
Finally, we believe that compatibility among controllers should also be taken
into consideration. Currently, multiple network devices perform switching and
routing in a standardized way. However, if the devices are controlled by software-
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based controllers, then standardization should be achieved too. Controllers from
different domains should use the same protocols to ensure that the communication
is possible between hosts in different domains.
Next we conclude this chapter by discussing the future research directions in
OpenFlow-based networks.
2.8 Conclusions and future directions
SDN is a promising technology for enabling advanced functionality in pro-
grammable networks. Our survey paper [7] is, in our opinion, the first one to dis-
cuss the capabilities, application, deployments and challenges of SDN/OpenFlow-
based networks. We also explained and compared the OpenFlow specifications.
Below, we identify future research directions in OpenFlow-based networks.
First of all, applications have been developed in areas such as security, ease
of configuration, availability, network and data center virtualization, wireless
applications and others. Currently, a majority of the surveyed applications consist
of small, simple networks with some OpenFlow switches and hosts. Only a
small number of studies demonstrate their work in a WAN. In [85], the authors
emulated an OpenFlow-enabled WAN, but this is an exception to the majority
of studies. Whether OpenFlow can be used in WAN deployments or not is still
an open question. Studies show that OpenFlow could be used to control a WAN
([82, 84, 74]). However, scalability and performance experiments have not been
conducted yet.
Second, we observe that OpenFlow switches have been used as a multi-layer
network device. This technology was first proposed to control Ethernet switches.
However, OpenFlow has also been used in routing ([90, 98, 109, 110]), IP address
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validation ([59]) and MPLS control ([81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88]). This shows
that OpenFlow can be used at multiple layers. Future directions include tighter
integration of OpenFlow features with routers and MPLS switches to reduce their
complexity and cost.
Third, we find an open problem in the design of OpenFlow architectures. So
far, mostly all applications and deployments use only one controller to manage
all the switches. Distributed architectures with more than one controller could
be used to address some of the challenges such as availability or reliability [141].
In fact, a vast majority of networks contain duplication as a means to ensure
the availability of the system. We believe that the possibility of communicating
controllers in the OpenFlow 1.2 specification ([34]) is an opportunity to deploy
this kind of architecture. Coordinating tasks across multiple controllers and using
them during normal and failover conditions are tasks for future investigations.
Fourth, we believe that most studies do not involve real hardware but use
virtualization tools such as Mininet [46] and Open vSwitch [45]. Also, the number
of hosts is small in most of the applications. Scenarios such as Ethane [52], where
validation includes real hardware and up to 300 hosts are not very common. Real-
istic hardware simulations would also yield better results regarding the advantages
and disadvantages of using OpenFlow in real networks. Using testbeds such as
those described in this chapter is a good way to strengthen the validation of new
applications.
Finally, it is important to mention that data center virtualization is one of the
active areas that has received a lot of attention in the industry. The deployment
of OpenFlow by Google [136] in one of their backbone networks and active par-
ticipation of the Open Networking Foundation are good examples of the interest
of industry in OpenFlow. Integrating OpenFlow into such large scale real-world
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applications is an important future direction.
In conclusion, SDN is one of the transformational technologies to affect the
networking vendor community in the last decade and exhibits tremendous scope
for future research and deployment. Since the publication of our survey paper [7],
other surveys on SDN have also appeared [152, 153, 154].
In the next Chapter, we show how SDN and OpenFlow can be used to simplify
campus networks management by proposing OpenSec, a framework that enables
policy-based management at campus scale.
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Chapter 3
Campus scale: Policy-based security management using OpenSec
3.1 Introduction
With the advent of SDN, efforts to automate and simplify network operation
have become popular [155, 52, 156]. In SDN, the complexity of the network
shifts towards the controller and brings simplicity and abstraction to the network
operator. As we move away from manual configuration at each device, we get
closer to automated implementation of network policies and rules. SDN decouples
the control plane from the data plane and migrates the former to a logically
centralized software-based network controller. More complex network-control
applications can thus be implemented at the controller and exploit the fact that
they are network-aware due to the centralized nature of the control plane.
In this chapter we show how SDN can be used to implement policy-based
security in small networks such as local area networks (LAN) or campus networks.
To this end, we propose OpenSec, an OpenFlow-based network security framework
that allows campus operators to implement security policies across the network.
To motivate this work, suppose a campus operator needs to mirror incoming
web traffic to an intrusion detection system (IDS) and e-mail traffic to a spyware
detection device. Our goal is to leverage SDN to allow the operator to write a high-
level policy to achieve this, instead of having to manually configure each device.
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Furthermore, suppose the IDS detects malicious traffic and the sender needs to be
blocked from accessing the network. Instead of having the operator configure the
edge router to manually disable access to the source, we are interested in blocking
the sender automatically.
Because OpenSec provides an abstraction of the network, the operators can
focus on specifying simple and human-readable security policies, instead of on
configuring all the devices to achieve the desired security. OpenSec consists of a
software layer running on top of the network controller, as well as multiple external
devices that perform security services (such as firewall, intrusion detection system
(IDS), encryption, spam detection, deep packet inspection (DPI) and others) and
report the results to the controller. The main goal of OpenSec is to allow network
operators to describe security policies for specific flows. The policies include a
description of the flow, a list of security services that apply to the flow and how to
react in case malicious content is found. The reaction can be to alert only, or to
quarantine traffic or even block all packets from a specific source.
We have built OpenSec taking three design requirements into consideration.
First, policies should be human-readable. Simplicity is one of the main goals of our
framework and although current work has focused on creating human-readable
policies [76, 156, 157], we argue that there is still room for improvement to make the
policy languages human readable. Second, data plane traffic should be processed
by the processing units (network devices, middleboxes or any other hardware that
provides security services to the network). When the controller is responsible for
all tasks it becomes a bottleneck and the solution does not scale well. In OpenSec,
the controller is subject to a low workload and is responsible for implementing
policies and modifying forwarding rules based on the security alerts received
from the processing units. Third, the framework should react to security alerts
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automatically to reduce human intervention when suspicious traffic is detected.
To demonstrate the benefits of using OpenSec, we show two use cases. First,
we demonstrate how OpenSec can be used in a campus network to implement
network control for residential housing. To do this, we meet the requirements of
network usage established by the Carnegie Mellon University campus. Second,
we show how OpenSec can be used in a campus network to deploy a Science
demilitarized zone (DMZ) to enable higher throughput for scientific data transfers.
Our evaluation shows that OpenSec scales well because the delay in reacting
to alerts remains constant when the traffic rate increases. We also show the
benefits of moving the middleboxes away from the data path in terms of achieved
throughput. Finally, we compare OpenSec with existing solutions such as Procera
[76], CloudWatcher [157] and Fresco [158] and show that the performance of the
proposed framework is equal or better than similar works.
Our contributions in this chapter are as follows:
1. We create a simple, human-readable language to automatically implement
network security policies.
2. We give a first step towards automated, policy-based reaction to security
alerts using OpenFlow.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section II survey related
work and in Section III we motivate our work. Next, in Section IV we describe
the OpenSec framework and its main components. After that, we describe the
operation of OpenSec in Sections V and VI. In sections VII and VIII we describe
the two use cases. In Section IX we evaluate the framework in terms of scalability
and performance and we compare OpenSec against similar work in Section X.
Finally, we conclude in Section XI.
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3.2 Related work
3.2.1 Policy-based management without SDN
A significant amount of work has focused on policy specification [159], policy
refinement [160, 161, 162, 163], conflict detection [164, 165] and policy analysis [166]
in networks. Policy-based management (PBM) has also been applied to network
management [167] and security [168].
Agrawal et al. [166] provide an overview of how policy-based management
can be applied to networked systems. In particular, they explain how Policy
Management for Autonomic Computing (PMAC) can be applied to network
management. In a nutshell, PMAC is a generic policy middleware that supports
extensive and flexible policy languages. Also, a Policy Definition Tool (PDT) should
be provided to allow users to create and modify policies. Finally, an automated
manager is responsible for collecting policies and implementing them.
Rubio-Loyola et al. [163] propose a a method to refine policies in policy-based
management systems. Policy refinement allows to derive low-level enforceable
policies from high-level guidelines. The authors provide a list of steps needed
to convert high-level goals into low-level policies and describe a framework that
supports all the required steps.
Charalambides et al. [164] address conflict resolution in PBM, a crucial aspect
when managing a system using policies. Indeed, as the authors point out, when
several policies coexist it is likely to encounter that two or more policies give a
different output for the same input. This study addresses the problem of conflict
resolution when using policies to provide Quality of Service (QoS).
OpenSec is similar to these methods in that it proposes a centralized system
capable of receiving policies as input and analyzing them, checking for conflicts
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and implementing them. In this work, however, we provide a detailed explanation
of how policies can be converted into OpenFlow messages to update the forwarding
rules dynamically. Also, the policies used in OpenSec are low-level specifications
because they already include a list of OpenFlow matching fields that should be
used. Thus, the main contribution of OpenSec is the automated administration of
processing units and dynamic reaction to security alerts using SDN, as opposed to
deriving low-level policies from high-level goals.
3.2.2 Policy-based network management using SDN
With the advent of SDN, the field of network management has evolved to become
more dynamic [169, 170, 171]. Casado et al. proposed Ethane [52]. In Ethane,
an operator creates a policy using the Flow-based Security Language (FSL) to
create a high-level access control list. Ethane allows an operator to write an access
control policy with good granularity while still using high-level language (for
example, using “testing nodes” instead of a subnet mask). Although OpenSec
does not focus on referring to network objects by name, we do provide a broader
set of security services besides access control. Also, OpenSec includes a reactive
component to security alerts. When anomalous traffic is detected, OpenSec can
modify traffic rules as specified by the policy, which adds a reactive component
missing in Ethane.
Foster et al. propose Frenetic [40], a programming language to program
OpenFlow-based networks. Frenetic provides an interface to query traffic infor-
mation. Frenetic can also be used to create a policy to react to network events. In
our opinion, Frenetic focuses on simplifying how to program network events and
how to retrieve traffic information. OpenSec focuses on hiding such complexity
and allowing a security operator to work at a higher level, since it was designed to
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implement and enforce security policies, rather than to provide another mechanism
to handle events sent by the network switches.
Finally, Bari et al. [172] proposed PolicyCop, an autonomic QoS policy en-
forcement framework for SDN. This framework allows to specify service level
agreements (SLAs) to implement and enforce QoS in an OpenFlow-based network.
The step-by-step method used by PolicyCop to convert policies into flow rules is
similar to that of OpenSec. However, our focus is on reacting to network security
alerts instead of QoS violations.
3.2.3 Candidate frameworks for comparison against OpenSec
Among the proposed frameworks that convert policies to OpenFlow messages,
three are candidates for comparison against OpenSec: CloudWatcher [157], Fresco [158]
and Procera [76]. We describe these frameworks next and we compare them against
OpenSec in Section 3.10.
Shin et al. proposed CloudWatcher [157], a security monitoring framework
for the cloud that has several similarities with our work. Using CloudWatcher, a
network operator can use a policy to describe a flow and describe which security
services must be applied to it. For example, if traffic within a subnet must be
subject to denial of service attack detection and intrusion detection, then a policy
can be used to describe this. The authors focus on how the controller can find the
optimal route to send the traffic to those processing units and the policy language
is not described in detail. OpenSec goes one step further by allowing the operator
to describe how to react in case malicious traffic is detected. Our focus is more
on how to implement the policies instead of optimal routing decisions to find the
processing units.
Fresco [158] is another OpenFlow-based security framework that exposes se-
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curity modules to external users, who can in turn define security policies using
such modules. To use Fresco, an operator must define the type, input, the output,
the parameter, the action and the event. Fresco is also similar to Procera and
Frenetic in the sense that it allows manipulating network events and handling
them through pre-defined modules.
Voelli et al. proposed Procera [76], a “functional reactive programming” frame-
work where a user can write a high-level policy to define how to handle network
events. Just like Frenetic, Procera also aims to simplifying how to deal with net-
work events. They have in common that they both seek a simpler interface to
program the network and to react to network events. Also, Procera addresses
an important topic: enforcing network policies. Our approach to enforce the
implementation of security policies is based on the technique proposed in Procera.
One thing that OpenSec does that is not considered in Procera and Frenetic is auto-
mated reaction to security alerts raised by external units. In OpenSec, the network
operator defines a security level and the framework automatically modifies flow
rules when malicious traffic is detected. In Frenetic and Procera, all reaction is
defined by the code written by the operator. In a nutshell, Frenetic and Procera
allow for a more granular control of the flow setup whereas OpenSec hides such
events from the operator and reacts automatically.
Although other studies have addressed policy-based network administration
using OpenFlow, as well as providing security through SDN, OpenSec’s innovative
approach allows operators to customize the security of the network using human-
readable policies and to customize how the controller reacts automatically when
malicious traffic is detected.
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3.3 Motivation
The main goal of OpenSec is to be a human-friendly, dynamic and automated
security framework. Next we describe three design requirements of our framework:
moving middleboxes away from the main datapath, reacting automatically to
security events and creating a simple policy specification language.
3.3.1 Moving middleboxes away from the main datapath
Sekar et al. show that, in a given enterprise, there are almost as many network
appliances as there are routers [173]. Moreover, they point out how middleboxes
do not favour network innovation, as they are closed system with no room for
experimentation. Indeed, middleboxes are harder to update, upgrade or replace
when compared to standard Ethernet switches.
The first goal of OpenSec is to move the middleboxes away from the choke
points of the topology traversed by all traffic. Instead, these devices should be
located outside of the main path between the LAN and the Internet and should
act as security processing units that are visited only by the traffic that needs
to be processed. Using a smarter OpenFlow-based control plane, the OpenSec
should dynamically create rules to re-route traffic. This is important in terms of
performance and reliability, since a L2 switch is easier to maintain, upgrade or
replace in comparison to specialized hardware. When a specific flow is subject to
deep packet inspection, for example, then the controller adds a rule that forces
such traffic to visit the DPI processing unit.
To allow OpenSec to scale better, the processing units are responsible for ana-
lyzing the traffic and detecting malicious flows. Sampling traffic at the controller
increases the chances of introducing a bottleneck and increases the complexity.
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Also, the connectivity between switches and controller is usually of low bandwidth.
In contrast, the data plane allows a faster bit rate and the processing units are
optimized to handle big flows. In OpenSec, the controller remains listening to
alerts and reacts to those alerts by deciding how to modify the traffic rules.
3.3.2 Reacting automatically to security events
The second goal of OpenSec is to enable automated reaction to security events.
When a middlebox detects suspicious traffic, it issues a security alert. Traditionally,
these alerts are received by a network operator who then decides how to react.
With OpenSec we aim at automating this reaction so that the framework either
blocks the traffic, or simply alerts the operator of the detected malicious traffic.
The reason why this is feasible is because, in general, an operator can plan ahead
of time how critical a flow is based on the service provided through that flow. In
a production network, for example, an operator would want a denial of service
attack to be stopped as soon as possible. In contrast, a testing environment could
be less critical. Thus, we designed OpenSec to allow the operator to specify ahead
of time what the automated reaction should be, so that in case of malicious traffic,
the human participation is minimized.
3.3.3 Creating a simple policy specification language
The third goal of OpenSec is to provide a simple policy specification language to
allow operators to redirect traffic to the middleboxes and to enable automated
reaction. Among all related work, Procera (see Section 3.2.3) is probably the one
that has focused most on designing human-readable policy definition. However,
we argue that understanding a definition written in Procera is not straightforward.
For example, the following instructions define a rule that allows all traffic:
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Procera: proc world→ do; returnA: λ req→ allow
This statement still contains symbols that make it complicated to read. Instead, we
aim at statements such as:
OpenSec: Flow: VLAN=192; Service: DPI; React: alert.
This OpenSec sample policy is described in Section 3.4.1. However, note that
three components can easily be identified: the matching pattern, the security units
that must be visited by this flow and the type of automated reaction.
Procera relies on reactive programming and its goal is different from OpenSec.
In Procera, the goal is to program the network using policies and this includes
handling events generated by the switches. In contrast, OpenSec does not com-
municate the network events to the end-user. Instead, they are automatically
processed. This allows us to use a much simpler syntax to describe the flow,
identify one or more services and specify how to react when malicious traffic is
detected. Policies can be defined using the keywords shown in Table 3.1.
3.4 OpenSec components
OpenSec is an SDN framework capable of forwarding flows to security process-
ing units based on policies and to automatically react to events raised by these
middleboxes. Using this framework, security devices such as intrusion detection
middleboxes, firewalls or encryption units can be removed from the main data
path between the LAN and the Internet. OpenSec leverages a smart control plane
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to allow end-users to direct only part of the traffic to these security units.
Figure 3.1: The OpenSec framework: Security functions are provided by the
processing units; traffic is routed to each processing unit based on requirements
given through security policies; the reaction to security alerts is automated.
In this section we describe the main components of the framework: a policy
specification language, a northbound interface, a policy manager, a set of pro-
cessing units, a security evento processor, an OpenFlow controller and a data
repository. Then, in sections 3.5 and 3.6 we explain how these components interact
with each other to implement the policies and to react to security alerts issued by
the processing units.
3.4.1 Policy specification language
OpenSec’s policy specification language allows to specify a matching pattern, a
list of security units that should be traversed by such traffic and an automated
reaction in case of receiving a notification from a unit (see Table 3.1). The matching
fields correspond to those available in OpenFlow 1.0. The service corresponds to
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any service ID registered by the processing units manager. Finally, the alert can be
to alert only (via email), to block or to re-route traffic to a quarantine device.
Table 3.1: Syntax to create policies using OpenSec.
Value Description
Flow inPort, VLAN,
etherSrc, etherDst,
ipSrc, ipDst,
TCP-SrcPrt,
TCP-DstPrt
Uses OpenFlow
match fields to
describe a flow
Service Encrypt, IDS, DPI,
spam, DDoS or any
other service
registered
Identifies a security
service that should be
applied to the flow
React alert, quarantine,
block
Determines how to
react if the service
reports malicious
content
To illustrate how this language is used, we explain the example given in Section
3.3.3:
Flow: VLAN=192; Service: DPI; React: alert.
The policy above specifies that all traffic tagged with VLAN 192 should be re-
routed to the DPI unit. Also, if the DPI middlebox informs of a suspicious sender,
OpenSec must only alert the operator via e-mail. Several match fields and several
units can be listed when specifying the policy.
3.4.2 Northbound interface
The current prototype of OpenSec includes a graphical user interface shown in
Fig. 3.2. The list on the left shows all policies currently implemented and the
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buttons on the left allow for adding or removing a policy. On the right side,
the detailed policy is shown on top and the sources that have been blocked
automatically using that policy are shown below. Finally, the operator can unblock
a source. A similar GUI is provided to the user to show the information of each
registered processing unit, similar to the data shown on table 3.2.
OpenSec should allow external applications to implement network security
policies automatically. As a consequence, there is a need for a northbound Appli-
cation Programming Interface (API) between OpenSec and the applications. The
development of such an API is part of our future work.
Figure 3.2: OpenSec’s graphic user interface. This interface allows the network
operator to add, remove and view policies. It can also be used to re-authorize
blocked sources.
3.4.3 Policy manager
The policy manager is a core component of OpenSec. It is responsible for parsing
new policies sent by the GUI and converting them to OpenSec objects. Next, it
must implement the policy using the southbound interface component (controller).
Finally it must also check periodically that the policy is implemented appropriately.
The operation of the policy manager is explained in detail in Section 3.5.
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3.4.4 Processing units
OpenSec relies on external processing units (or middleboxes) to analyze traffic.
The units are customized to perform the required security scan, such as a firewall,
an IPS or DPI. When suspicious traffic is detected, the processing unit issues an
alert to the OpenSec controller so that actions can be undertaken based on existing
policies. For this to work, all units must be known to the OpenSec controller.
OpenSec implements a processing units manager that collects all the registra-
tions and creates a list of units and the location in the network where they can be
found. In our current implementation, each unit is mapped to a service id (DPI,
IPS), a switchID, an input port and an output port (see 3.2). This is all the data
needed by OpenSec to manipulate the flow table of the devices in order to re-route
traffic to the processing units.
Note that, if a processing unit is vendor-specific and this automatic registration
cannot be implemented, a network operator can easily complete the information
in the controller manually. In our current implementation, both automatic and
manual registrations are supported.
Table 3.2: Registered security processing units for Fig. 3.1.
Service type Switch ID In-interface Out-interface
DPI 1 25 26
DDoS 2 48 49
Encrypt 3 25 26
3.4.5 Security event processor
One of the most important features of OpenSec is the automatic reaction to security
alerts. Usually, a network operator will react to an alert by either ignoring it or
blocking the source of the suspicious traffic. In OpenSec, the network operator can
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define such a reaction in advance using three possible choices: alert, quarantine or
block. The security event processor is responsible for collecting the notifications
issued by the processing units and modifying forwarding rules according to the
policies involved. This component is explained in detail in Section 3.6.
3.4.6 OpenFlow controller
OpenSec uses OpenFlow to interface with the switches. To do so, a module running
in the Floodlight controller [39] implements the required interfaces to listen to
network events and communicate with switches. When a request is received from
the policy implementer to push a new rule, this module is responsible for sending
the message to the right switches. A more detailed explanation of how an OpenSec
policy is converted to a list of OpenFlow messages is provided in Section 3.5.
Although the controller of OpenSec is centralized, multiple controllers can
work together to increase the availability of the control plane. In the current
implementation we rely on a single software to do this. However, it has been
proposed to have multiple controllers working in a synchronized way [174, 175,
176, 177]. We do not address the implementation of a distributed control plane in
this dissertation.
3.4.7 Data repository
OpenSec uses a data repository to store several pieces of information. First, all
implemented policies are stored to check for conflicts when new policies are
received, and also to know how to react to security events raised by the processing
units. Similarly, all the information needed to route traffic to the middleboxes
(device id, switch id, input port and output port) is also stored. Finally, OpenSec
also records when hosts are blocked from accessing the network.
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In the next section we describe how these components interact with each other
to implement security policies.
3.5 Operation of OpenSec: policy implementation
In this section we describe how the policy manager of OpenSec converts a new
policy created through the GUI into forwarding rules in the switches. Figure 3.3
provides an overview of the entire process.
Figure 3.3: Steps needed to implement a policy.
3.5.1 Policy parsing
The policy parser receives the policy definition file from the northbound interface
(GUI) component (as described in Section 3.4.2). Next, it converts it into a Policy
object that can be processed by OpenSec to update flow rules in the switches. First,
the parser builds a Flow object and sets the attributes based on the values given by
the policies. A Flow object is a simple structure where we store the VLAN, MAC
source and destination, IP source and destination and TCP port. Next, the parser
76
queries the processing units manager (described below) to retrieve the switch id
associated to the processing units specified in the policy, as well as the port needed
to send data to those units. This is added as a collection to the Policy object.
Finally, a flag is used to indicate whether the reaction in case of a security event is
to alert, quarantine or block. Algorithm 1 shows how policy definitions are parsed.
Note that we intentionally keep the policy parser OpenFlow-independent. The
fields used to describe a flow are standard and the Policy object can be used by
any other SDN protocol to update the forwarding tables of switches.
Data: new file path path
//Parse new policy from file Policy policy = new Policy( )
lines = readFile(path)
for each line f in lines do
if line starts with ‘Flow’ then
//Create a match based on fields match = createMatch(line);
end
if line starts with ‘Service’ then
//save codes of units (DPI, DoS, ...) servicesCollection = getServices(line);
end
if line starts with ‘React’ then
//Remember expected reaction
reaction = getReaction(line);
end
policy.setMatch(match);
policy.setUnits(units);
policy.setReaction(reaction);
policy.setVlan(getNextVLAN( ) );
end
Algorithm 1: Parsing a file into a policy object.
3.5.2 Policy checking
The policy checker receives a Policy object from the parser and verifies that it
does not conflict with existing ones. Checking for conflicting rules is particularly
challenging in deployments with multiple controllers sharing network control
through a slicing technique such as FlowVisor [51]. In such scenario, the checker
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should verify that controllers do not use unauthorized resources and do not
override rules pushed by other controllers.
In the context of OpenSec, all rules are pushed by the controller and this
simplifies the task. Our policy checker verifies that the Flow attributes of each
Policy object do not conflict with each other. For example, two identical Flow
objects cannot be part of different policies, since this will become ambiguous when
the rules are pushed to the switches.
The policy checker becomes increasingly important as the north API of OpenSec
becomes more sophisticated. We plan to allow for multiple security applications to
automatically add new policies and the policy checker needs to verify that those
applications do not interfere with each other. However, we do not address this
issue in the current work.
3.5.3 Policy implementation
Once a policy has been parsed and checked for conflicts, the policy implementer
can convert all objects into OpenFlow-compliant rules. The policy implementer is
the only component in OpenSec that is currently tied to the OpenFlow protocol.
It converts the Flow objects created by the policy parser into the specific instance
needed by the OpenFlow controllers (described below) to push new flow rules into
the switches. Note that several rules can be created simultaneously if the policy
specifies multiple security units. Rules will be pushed into the switches attached
to those devices.
When a new rule is pushed to a switch using OpenFlow, the message issued
by the controller must include an input port, a match and a set of actions. Note
that at least one rule will be inserted for each processing unit listed in the policy.
Therefore, for each unit OpenSec first finds the input port where traffic is expected.
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This is available in the data repository where all existing forwarding rules are
inserted (see Table 3.2). We assume that a rule already existed to carry the traffic
either in our out of the local network and, as a consequence, we expect that
OpenSec will find a rule that matches the pattern given in the policy. Once the
input port has been found, the match is created based on the policy matching
information. Finally, the action is computed as follows. First, an output port must
be added so that traffic reaches the middlebox. Second, a VLAN tag must be added
to uniquely map this traffic to a policy. Indeed, when a processing unit informs the
controller that malicious traffic has been detected, the VLAN id and the source IP
address are provided in the notification. These two fields uniquely map a source
to a policy, allowing OpenSec to react to traffic coming from the identified source
as specified by the policy. This is explained in more detail in Section 3.6. All
the steps described are shown in Algorithm 2. As a result, FlowMod OpenFlow
messages are issued for each middlebox to match on the input port and the policy
matching fields and to mirror traffic to the units through the port retrieved from
the database.
3.5.4 Policy enforcement
One important step of policy-based management is policy enforcement. This
step consists of periodically checking that policies are effectively implemented.
To do so, the controller issues packet in messages that match the fields of each
implemented policy. Next, the controller verifies that the issued packets were
routed appropriately. One possible way to check this is to craft packets that will
actually trigger alerts. Another one is to have the units notifying the controller that
a test message has been received. We are currently working on this component
and therefore do not provide evaluation results yet.
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Data: Policy policy
//Implement policy in network
servicesCollection = policy.getServicesCollection( );
for each service u in unitsCollection do
//For each service code, find the unit
Unit unit = unitManager.getUnit(service);
//Get DPID, inPort and match to create a flow rule
dpid = unit.getDPID( );
inPort = unit.getInPort( );
match = policy.getMatch( );
//Get input port from existing rule
inputPort = database.findInputPort(match);
//Get next available VLAN tag
vlanTag = database.getNextTagAvailable();
//Update existing rule
writeFlowMod(match on: inputPort and match, actions: add vlan tag, output to
port inPort );
end
Algorithm 2: Implementing a policy.
3.5.5 Step-by-step example
To summarize this section, we provide a step-by-step example of how an operator
can implement a policy using OpenSec. Suppose that we implement the following
policy using the sample network in Fig. 3.1:
Flow: VLAN=192; Service: DPI; React: block.
This policy ensures that traffic tagged with VLAN 192 is mirrored to the DPI
unit. Also, any source sending malicious traffic should be blocked.
To implement the policy:
1. A network admin should write the policy using the GUI shown in Fig. 3.2.
2. OpenSec parses the policy and locates the switch where the DPI unit is
connected, as well as the interface (switch 1, port 25 as shown in Table 3.2).
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3. OpenSec assumes that one or more rules already exist so that traffic from
VLAN 192 can go through the network.
4. OpenSec finds the rule in switch 1 that matches packets tagged with VLAN
192 to get the appropriate input port.
5. OpenSec also finds the next VLAN tag available to identify traffic from this
policy, assume it’s VLAN 20.
6. OpenSec modifies the rule so that traffic is forwarded as specified by the
original rule, but also forwarded to port 25. Additionally, the VLAN tag 20
is also added.
Once a policy has been implemented, traffic is routed to the processing units
and security alerts might be issued by the middleboxes. Next we describe how
OpenSec reacts to these alerts.
3.6 Operation of OpenSec: reaction to security events
One key feature of OpenSec is the ability to automatically react to security alerts
without involving the network administrator. In this section we describe with
more detail how this process is achieved. The overall process is shown in Fig. 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Steps needed to react to a security event.
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3.6.1 Configuration of processing units
OpenSec relies on the processing units to perform security scans on incoming
traffic. In the current implementation, each middlebox must be configured by the
network operator to do a specific task. However, enabling automated configuration
by OpenSec is a possible future work direction. To be compatible with OpenSec, a
processing unit must be capable of sending a message to the controller indicating
that a tuplet {VLAN, IP source} is behaving suspiciously. As we described in
Section 3.5.3, OpenSec tags traffic with a VLAN to uniquely map it to a given
policy. Therefore, by sending the VLAN tag and the IP source, the processing unit
identifies the sender but also indicates OpenSec which policy caused this flow to
be routed to the unit.
3.6.2 Reaction to security event
OpenSec listens to notifications from processing units using application layer
sockets. When a new message arrives, a new threat handles it. First, the process
reads the VLAN tag and the IP source of the suspicious node. Next, the process
queries the data repository to get the policy mapped to the received VLAN tag.
Finally, the process retrieves the type of reaction specified in the policy. As a result,
OpenSec now knows if the source must be blocked or sent to quarantine. If the
specified reaction is ‘alert,’ forwarding rules are not modified and the network
administrator is notified by e-mail. Otherwise, we describe next how to modify
the forwarding rules.
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3.6.3 Creation of new OpenFlow rules
The creation of new rules depends on the reaction type. To quarantine traffic, a
processing unit logging all traffic is attached to one of the switches on a given port.
By default, a rule exists on all switches to forward to the quarantine unit all traffic
tagged with a specific VLAN tag. Therefore, to react to such attack, OpenSec must
simply insert a rule at the edge switch that will tag all incoming traffic from the
suspicious source with the VLAN tag associated to the quarantine unit. Similarly,
if the policy indicates that traffic should be dropped, then OpenSec inserts a rule
at the edge switch to do so.
3.6.4 Step-by-step example
Consider once again the example started in Section 3.5.5 that forwards traffic to a
DPI unit and blocks suspicious sources. Now we describe the steps followed when
an alert is sent by the DPI unit to OpenSec.
1. The DPI processing unit is configured by the administrator to perform some
security scan.
2. The processing unit detects malicious traffic coming from source 174.145.23.3
and sends a notification to the controller: {20, 174.145.23.3} (20 is the VLAN
used in the example started in Section 3.5.5, the IP source is only an example).
3. OpenSec retrieves from the data repository the policy mapped to VLAN tag
20 and the reaction specified by the policy (block).
4. OpenSec issues a flowmod message to the edge switch asking to block all
traffic coming from source 174.145.23.3.
83
Next we describe two use cases that demonstrate the advantages of OpenSec.
First, we show how the framework can be used to enforce network access require-
ments in a campus network in Section 3.7. After that, we show how it can be used
to deploy a scientific demilitarized zone (Science DMZ) in Section 3.8.
3.7 Use case 1: traffic analysis for campus networks
The first use case we consider is a residence hall network where both outgoing and
incoming traffic must be monitored. We describe through emulation the OpenSec
policies implemented and the benefits obtained. First we look at controlling
outgoing traffic and later we focus on incoming messages.
Figure 3.5: Campus topology for housing Internet traffic.
3.7.1 Controlling outgoing traffic using OpenSec
Consider the residence hall network control requirements of the Carnegie Mellon
University (CMU) campus [178]. The campus policy establishes acceptable prac-
tices for residence hall and dedicated remote access network connections. One
of the requirements is that mail bombing, ping flooding, smurf attacks and SYN
flooding are forbidden. Mail bombing consists of sending huge volumes of email
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to a specific address to overload the mailbox or the mail server. Ping flooding is a
denial of service attack achieved by sending a large amount of ICMP echo requests.
A smurf attack consists of contacting multiple nodes using a forged IP source
address. When the nodes reply, the attacked node is overloaded with messages.
We deployed in GENI [122, 179] a topology as shown in Fig. 3.5 to demonstrate
how OpenSec can be used to enforce the requirements of CMU. All OpenFlow
switches are implemented using virtual machines running Open vSwitch.
The experimental setup of the first scenario is based on traffic collected at the
University of Twente in the Netherlands [180]. A 300 Mbit/s (a trunk of 3 x 100
Mbit/s) Ethernet link has been measured, which connects a residential network
of a university to the core network of this university. On the residential network,
about 2000 students are connected, each having a 100 Mbit/s Ethernet access link.
The residential network itself consists of 100 and 300 Mbit/s links to the various
switches, depending on the aggregation level. The measured link has an average
load of about 60%. Measurements were made in July 2002. This trace ensures that
OpenSec is receiving a realistic traffic load corresponding to an actual campus
residential network. In total, there are 24 GB of data with 14M flows.
We also developed two security units: one for intrusion detection and one for
deep packet inspection. The IDS unit runs Bro [181], an open source network
analysis framework capable of intrusion detection. The DPI unit is built on top of
nDPI [182], an open source DPI tool. nDPI supports all major networking protocols
at any layer, such as IPv4, IPv6, UDP, TCP, HTTP, DNS, SSH, SMTP, Flash and
many others. The IDS unit is configured to detect ping flooding and SYN flooding
attacks by sending an alert when a given source sends more than 25 ICMP echo
requests per second. Similarly, if a node sends multiple TCP handshake requests
and then drops the connection, an alert is also raised. Finally, malicious traffic is
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generated using nmap [183] and scapy [184].
We use OpenSec to ensure that outgoing traffic tagged with label 15 goes
through the implemented security units. To do so, we deploy the following policy:
Flow: VLAN=15, Service: DPI, IDS, React: block.
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Figure 3.6: Automated blocking of sources 192.168.1.2 and 192.168.1.3 after detect-
ing a SYN flood and a Smurf attack. Source 192.168.1.1 remains unblocked.
The focus of the experiment was to demonstrate how OpenSec can detect
traffic that does not adhere to the policy and block a source. We created traffic at
three different nodes inside the residential network. The first sender (IP address
192.168.1.1) generates normal traffic by copying a file from a server on the Internet
side network. However, the second sender (IP address 192.168.1.2) launches a
ping flood attack and a third one (IP address 192.168.1.3) sends a smurf attack by
manually crafting packets using the scapy tool.
Figure 3.6 shows the traffic reaching the Internet coming from the three senders.
First, The traffic from sender 192.168.1.1 remains constant and never gets blocked.
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Second, the traffic from sender 192.168.1.2 starts constant but then increases
significantly (this corresponds to the time when the ping flood is started). As
soon as this happens, the IDS unit notifies OpenSec that the sender 192.168.1.2 is
sending malicious traffic. The unit also sends the VLAN tag to uniquely identify
this policy. When this happens, OpenSec retrieves the policy using the VLAN tag,
finds the expected automated reaction and blocks the sender. The same happens
when sender 192.168.1.3 starts sending spoofed IP source addresses, as the DPI
unit informs OpenSec and the sender is automatically blocked. As a result, no
more traffic is allowed from senders 2 and 3.
3.7.2 Protecting the residential network from outsider attacks
Next we look at traffic coming from the Internet into the network. To do so, we use
another dataset available at the University of Twente that collected traffic directed
to a honeypot to evaluate OpenSec at a higher scale [185]. The honeypot was
connected to the Internet and ran network services such as SSH, FTP, HTTP and
so on. By design, only suspicious traffic was forwarded to that node. The traffic
trace was also labeled and organized in a database of flows, alerts and alert types.
As a consequence, it is very convenient for experimentation because each flow has
been labeled with one attack type, such as SSH scan, SSH connection, FTP scan,
FTP connection or HTTP connection. Table 3.3 shows a detailed classification of
the dataset.
Table 3.3: Type of traffic in the dataset
Traffic type Number of IP
sources
Number of flows
SSH conn 103,104 13,939,813
FTP conn 5 12
Entire dataset 107,988 14,170,132
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The experimental setup using the GENI testbed for this scenario is as follows.
We replayed the honeypot traffic dataset from a node in the Internet to replicate
all the messages. To detect suspicious ssh connections, we configured Bro to alert
when a single source attempts more than six connections every five seconds or less.
This decision is based on the traffic received by the honeypot where a majority
of ssh connections were attempted every five seconds in average. Moreover, we
created a policy that mirrors to Bro all incoming traffic destined to port 22.
First we evaluate the detection accuracy of simply alerting when a source
attempts connections every five seconds for at least six times. Since OpenSec will
only issue an alert for one out of six connections, we expect a number close to the
sixth part the total number of flows. However, a close observation of the start and
end times of each connection yields that, out of 1000 connections, an average of 20
will go unnoticed by OpenSec because there is a pause of more than five seconds
between two or more alerts.
Second, we modify the policy to block traffic instead of only issuing an alert.
Table 3.4 shows the number of flows that reach the destination instead of been
blocked, as well as the number of sources blocked. Note that 95.5% of flows are
stopped before reaching the destination and 99% of attacking nodes are blocked
from the network.
Table 3.4: Results of implementing the blocking policy
Total flows Flows
reaching
destination
Total IP
sources
Sources
blocked
13,939,813 628,624 103,104 102,085
In the next Section we describe another campus network scenario and we
describe how to use OpenSec for scientific networking purposes.
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3.8 Use case 2: Deploying a Science DMZ
In this section, we describe how Science demilitarized zone (DMZ) [186] can be
deployed in a campus network using OpenSec.
Figure 3.7: Science DMZ in a campus network.
3.8.1 Science DMZ
Science networks carry high-speed data transfer flows that need high bandwidth
and are very susceptible to packet loss. Therefore, the goal of a Science DMZ is to
rout traffic through a path with customized controls that ensure an acceptable level
of security while guaranteeing a high-speed loss-free channel. Unlike the Science
DMZ, the traditional DMZ must protect the network against multiple threats.
Figure 3.7 shows how a border router splits traffic into two paths as soon as
data reach the campus network. Inside the Science DMZ, there is an end-host
customized to receive high-rate data. The Science DMZ also contains a perfSONAR
node [187] for performance measurement purposes. Note that packets do not
traverse these monitoring devices; instead, traffic is simply mirrored so that there
is no performance loss.
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Table 3.5: Syntax to create policies using OpenSec and Procera.
OpenSec Flow: EtherPort =
1
Service: perf-
SONAR, IDS
React: alert
/* Security controls
for the Science
DMZ */
Flow: EtherPort =
1
Service: Firewall
React: alert
/* Firewall for all
traffic going to the
LAN */
Flow: TCP-dp = 25
Service: Spyware
React: block
/* Spyware detection
of incoming mail */
Procera proc world→ do
returnA:
λ req → if Ether-
Port=1 and secu-
rity event already
exists
alert
else
allow  redirect
10.10.1.1  redirect
10.10.1.2
proc world→ do
returnA:
λ req → if Ether-
Port=1 and secu-
rity event already
exists
alert
else
allow  redirect
10.10.1.3
proc world→ do
returnA:
λ req → if TCP-
dp=25 and secu-
rity event already
exists
deny
else
allow  redirect
10.10.1.4
3.8.2 Deployment of a Science DMZ using OpenSec
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Figure 3.8: Number of bytes received by end-hosts in the Science DMZ and the
LAN. The host in the science DMZ receives more traffic because the path between
end-points is faster. For the host in the LAN, security devices such as the firewall
decrease the performance and the traffic rate is lower.
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Figure 3.9: Number of bytes received by the firewall and the spyware detection
units. The amount of traffic that visits the spyware detection unit is lower because
only traffic with destination port TCP 25 is routed through this unit.
We created the network shown in Fig. 3.7 in GENI. The testing devices (email
senders, data transfer nodes and webserver users) are deployed in the GENI
aggregate located at the University of Illinois. The campus network is deployed in
the University of Utah InstaGENI aggregate. In this experiment, the aggregates
are “stitched” together through a layer-two tunnel. This connectivity is provided
by the GENI testbed.
We also scale up the experiment using a scaling technique provided by GENI
so that there are 50 nodes deployed in the Illinois aggregate. Out of 50 nodes, 10
send scientific data at a high rate, 25 send requests to the web server located in the
LAN and 15 send email traffic.
The first row of Table 3.5 shows the policies used to realize the required
security behavior. On the Science DMZ side, all traffic is mirrored to the IDS and
the perfSONAR units. On the LAN side, all traffic is sent to the firewall and then
forwarded to the LAN once it has been inspected by the firewall. Also, incoming
mail is forwarded to the spyware detection unit.
Note that three simple policies have saved the user from manually adding
multiple rules to individual switches. This is a clear advantage of leveraging SDN
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to abstract the complexity of the network and show a simple abstraction to the end
user.
In terms of network performance, we run two additional experiments. First,
we send high-rate flows to a host in the Science DMZ and we do the same with
a host in the LAN. Figure 3.8 shows the result of comparing these two transfers.
In both cases we use the secure copy (scp) tool to transfer a large file and we
measure the number of bytes per second received at each host. We observe that
the end-host in the Science DMZ receives a constant number of bytes per second,
whereas the rate of traffic sent to the host in the LAN decreases. The reason for
this decrease is that the path through the campus network is much slower than
the one traversing the Science DMZ and packet loss occurs at the firewall and the
spyware detection units. Thus, the TCP implementation of the sender assumes
that this is due to congestion and lowers the transmission rate. For this reason,
after the initial decrease the throughput becomes stable.
Second, we measure the amount of traffic that traverses the firewall and we
compare it with the amount of data routed to the spyware detection unit. Table
3.5 shows the OpenSec policies in this experiment. Note that the third policy
ensures that only TCP-25 traffic goes to the spyware unit. As a result, Fig. 3.9
shows the difference between the traffic going to the security units. By filtering
mail traffic, we significantly reduce the load of the spyware unit. The second row
of Table 3.5 also shows how the equivalent functionality would be achieved in
Procera. Notice how the syntax is closer to a programming language rather than
a simple list of match fields and security services. While Procera provides other
functionalities, OpenSec’s syntax is sufficient to provide adequate routing of traffic
to the appropriate middleboxes.
The two use cases described show how OpenSec simplifies policy implementa-
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Figure 3.10: Time elapsed between the detection of malicious traffic and the
blocking of the source. Independently of the traffic rate, the time needed by
OpenSec to detect malicious traffic and block the sender remains constant.
tion in a campus network. Next, we focus on the performance of the framework
by studying its scalability and gain in throughput.
3.9 Performance evaluation
In this section we evaluate the scalability of OpenSec and we measure the through-
put gain of not having to traverse middleboxes.
3.9.1 Scalability
OpenSec scales well because only the processing units (instead of the controller)
deal with the increasing amount of traffic. In the DPI example, the processing
unit is capable of inspecting traffic at high bit rates, but the load at the controller
remains minimum. As shown in Fig. 3.10, the delay needed to block malicious
traffic remains constant independently of the number of packets per second. This
delay remains constant because it does not depend on the number of attacks
detected or the packet arrival rate. For every alert, the controller simply finds
the matching policy and modifies the forwarding rules as required. Also, if the
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capabilities of the processing units must be improved, this task is independent of
OpenSec and can be performed without modifying the controller. This framework
is easier to deploy in comparison to when a middlebox is located in the main data
path.
3.9.2 Gain in throughput
Next we show the advantage of removing middleboxes from the main data path
in terms of throughput. There are two factors that impact throughput based on
our experiments: increased latency and packet loss. To show the impact of latency
on the throughput, we first measured how the round-trip delay increases as the
traffic traverses more units placed on the datapath (see Fig. 4.7). The impact of
this increase on the throughput can be observed in Fig. 3.12. In both figures,
we show how the latency and the throughput remain constant when OpenSec is
used to mirror traffic to the units instead of traversing all the middleboxes for
in-line processing. Although this impact is considerable, the packet loss caused
by in-line processing is even more significant. To illustrate this, suppose that a
supercomputing facility wants the IDS to analyze all incoming traffic. However,
security middleboxes such as firewalls and IDS units are not yet capable of dealing
with big data flows without dropping packets. Dart et al. [186] show the TCP
throughput can be reduced by a factor of 9 if a router is losing a very small
percentage of traffic. To verify this, we simulated a DPI unit that is traversed by all
traffic and then sends all data back to the main data path. To evaluate the benefit
of using OpenSec, we compared the throughput achieved using an in-line IDS
with the throughput achieved using OpenSec. We experimented with different
percentages of packet drops and Fig. 3.13 shows how this solution heavily impacts
the TCP throughput between the server and the client. By duplicating the traffic,
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Figure 3.11: Increase in round-trip latency as more middleboxes are traversed by
the traffic.
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Figure 3.12: Decrease in throughput as more middleboxes are traversed by the
traffic. This experiment only considers the decrease due tu an increased latency.
The throughput can be reduced further based on packet loss as shown in Fig. 3.13
OpenSec increases the amount of traffic, but also allows the data to traverse the
network at a faster rate.
3.10 Comparison with existing solutions
In this section we compare OpenSec against CloudWatcher [157], Fresco [158] and
Procera [76], the three similar solutions described in Section 3.2.3.
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Figure 3.13: TCP throughput achieved using OpenSec and in-line DPI using a
10Mbps link. The packet loss caused by in-line DPI reduces the throughput
significantly, whereas it remains constant when using OpenSec because the traffic
is only mirrored to the DPI and the packet loss is smaller.
3.10.1 Procera
The main advantage of OpenSec with respect to Procera is simplicity. We showed in
Table 3.5 how OpenSec’s syntax is simpler than Procera’s to deploy a Science DMZ.
Also, the fact that OpenSec does not expose switch events to the end-user simplifies
the network administration. We do not provide a quantitative comparison because
no comparable numerical results are provided in Voelli et al. [76].
3.10.2 CloudWatcher
Next, we compared the time needed by OpenSec to translate policies into OpenFlow
messages with the results achieved by CloudWatcher. The results, shown in
Table 3.6, do not include the time needed to send the message from the controller
to the switch, but only the time needed to translate a policy into a set of OpenFlow
messages. Table 3.6 shows the results when there are one, two or three processing
units involved in the policy. Because CloudWatcher evaluates multiple algorithms,
a range of time is given. In all cases, OpenSec achieves a faster time because we
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do not consider routing in our proposed solution. However, we do note that times
for both solutions are similar.
Table 3.6: Time needed to create OpenFlow rules in OpenSec and CloudWatcher
for a single policy
One unit Two units Three units
OpenSec 0.07 ms 0.07 ms 0.07 ms
CloudWatcher 0.1-1.1 ms 0.1-1.15 ms 0.1-1.2 ms
3.10.3 Fresco
Table 3.7 compares the time needed to implement the network rules using only
one controller, Fresco or OpenSec. The results show that OpenSec needs less time
to parse the policy and push rules into the switches.
Table 3.7: Time needed to create and push OpenFlow rules in OpenSec and Fresco
for a single policy
NOX/Floodlight Scan detection
Fresco 0.823 ms (using
NOX)
2.461 ms
OpenSec 0.45 ms (using
Floodlight)
0.46 ms
One limitation common to OpenSec and Fresco is that a certain delay exists
between the detection time and the moment when traffic is actually blocked. Due
to the fact that the delay remains constant, the number of packets that bypass the
quarantine unit grows linearly. This behavior is shown in Fig. 3.14. The policy
deployed for this prototype works well to detect attacks that are carried over
multiple packets, such as a denial of service attacks. In such scenarios, reacting to
the attack after a small number of packets have reached the server is acceptable
because the number of packets that go through is too small to effectively launch an
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Figure 3.14: Number of packets that go through after detection of malicious traffic.
As the traffic rate increases, the number of packets that go through while the
blocking is being implemented grows linearly.
attack. However, if the requirement is to detect smaller attacks that are carried over
a small number of packets (SQL injection, for example), then in-line processing is
needed.
OpenSec can also achieve real-time blocking using a a different policy that
sends all traffic to the unit and then receives all traffic back and forwards it. This
allows the processing unit to drop packets. However, we showed in this chapter
how having an in-line processing unit can significantly reduce the throughput of
a flow. Therefore, a trade-off exists between achieving higher performance and
having a faster response time to block suspicious packets.
Finally, one advantage of OpenSec in comparison to other solutions is that the
policy language is simpler. Solutions such as Procera rely on existing languages that
are fairly complex to read and look more like programming languages. OpenSec
provides the simplest way to establish OpenFlow matching fields, a list of security
units and a reaction, in comparison to other solutions.
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3.11 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented OpenSec, an OpenFlow-based framework that allows
network operators to describe security policies using human-readable language
and to implement them across the network. OpenSec acts as a virtual layer
between the user and the complexity of the OpenFlow controller and automatically
converts security policies into a set of rules that are pushed into network devices.
OpenSec also allows network operators to specify how to automatically react when
malicious traffic is detected. OpenSec allows for automated reaction to security
alerts based on pre-defined network policies. By doing so, it contributes to hiding
the complexity of the network to security operators, who only need to focus on
defining the policies.
Our evaluation shows several advantages of OpenSec. First, moving the anal-
ysis of traffic away from the controller and into the processing units makes our
framework more scalable. Even when the load is high, the controller is not a
bottleneck. Second, OpenSec is a first step towards moving the security controls
away from the core of the network. This is a key requirement in a network that
leverages Cloud security, for example. Instead of controlling every device, the local
network just sends data to the cloud and reacts based on the alerts received by the
cloud service provider. Third, OpenSec fits well in scenarios that require mirroring
of traffic to monitoring devices. This is particularly true for the Science DMZ use
case that we demonstrated, because of the significant throughput gain achieved.
This use case also showed how multiple policies can be combined together to
achieve a campus-wide deployment. Likewise, the use case of residential networks
showed how a simple policy can be used to control network access from housing
networks. Moreover, our scalability results show that OpenSec achieves a constant
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reaction time for different traffic rates.
Future work includes securing the OpenFlow framework and enforcing policy
implementation. In order to deploy OpenSec at any production level, several
security measures must be taken into consideration, such as switch authentication,
physically distributed control plane and also authenticating the users that are
allowed to add policies to OpenSec. We are also interested in addressing automatic
enforcement of the policies. Likewise, the implementation of some OpenSec’s
features such as the policy enforcer and a more sophisticated northbound API
is left as future work. Finally, we plan to investigate how to speed up in-line
processing using programmable boards such as NetFPGA cards.
The usage of SDN and OpenFlow in datacenters and LAN is widely accepted
by now. However, for larger scale deployments it is still a challenge to identify
the best way of using SDN to provide flexibility to network operators. In the next
Chapter, we describe how SDN can also be used at the WAN scale by proposing a
framework that virtualizes the network and provides bandwidth provisioning to
the WAN tenants.
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Chapter 4
WAN scale: Dynamic Network Provisioning for SDN Transport Networks
4.1 Introduction
Current science projects rely on large-scale collaboration and data transfers. The
need for high-speed networking has enabled innovation on high-bandwidth, multi-
domain and multi-layer networking. Research and education organizations such as
ESnet and Internet2 are currently capable of transmitting data at 100 gigabits per
second and are aiming at 400 Gbps across their wide area network (WAN) [55, 188].
However, one challenge that continues to exist is building a dynamic end-to-end
circuit. By end-to-end, we refer to a circuit that goes all the way from a scientific
processing unit to another, instead of a circuit that only traverses the WAN. The
difficulty is to go from the WAN to the LAN dynamically and for end-sites to have
control without being exposed to the WAN topological complexity introduced by
slicing architectures [188].
The first contribution of this chapter is to describe the main challenges in
deploying SDN to achieve efficient end-to-end circuit provisioning for science net-
works. Several problems have been identified in the past for any SDN deployment,
such as dependency on the controller or the delay needed to insert forwarding
rules in switches. In this chapter we focus on specific challenges of SDN that
can significantly impact the ability to deploy SDN-based science networks. For
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example, we describe the challenge in efficiently virtualizing a WAN, optimally
placing controllers to reduce latency or dealing with the interoperability and secu-
rity problems raised when hosting multiple tenants. We also describe the challenge
in achieving multi-domain provisisioning for scientific flows.
The second contribution of this chapter is to propose the eXtensible Traffic
Engineering Framework (XTEF), an SDN-based transport network model capable
of WAN virtualization and on-demand network provisioning for scientific flows.
The two main components of XTEF are OneSwitch [16] and DTS (dynamic tunnel
setup). OneSwitch is a WAN abstraction model that exposes the entire WAN as a
single switch so that external application controllers can dynamically create flows
across the network. DTS is an algorithm used to provision the WAN that reactively
bypasses busy IP routers using WDM tunnels. In this chapter, we provide a
detailed explanation of OneSwitch and DTS.
To evaluate the framework, we first evaluate the performance of OneSwitch
with multi-tenant usage on the GENI testbed. To do so, we measure the delay
introduced by OneSwitch to act as a virtual layer between the physical network and
the end-users OpenFlow controller. We also evaluate the scalability of OneSwitch
by investigating how many tenants can use instances of OneSwitch at the same
time. Next, we emulate a large network using Mininet to evaluate the scalability
of the DTS algorithm. As a result, we compare the network performance with
and without on-demand WDM tunnels and show how 10% additional flows when
using WDM tunnels given that one wavelength per ROADM is available to be
used for a tunnel.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we survey the
related work in Section 4.2. Next, we describe the challenges in using SDN for
scientific networks in Section 4.3. After that, we describe the main components
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of XTEF in Section 4.4 and we explain the implementation details in Section 4.5.
Next, we describe the experimental setup in Section 4.6 and we evaluate XTEF in
Section 4.7. Finally, we conclude and discuss future work in Section 4.8.
4.2 Related work
This section includes related work on network virtualization using SDN, SDN at
WAN scale and multi-layer bandwidth provisioning using SDN.
4.2.1 Network virtualization using OpenFlow
SDN and OpenFlow have been commonly applied to network virtualization, in
particular at a data-center scale. Casado et al. [189] provide a good explanation of
what does it mean to virtualize the network forwarding plane and how it can be
done. They clarify the difference between providing a logical view of the network
to a software running on top of the virtual layer and just slicing the forwarding
plane to multiplex access to it. They describe an OpenFlow-based prototype
implementation of such virtualization and they discuss possible scenarios.
Matias et al. [190] propose a network virtualization scheme to simulate a data
center’s network. They use virtual switches, links and nodes. A node virtualizes
a VM host and in the physical network, multiple virtual hosts can reside in that
node. Instead of using VLAN tagging to achieve virtualization, the authors suggest
using locally managed mac addresses. They use part of the address to identify a
node.
A whitepaper by NEC [191] proposes ProgrammableFlow, another end-to-end
virtualization scheme that shows the end user virtualized bridges, routers and
nodes. This study focuses on allowing users to create virtual networks using
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scripts. Internally, ProgrammableFlow uses a topology service, a path mapper
and a flow mapper to translate between the physical network and the virtual one.
ProgrammableFlow supports L3 virtualization as well.
Drutskov et al. [192] propose an implementation of a Big Virtual Switch.
The virtual switch uses OpenFlow to program the physical switches and is also
OpenFlow compliant so that an application controller can program it. The virtual
switch hides the physical topology and presents the user nodes, interfaces and
links. To improve the performance of the mapping, they query a database to do
this.
Finally, Skoldstrom et al. [193] discuss different schemes for a virtual switch in
a WAN. They also point out important requirements that should be met by such a
switch. The authors also mention that the scheme must ensure that tenants use
the bandwidth of the control plane fairly. A compromised application controller
could overload the network by sending a large number of configuration messages
to the virtual switch. The authors mention how virtual separation can be done
through slicing (FlowVisor) or through encapsulation (assign a virtual network
id). They also describe how to separate the flow tables: flow-based partitioning or
table partitioning.
4.2.2 SDN at a WAN scale
There are significantly less SDN-based deployments at a WAN scale. To the best of
our knowledge, only Google and Microsoft have proposed using SDN to control
their WANs [10, 194]. Google has deployed SDN in one of their backbone inter-
datacenter network [10]. The authors describe how SDN allows them to meet
requirements that are very specific to Google. Also, the fact that the number of
end-points is relatively small makes it possible to use SDN. In this scenario, Google
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controls the WAN as well as the applications running on the end hosts. Having an
end-to-end control of the network simplifies the administration of the WAN.
Microsoft has experimented deploying SWAN (SDN-driven WAN) on a testing
environment that simulates their WAN. They describe the limitations of MPLS
TE to maximize bandwidth utilization and they show how using SDN can highly
increase the bandwidth usage. Services communicate to the SDN controller how
much data they need to send and how sensitive they are to congestion. The
controller computes new paths that guarantee that no congestion occurs for those
services that are sensitive to it. According to the authors, simulations show that
SWAN carries 60% more traffic than the current production network.
4.2.3 Multi-layer bandwidth provisioning using SDN
Bandwidth on-demand is a well studied problem [195, 196]. Doverspike et al. [196]
also proposed using SDN to enable cost-effective bandwidth-on-demand for cloud
services. The novelty of our work consists of combining WDM tunneling with
a WAN abstraction framework and application-driven traffic engineering to en-
sure bandwidth guarantees, while also supporting other requirements such as
maximum latency limits.
4.3 Description of challenges
In this section we describe some of the challenges that must be addressed when
designing SDN-based science networks. Although a majority of these challenges
are inherent to SDN, we highlight aspects that are specific to science networks.
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4.3.1 WAN virtualization
WAN abstraction is a challenge that has major relevance in the context of science
networks. Indeed, the need for dynamic, on-demand circuits motivates network
providers to allow for network tenants at scientific facilities to easily setup circuits
across the WAN. Naturally, this goes hand-in-hand with network virtualization as
the carrier needs the end-user application controller to program the network to
achieve end-to-end connectivity. However, the provider must also ensure that the
end-user does not have direct access to the network devices. There are different
virtualization models based on the level of virtualization. For example, the entire
WAN can be abstracted as a single switch and the entire path across the WAN is
hidden from the end-user application controller. In contrast, a framework could
also allow the tenant to control a customizable amount of network through a
virtual set of routers and links.
OneSwitch is an example of WAN abstraction framework. However, we do
not describe it in detail here since we do so in Section ??. Other virtualization
models have also been proposed. For instance, Drutskoy et al. [197] propose
a similar virtualization technique where OpenFlow is used to control both the
network devices as well as the virtual routers. This virtualization model allows for
end-users to decide if they want a fully virtualized network or if a finer-grained
control is required.
The choice of the appropriate WAN virtualization model is an important chal-
lenge since it affects the amount of information revealed to the tenants, as well as
the level of control application controllers have on the routing across the WAN. For
instance, a tenant could be interested in having two link-disjoint paths between two
nodes. Such a request cannot be granted in a model such as OneSwitch. However,
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Table 4.1: Existing network virtualization models
Model type North API South API Abstraction level
OneSwitch [16] OpenFlow OpenFlow Entire WAN as a
single switch
Big Switch [197] OpenFlow OpenFlow Virtual links and
switches
RouteFlow [198] BGP, OSPF and
other standard
protocols
OpenFlow Virtual links and
routers
Programable Flow
[199]
Proprietary API OpenFlow Customized net-
work with routers
and bridges
supporting this feature requires revealing a significant amount of topology infor-
mation. There are other challenges, such as chosing a communication protocol
between the provider and the tenant, ensuring interoperability and efficiently
virtualizing messages. These challenges are described in the following sections.
4.3.2 Scalability
Two requirements are critical in making SDN scientific networks scalable: efficient
WAN virtualization for a large number of tenants and appropriate controller
placement to reduce delays.
First we address the problem of efficient virtualization. Any WAN virtual-
ization model needs to consider the overhead needed to map physical to virtual
resources every time there is interaction with network tenants. This virtualization
includes finding the right tenant based on the VLAN, switch id and ingress port
for incoming messages. Similarly, messages coming from the tenants must be
translated to appropriately insert forwarding rules in the physical network devices.
This overhead becomes significant when the number of tenants increases. Drut-
skoy et al. [197] propose a container-based virtualization technique that consists
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Table 4.2: Order of priority for short-term deployments
Challenge Rationale
WAN virtualization Virtualization is necessary to allow tenants to pro-
gram the WAN. Without virtualization, manual
operation is required and dynamic, on-demand
circuit reservations are unlikely to be deployed
successfuly.
Multi-layer provisioning Virtualization alone does not provide end-to-end
connectivity and the WAN must be provisioned
efficiently. Integrated management of circuit and
packet networks is necessary to achieve flexible
transport networks.
Scalability Controller placement and efficient virtualization
must accompany WAN virtualization for the so-
lution to be feasible for science networks. How-
ever, designing the WAN virtualization model
and provisioning comes before ensuring scalabil-
ity.
Multi-domain circuits Inter-domain communication between SDN
peers is important but current deployments can
rely on systems such as OSCARS to be deployed.
It is more important to successfuly deploy SDN
at the edge of the network for virtualization,
rather than requiring SDN to control all the path
across domains.
Security An acceptable level of trust is assumed in science
networks scenarios. Although security should
also be a design priority, the items above are
more relevant in order to achieve successful de-
ployments soon.
Interoperability Interoperability will become an important issue
when the number of tenants increases. How-
ever, it is hard to address the topic in the short
term because there is too much variation in the
selection of north and south APIs, and current
deployments are likely to be closely tied with a
specific technology.
of mapping between controller API calls rather than OpenFlow messages. They
combine this with database-driven mapping and show how their virtualization
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model can scale up to multiple tenants.
Second, we address the problem of efficient controller placement. This problem
needs little motivation, as it has been adequately addressed lately [200, 201, 202,
203]. However, this problem has been less well studied in the specific context
of extreme-scale science infrastructures. Given the requirements for bandwidth,
latency, and rapid provisioning and re-provisioning of resources, the usual two
questions remain: how many controllers are needed and where should they be
in the network? Previous studies have proposed latency metrics such as average
latency or worst-case latency as optimization problems to decide where to place
network controllers. Alternatively, another solution is to place controllers to
maximize the number of nodes within a latency bound. Another decision related
to the controller placement is the number of controllers that should be deployed in
the domain. Heller et al. [200] argue that for most topologies, adding controllers
yields slightly less than proportional reduction; that is, k controllers reduce latency
nearly to 1k of the baseline latency with one controller.
The problem of dynamically loading controllers in the context of science net-
works is still open. The bursty nature of scientific traffic makes it hard to predict
what is the best location for one or more controllers. Moreover, although studies
have proposed deploying a distributed control plane for SDN, controllers are
placed and loaded manually. A more dynamic deployment is needed to efficiently
place controllers appropriately.
4.3.3 Interoperability
Dealing with multiple tenants results in interoperability challenges for SDN deploy-
ments. In particular, the decision on the appropriate northbound and southbound
APIs is still open. WAN abstraction models face the challenge of choosing an
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SDN protocol twice. On the one hand, the controller needs to communicate with
network devices. On the other hand, network tenants must use some protocol to
control the WAN.
So far, OpenFlow has been the de-facto standard to deploy SDN networks. This
protocol has been supported by plenty of hardware switches and it is also available
using Open vSwitch, which greatly simplifies low-cost, research deployments.
However, there are reasons to believe that, while SDN is here to stay, OpenFlow is
not. For instance, this protocol faces the problem of either providing a standardized
common denominator only (OpenFlow 1.0), or providing a very complete set of
features that make it hard for vendors to fully comply with the standard (OpenFlow
1.1 and above). The functionality provided by OpenFlow 1.0 is too basic and
constantly necessitates extensions to the protocol, which yields interoperability
problems. The dificulty of fully complying with OpenFlow 1.1 and above makes it
hard to guarantee that an application functioning on a given hardware will also
work on another vendor’s hardware.
As a consequence, network vendors have looked at other options such as XMPP
(Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol), BGP-LS (Border Gateway Protocol -
Link State) or PCEP (Path Computation Element Protocol). These protocols bring
advantages such as providing a management plane (which is not provided by
OpenFlow) and the ability to support legacy hardware during the transition to
SDN. Network providers with WAN virtualization models need to decide which
protocols are exposed to the tenants, or if a single protocol should be enforced.
4.3.4 Security
When securing a science network, a fine balance between security and efficiency
must be considered. As opposed to a traditional enterprise or campus network, a
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deployment for transfer of scientific data cannot place a battery of middleboxes
performing functions such as firewall, intrusion detection and spam detection
between the two end-points. Indeed, these security mechanisms create packet
loss and it has been shown that TCP throughput can be reduced by a factor of
9 if a path loses a very small percentage of traffic [186, 204]. This has motivated
the design of the so-called Science DMZ, a section of the deployment between
the WAN and the organization’s network that is optimized for high speed data
transfers [204]. The design of Science DMZs has been extensively discussed by
researchers at ESnet. Therefore, we focus our attention on a less studied problem:
securing a multi-tenant network in the context of science networks.
The challenge when designing a science network with multi-tenancy is achiev-
ing sufficient security while maintaining a network desing that is capable of high
speed data transfers. For example, it is important to decide whether to follow a
model of control plane “partitioning” or a model of full virtualization. By “parti-
tioning” we mean tools such as FlowVisor [51] that allow for tenants to program
some but not all forwarding rules. In full virtualization, instead, a complete trans-
lation occurs between the messages received from the tenants and those sent to the
network devices. Similarly, attention must be given to prevention and detection of
malicious or compromised application controllers. Once again, the delays incurred
by the security mechanisms implemented must still enable efficient data transfers
for science networks.
4.3.5 Multi-domain circuits
Before addressing multi-domain circuit reservation using SDN, we point out
that inter-domain operation is still an open problem for SDN in general. The
limited amount of existing work has focused on how an SDN-based Autonomous
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System (AS) can co-exist with IP-based ASes ([205]) and on information exchange
mechanism between SDN controllers in different domains ([206]). One work goes
a step further and suggests outsourcing routing decisions to an external party that
will then be responsible for the routing decisions of several domains [207].
In the context of science networks, current solutions such as OSCARS rely
on trust between domains and a path computation engine is allowed to directly
modify the forwarding rules of a device in another domain. For inter-domain
circuit reservation to scale appropriately, a significant amount of work is needed
in the east-west interface between controllers.
4.3.6 Multi-layer provisioning
Finally, SDN-based networks must consider the challenge of multi-layer provision-
ing. Indeed, managing each layer (IP, WDM, OTN) separately greatly reduces the
flexibility of the network and the ability to adjust based on traffic demands. In
traditional networks, when the IP control plane requires additional bandwidth,
then operators of the optical layer must configure new circuits that can later be
used by the IP layer. Because this operation requires human intervention, it is not
feasible to achieve on-demand network provision automatically. In contrast, an
integrated control plane allows for the network controller to optimize how flows
are routed across the network. If the same network controller can orchestrate how
the IP layer and the optical layer interact with each other, then it becomes feasible
to adjust the optical layer capacity in real time based on the needs of the IP layer.
In the next section, we describe how we propose to address the WAN virtual-
ization and multi-layer provisioning challenges using OneSwitch and XTEF.
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Figure 4.1: The XTEF framework uses the OneSwitch WAN abstraction model, the
DTS provisioning algorithm and the ONOS controller.
4.4 Components of XTEF
The goal of XTEF is to provide application-driven network provisioning to external
applications. To do so, it first relies on OneSwitch to abstract the WAN and
collect traffic engineering requirements from the application controllers. Second,
XTEF uses MPLS the DTS algorithm to provision the network. Third, XTEF uses
wavelength-based routing to route traffic between IP routers. In this section we
describe each of these components.
4.4.1 OneSwitch
OneSwitch [208] abstracts the entire topology of the WAN as a single switch, where
each virtual port is mapped to a physical port of a physical switch at the edge of the
network. OneSwitch provides a virtual switch to each tenant as shown in Fig. 4.1.
Suppose an organization A has access to the WAN through router 1 and port 10.
Also, suppose a scientist in organization A wants to retrieve data from a scientific
laboratory B connected to the WAN through switch 2, port 11. OneSwitch provides
the application controller with a virtual switch that has two virtual ports 1 and
2. By forwarding data from port 1 to port 2, the application controller is actually
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sending data from organization A to the laboratory B. Internally, OneSwitch is
responsible for translating all messages.
There are several advantages in this model. First, it is simple. An application
controller can forward data across the WAN by simply forwarding packets from
one virtual port to another. Second, it only involves the routers at the edge of the
network and internal topology does not need to be shown to the tenants. Third,
the virtualization layer adds security to the deployment, because all rules issued
by application controllers must first be handled by OneSwitch.
4.4.2 Traffic engineering
OneSwitch is not responsible for provisioning the WAN. Instead, the framework
assumes that there is a path for packets to traverse the network and some way to
tag packets (VLAN tag, WDM wavelength, etc.). XTEF uses MPLS label forwarding
to provision the WAN resources at the IP layer. For each pair of edge routers, at
least two link-disjoint paths are configured. To add variety in our experiments,
we configured the network so that the bandwidth available on both link-disjoint
paths is the same but one path provides a smaller latency (5 ms instead of 25 ms).
The establishment of the paths is not within the scope of this work, so we simply
assign MPLS labels across the network to achieve the connectivity between all
edge routers. At the optical layer, we use up to 80 wavelengths per link between
two ROADMs. Short-range links between IP routers and ROADMs have a capacity
of 100 Gbps. Both networks (IP and optical) are managed by the same controller,
so we combine MPLS labels and wavelength assignment to create two end-to-end
paths between each pair of edge routers. Once the network has been provisioned,
the traffic engineering component informs OneSwitch of the label that must be
used between all pairs of edge routers.
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4.4.3 Dynamic Tunnel Setup algorithm
As the amount of traffic increases, more flows get aggregated in the network links.
This can lead to congestion on some short-reach links. Next, we propose DTS,
an algorithm that exploits unused wavelengths to temporarily increase network
capacity to deal with traffic increase. DTS creates a bypass at the WDM layer
between the two closest ROADMs before and after busy short-reach links.
DTS works as follows. First, it monitors the load on all short-reach links.
Second, when the load on one of the links is above a threshold (70% in our
implementation described below), the algorithm finds which flow is contributing
the most to the increased load. Third, given the chosen flow and its path, the
two closest ROADM neighbors rn−1 and rn+1 are selected and a WDM two-hop
tunnel is created between them. As a consequence, the flow will not be dropped
at ROADM rn and the load at the busy short-reach link is reduced. Fourth, the
matching rules at the entry point of the WDM tunnel are modified so that, instead
of matching on the MPLS label only, the IP router also matches on the IP source
address of the flow and adds a different lambda for the flows that will be routed
through the bypass. Finally, when the load on the bypass is below a threshold
(10% in our experiments), the tunnel is removed.
4.4.4 ONOS controller
XTEF uses the ONOS controller [209] to control the routers using OpenFlow.
ONOS is an open source SDN controller designed for service providers created
in conjunction by ON.Lab and the Linux Foundation. ONOS provides sample
code to create applications that provision point-to-point circuits at the WDM layer.
This is the main reason why we chose it instead Open Daylight or other similar
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controllers.
In the following section we describe in detail the implementation of OneSwitch,
DTS and the ONOS application.
Figure 4.2: Message exchanges using OpenFlow or XMPP as northbound API
4.5 Implementation of XTEF
In this section we describe the implementation of OneSwitch, which varies de-
pending on the chosen northbound API. We also explain how the DTS algorithm
monitors link load and how it uses the ONOS app to request for WDM tunnels.
Lastly, we describe how such app is implemented in ONOS.
4.5.1 OneSwitch implementation
OneSwitch is the component responsible for virtualizing the WAN. Therefore, its
main task is to collect network events from the underlying OpenFlow controller,
translate them and forward them to the application controllers. Likewise, when an
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application controller sends a message to OneSwitch, this component must convert
the message and issue it back to the OpenFlow controller.
As we described earlier, we experimented using two different northbound
API’s: OpenFlow and XMPP. The implementation using OpenFlow was done on
top of the Floodlight controller. In Floodlight (and in other OpenFlow controllers
in general), new applications can be added and registered with the controller.
Next, when the controller loads, the application is loaded automatically. Therefore,
we created a new application that listens to incoming packets (packet in events).
When a new packet is received, OneSwitch inspects the input switch id, port and
VLAN tag. By doing so, the packet can be uniquely mapped to an application
controller. To communicate with application controllers, OneSwitch must act as
an OpenFlow-compliant switch. To do so, OneSwitch uses the Netty java library
to establish an asynchronous channel with every application controller and it
also implements all the OpenFlow messages needed to establish a handshake:
Hello, EchoRequest, EchoReply, FeaturesRequest and FeaturesReply. While this
increases the complexity of the implementation, it does simplify the operation of
application controllers, as they simply need to run an OpenFlow controller to talk
to OneSwitch.
The implementation using XMPP was done on top of the ONOS controller to
leverage existing sample code to create optical circuits between two IP routers.
XMPP was first proposed as a messaging protocol between a provider and a
subscriber. To implement a chat, for example, two or more client applications
would subscribe to the XMPP server to exchange messages. In our case, we use
XMPP for two reasons. First, it provides a standardized way to communicate
between two parties. Second, Juniper is already using XMPP as a northbound API,
which indicates that the protocol is worth being considered. In our implementation,
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Figure 4.3: Operation of DTS using sFlow and a point-to-point optical intent
application on ONOS
we developed the XMPP server on OneSwitch using Openfire [210], an open source
Java library for XMPP. In this implementation, OneSwitch is also an application of
the ONOS controller that listens to packet in messages and finds the application
controller based on the switch ID, VLAN and input port. However, instead
of forwarding OpenFlow messages, we created a simple syntax to exchange
information between OneSwitch and the application controller. On the one hand,
OneSwitch concatenates the switch ID, the input port and the IP source and
destination addresses. On the other hand, an application controller concatenates
the match fields and the output port.
Figure 4.2 compares how OneSwitch communicates with application controllers
using OpenFlow or XMPP. When using OpenFlow, all messages are standard to
this protocol. Therefore, it is slightly more efficient because OneSwitch only
needs to modify properties of each packet, such as replacing the input port or the
switch id. It is also easier for application controllers to simply use an OpenFlow
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controller. In contrast, when XMPP is used, all the communication between
OneSwitch and the application controllers is based on XMPP stanzas, which is
the XMPP terminology for messages and this must also be implemented by the
application controllers. However, the XMPP implementation is easier to deploy
because an open source XMPP server is used and there is no need to implement
the communication details, as opposed to when using OpenFlow. Furthermore,
bandwidth and latency requests are only possible using XMPP. To do this with
OpenFlow, protocol extensions are needed.
Using any of the two implementations, OneSwitch is responsible for tagging
incoming packets with the appropriate label to forward flows across the WAN. To
do so, it queries the traffic engineering component for an available route given
the bandwidth and latency requirements. If the request is not feasible, OneSwitch
rejects the flow. Otherwise, it tags packets with an MPLS label and an output port
based on the information provided by the traffic engineering component.
4.5.2 DTS implementation
Figure 4.3 shows the implementation steps of DTS. In step 1, DTS uses sFlow
[211] to monitor the load on each of the short-reach links between IP routers and
ROADMs. The DTS algorithm is triggered when the capacity of one of these links
exceeds 75%. sFlow is installed on all IP routers following these instructions [212].
A central collector is also installed in the same node as the OpenFlow controller.
When a load is higher than 70%, the sFlow component notifies DTS and informs of
the router ID, as well as the source and destination of the flow (step 2 in Fig. 4.3).
DTS is network-aware and knows the path of the identified flow, as well as the
wavelength that is being used for that flow. Therefore, it locates the two closest
ROADMs before and after the busy short-reach link (steps 3 and 4). For example,
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if r3 is the IP router to be bypassed, then the tunnel is created between o2 and o5
using wavelength l. If the identified flow was using wavelength l1, then o2 must
replace the labels to send the flow through the tunnel and reduce the load at the
short-reach link. In steps 5 and 6, DTS requests the ONOS application to create
such tunnel using wavelength l.
Next we describe how to expose an application through the ONOS web interface
to satisfy tunnel requests issued by DTS.
4.5.3 ONOS application implementation
The ONOS application is responsible for inserting flow rules in the switches to
create the tunnel requested by DTS. For a tunnel between ROADMs r1 and r3 to
bypass r2 using wavelength l, three rules are required (steps 7, 8 and 9). At r1,
the application needs to change the output wavelength. At r2, a new rule must be
issued so that flows with wavelength l are forwarded to the following ROADM
to bypass the IP router connected to r2. To achieve this, the ONOS application
is aware of the topology and ports needed to connect r1 with r3. Finally, at r3,
wavelength l must be replaced with the original wavelength assigned to this flow.
To make this application accessible to external users, we create a user interface
overlay as shown in this tutorial [213]. By doing this, the application can be used
from the ONOS web interface. Therefore, we use a curl command from the DTS
script to request tunnels.
In the next section, we describe the experimental setup used to evaluate the
proposed framework.
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4.6 Experimental setup
4.6.1 GENI testbed topology
We use two topologies for our experiments. Topology 1 (see Fig. 4.4) is a physically
distributed network on the GENI testbed to experiment with large scale and
realistic delays. This topology is based on Internet2’s network and consists of
nine IP routers distributed across the country. We consider Los Angeles, Seattle,
Washington D. C. and New York as the edge routers that serve as entry points
to LANs. In total, we simulate 50 scientific facilities by deploying 50 nodes
connected to the WAN through one of those edge routers. Furthermore, we deploy
50 application controllers, one for each of those 50 facilities. The application
controllers are deployed on different aggregates on the GENI slice, but they all
have four virtual ports, one for each edge router. Finally, the controller that runs
OneSwitch is hosted on the Houston node, which is the most centralized.
Figure 4.4: Experimental topology emulated in GENI
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For topology 1, we are only interested in evaluating the performance of
OneSwitch and we do not consider network provisioning. Therefore, we pro-
vision ahead of time end-to-end Ethernet-layer circuits between all pairs of edge
routers. For example, all traffic between Los Angeles and New York is forwarded
through Salt Lake City, Houston and Atlanta. Moreover, each of those circuits is
identified with a VLAN tag. Therefore, when an application controller requests
traffic between Los Angeles and New York, OneSwitch simply adds the appropriate
VLAN tag and the data is delivered to the exit edge router.
4.6.1.1 Scenario 1
Using this topology, we create the first experimental scenario (referred in the
evaluation as Scenario 1). The goal is to gradually increase the number of flows
from one to 50 and measure the time delay added by OneSwitch during the
virtualization. To do so, we measure the average delay needed by OneSwitch to
setup a new flow rule at the edge of the network when receiving 1 Gbps flows
from each sender node. To have a point of comparison, we use a default SDN
learning switch that reacts to incoming packet in messages by pushing new rules
to forward traffic. Therefore, we expect to see a longer delay when OneSwitch is
used, because more processing is done at the controller.
4.6.2 Mininet emulation topology
The motivation to use Mininet is that large-scale, multi-layer networks can easily
be emulated. Indeed, Mininet uses LINC-Switch to emulate reconfigurable optical
add-drop multiplexers (ROADMs). These devices are OpenFlow-compliant and
support three actions which can be added to forwarding rules: add, forward and
drop. The add action adds an output port and a lambda to specify which wavelength
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must be used. The forward action matches on an input port and a lambda value and
outputs traffic to another optical port. Finally, the drop action forwards the data
through the short-reach link to the IP router. Therefore, ROADMs and IP routers
can both be managed by an OpenFlow controller.
The experimental topology is too large to be drawn, but it consists of 15 IP
routers, 75 ROADMs, 30 hosts, 98 WDM links with 80 wavelengths each, 54 short-
reach links and 100 flow requests. Each wavelength provides a bandwidth of 50
Mbps We also provisioned the network resources statically using MPLS labels
to ensure that two link-disjoint equal cost paths exist between each pair of edge
routers. We consider 5 IP routers as edge nodes. Each IP router is connected to a
ROADM device, but not all ROADMs are connected to an IP router. Finally, each
end-host is assigned a wavelength per end-to-end path. To illustrate this, suppose
that two senders are connected to router 1 and a total of ten paths are available
to another edge router, then router 1 handles twenty different wavelengths. As a
side node, the LINC-Switch emulator does not restrict the maximum amount of
wavelengths.
4.6.2.1 Scenarios 2 and 3
Using topology 2, we create two scenarios. First, we create 10 traffic flows with
latency requests between 5 and 25 milliseconds between the same pair of source
and destination nodes. The network is provisioned to provide two paths: one
with 5ms latency and another one with 25ms latency. We compare using Equal
Cost Multiple Path (ECMP) versus using the proposed XTEF. The scale of this
experiment (scenario 2) is small, but our goal is simply to evaluate if XTEF is
capable of satisfying the latency requirements issued by the application controllers
of all the flows.
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Second, we created 60 flow requests using iperf to send data at 5 Gbps on
average. The goal of this experiment is to evaluate how much can the DTS
algorithm increase the capacity of the network using WDM tunnels. In this
experiments, flows are added sequentially to the network load.
4.7 Evaluation
In this section, we first evaluate the virtualization delay added by OneSwitch
when new flows enter the WAN. Second, we demonstrate the benefits of having
application-driven traffic engineering as opposed of sending all flows through
equal cost paths. Third, we evaluate how DTS can increase the network capacity
using WDM tunnels. Finally, we evaluate the scalability of the framework.
4.7.1 Virtualization delay and scalability of OneSwitch
Each instance of OneSwitch acts as a virtual layer between the physical devices
of the network provider and the virtual Ethernet switch programmed by the
application controller. Naturally, this virtual layer adds a processing delay when
translating OpenFlow messages coming from the physical switches to similar
messages directed to the application controller. Next, we quantify these delays to
determine how scalable OneSwitch is and what is the impact on the transmission
times of having an intermediate virtual layer. To do so, we use the GENI topology
shown in Fig. 4.4 and experimental scenario 1.
Figure 4.5 shows the round-trip time needed to send packets with and without
using OneSwitch. When OneSwitch is not used, we hardcode the flow rule at
the edge of the WAN so that traffic tagged with a given VLAN is forwarded to
the destination. This is the traditional approach in which a network operator
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Figure 4.5: Round-trip ping time between Los Angeles and New York for a single
flow.
manually configures the edge switch of the LAN to forward packets to the WAN
with a given VLAN. By using OneSwitch, the application controller can now
automatically control both the LAN edge switch and the WAN edge switch. This
adds a delay which is needed to push the flow rules during the first packets.
However, notice that once the flows have been pushed, the performance is identical
in both cases. Therefore, OneSwitch only adds a delay when the controller needs
to handle packets often. In practice, few packets end up going to the controller
since rules are pushed proactively. We argue that this delay is acceptable given the
great benefit in terms of flexibility offered to the end-user.
Figure 4.5 also shows that the difference in the delay between using OpenFlow
or XMPP as the northbound API is very small. We expected the OpenFlow delay
to be slightly lower because the processing tasks at the controller are slightly faster.
Indeed, when using OpenFlow, OneSwitch simply modifies fields of the already
existing packet in and flow mod objects. In contrast, when XMPP is used, new
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message objects must be created from scratch. However, this result shows that
both protocols can be used without one of them being significantly better than the
other in terms of processing delay.
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Figure 4.6: Delay introduced by OneSwitch for varying number of tenants.
The results in Fig. 4.5 only consider one single packet arriving at the edge of the
WAN. Next we focus on evaluating how OneSwitch handles multiple simultaneous
flows. To this end, Fig. 4.6 shows that the delay added by OneSwitch is almost
constant when the number of application controllers using instances of OneSwitch
increases. OneSwitch handles each end-user application controller using different
threads and is thus capable of handling multiple tenants at the same time. In this
experiment, we increase the number of end-user applications sending data from 5
to 50. The results show that both implementations of OneSwitch handle the load
with only a small increase in the total delay.
4.7.2 Application-driven TE
To demonstrate how XTEF is capable of application-driven TE, we used scenario
2. The network was provisioned to provide two paths: one with 5ms latency
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Figure 4.7: Latency limits guaranteed for each flow with and without traffic
engineering.
and another one with 25ms latency. We compared using ECMP versus using the
proposed XTEF. Figure 4.7 shows how, using ECMP, flows 1, 3, 7 and 9 do not
receive the required latency using ECMP. In contrast, XTEF is able to satisfy the
requested latency for all flows. This simple proof-of-concept experiment shows
how XTEF can respond to the application controller’s request and forward flows
through the appropriate path.
4.7.3 Network provisioning
Figure 4.8 shows the percentage of flows that received the requested bandwidth
with and without WDM tunnels. Using ECMP, the framework was capable of
satisfying the demands up to 37 flows but started rejecting new flows afterwards.
To compare, we first create a network with sufficient free wavelengths at each
ROADM and show how the demand could be completely satisfied. However, this
is not realistic and we also experimented on how to use a single extra wavelength
per ROADM (i.e. only one tunnel can start, traverse or end at each ROADM). The
results show that the demand can be increased by more than 10% using a single
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Figure 4.8: Percentage of flows that received the requested bandwidth guarantee.
additional wavelength.
4.8 Conclusion
The XTEF framework is capable of application-driven traffic engineering in a
WAN through the following contributions. First, OneSwitch achieves topology
virtualization and allows end-users to program the network without having access
to the physical devices. By controlling the entire WAN as if it were a single
Ethernet switch, an end-user application controller can create multiple paths
between different locations with simple OpenFlow or XMPP statements.
Second, by replacing OpenFlow with XMPP as the northbound interface be-
tween the WAN controller and the application controllers, we allow for the latter
to specify bandwidth and latency requirements for each flow. Below OneSwitch,
the proposed traffic provisioning algorithm uses MPLS forwarding and ECMP to
satisfy the demands of the application controllers.
Third, the DTS algorithm allows for additional network provisioning when
short-reach links reach a load of 70% of their capacity. This algorithm requests an
ONOS application to create a WDM tunnel between the two closest ROADMs to
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bypass the busy IP router.
Our evaluation of OneSwitch shows that the delay introduced by the virtual
layer is small. It also shows that OneSwitch can host up to 50 application controllers
simultaneously. Our results also show that XMPP guarantees latency requirements
for all received flows. In contrast, when the application controller does not
specify latency limits and routing is done using ECMP, only 50% of flows receive
satisfactory latency. Finally, our results also show that DTS can increase the
network capacity by more than 10% using a single additional wavelength at each
ROADM.
As future work, we will investigate the following two problems. First, there
is a trade-off in cost between having a wavelength available instead of using
it permanently. We argue that the advantage of using short-term WDM tunnels
allows for the network to adapt to traffic conditions and use the tunnel in a different
way depending on the network load. The second research direction involves the
number of ROADMs to include in the tunnel. In our current implementation, only
two-hops tunnels are created because it allows to aggregate more flows in the
tunnel. Indeed, if the tunnels were longer, it would be less likely to identify more
flows sharing the same path. However, we will experiment with using end-to-end
tunnels as well to compare against two-hop tunnels if a better performance can be
achieved.
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Chapter 5
Internet scale: Intra-domain cut-through switching in MobilityFirst
5.1 Introduction
Mobile devices are becoming dominant in current networks and significant core
architecture changes have been proposed to support them. Current protocols
such as TCP/IP were not designed with mobility as a key design requirement.
The inferior performance of these protocols in highly mobile networks and the
increasing number of mobile devices has motivated the research community to
design Future Internet architectures (FIA) that consider mobility as a key design
requirement ([3, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220]).
MobilityFirst [3, 13] is a project funded by the NSF FIA and FIA-NP programs
that proposes a mobility-centric architecture for the future internet. MobilityFirst
supports secure identifiers that inherently support mobility and trustworthiness.
These mechanisms greatly enhance the support of mobile devices in the network.
In the MobilityFirst architecture, data is transmitted between adjacent routers in
a hop-by-hop manner. Entire chunks of data are received at the next hop before
being forwarded again. Also, routing decisions are performed at each hop to
ensure proper delivery if a node has disconnected and connected to another point
of the network. However, this process also increases the delay needed to send data
in a hop-by-hop manner [3]. Furthermore, certain segments of the network are
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stable and allow exceptions to the storage and routing delays. If we know that
a node will remain connected to the same access point for a period of time, we
do not need to make routing decisions at every hop between the source and the
destination. Also, segments within the core of the network are exempt of mobility
requirements. In scenarios like this, it is possible to bypass the routing layer of
MobilityFirst.
In this chapter, we propose an SDN-based control plane to cut-through Mobility-
First routers across a single domain. Such technique can improve the performance
of the network, because the delay of forwarding data at a lower layer is smaller.
Another advantage is that it enables flow aggregation. Multiple data transmis-
sions can be encapsulated in the same flow. To illustrate the advantage of flow
aggregation, imagine a football stadium with 80,000 users accessing resources on
the Internet. Without any bypass, routing decisions will be made at each hop of
the way between the source and the destination for each of the 80,000 users. If
we assume that the users will remain in the stadium for a period of time, we can
bypass the routing layer. It is very likely that the routes between the sources on
the Internet and the destinations in the stadium share more than one MobilityFirst
router. For those sections of the network that are shared, we can forward all the
data using the same rule (informally, we can think of it as “Tag all traffic going
to the stadium with VLAN 1”). Once the data reaches the last hop of the bypass,
each packet is routed to its specific destination accordingly. Therefore, using a
small number of rules, we can forward the traffic intended for all the users in the
stadium.
To realize the cut-through switching capability, we first describe an OpenFlow-
based implementation of intra-domain cut-through switching for MobilityFirst.
OpenFlow is the most commonly deployed Software Defined Networking tech-
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nology today. SDN decouples the data plane from the control plane in a network
switch, by migrating the latter to a software based component. In an OpenFlow-
based network, the controller can dynamically update the forwarding rules of a
network device. The controller also has a centralized view of the network. Because
of these capabilities, an OpenFlow-based network can be used to create, modify
and delete layer 2 circuits to bypass the routing layer.
To evaluate the performance and scalability of the cut-through mechanism, we
first run experiments on the ORBIT [4] testbed to evaluate the performance of a
file transfer using real hardware. Next, we deploy a MobilityFirst network on the
GENI testbed and we show how a faster transfer time is achieved and how the
number of packets processed by the controller is significantly reduced. Moreover,
we demonstrate the scalability of the solution by exploiting the flow aggregation
capability of the network.
The contributions of this chapter are:
• We describe how the MobilityFirst architecture can be adapted to be deployed
in an SDN/OpenFlow-based network
• We propose a new cut-through technique that, unlike the vast majority
of related work, does not bypass an IP layer but a GUID-based routing
mechanism.
• We address the challenge of a bypassing technique in an inherently mobile
network architecture.
• We show how OpenFlow can be used to aggregate multiple data transfers
using the same flow table rule to achieve higher scalability.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We begin by providing
background information on MobilityFirst and an SDN-based implementation of
MobilityFirst in section 2. In section 3 we survey the related work and in section
4, we describe how to bypass the L3 routing in MobilityFirst using L2 VLAN
switching. In section 5 we explain how OpenFlow can be used to achieve the
bypass using VLAN switching. In section 6, we evaluate the proposed solution
and we conclude in section 7.
5.2 Background and related work
Next we provide an overview of the MobilityFirst architecture. We also describe
the ORBIT testbed that was used to run the experiments.
5.2.1 Overview of MobilityFirst
The MobilityFirst project proposes a clean slate redesign of the Internet architecture
[3]. This design aims at supporting mobile devices and applications as the main
elements of the network. Cisco has predicted that by 2014, wireless devices
will account for more than 60% of IP traffic [221]. The current IP protocol was
not designed for mobile applications and the emergence of such traffic offers an
opportunity to evaluate what should be the purpose of functionality of the network
[3].
Figure 5.1 shows the main building blocks of the MobilityFirst architecture.
MobilityFirst provides three meta-level services: the global name resolution ser-
vice (GNRS), the name-based services and the optional compute layer plug-ins.
MobilityFirst also provides three core transport services: the hybrid GUID/NA
global routing service, the storage aware routing (GSTAR) and the hop-by-hop
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transport [3]. In this background section we focus on explaining how routing is
performed in MobilityFirst.
Figure 5.1: Basic Protocol Building Blocks in MobilityFirst. Figure was redrawn by
co-authors (Source: Raychaudhuri et al. [3]).
Storage-assisted segmented data transport: MobilityFirst uses generalized storage-
aware routing
(GSTAR) [222]. In Fig. 5.1, suppose that a host wishes to send data to John’s laptop.
First the host should acquire Johns GUID. Then a packet is sent with the GUID
as the destination. A MobilityFirst node resolves the GUID using the GNRS and
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obtains a list of NAs where the destination is connected to the network. The router
sends a packet containing a destination GUID, a service identifier and a list of
NAs. At each hop, a router will decide if the NA is within its reach or if the data
must be forwarded to another router.
Figure 5.2: Hybrid GUID/NA packet headers in MobilityFirst. Figure was redrawn
by co-authors (Source: Raychaudhuri et al. [3]).
MobilityFirst uses a hybrid name/address based routing to achieve scalability.
The number of GUID objects is expected to be in the order of billions, but network
addresses are expected in the order of millions. By mapping GUIDs to NAs,
routing is greatly simplified [3]. Figure 5.2 shows how GUIDs and NAs are used
during the routing process.
Another important feature of MobilityFirst is that the transmission of data in
a hop-by-hop manner to support mobility. In this architecture, the entire file is
received at each hop before transmitting it to the next one. Using this approach, it
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is possible to do storage-aware routing and late binding [3].
5.2.2 Software defined networking implementation of MobilityFirst
Next we describe an SDN implementation of MobilityFirst provided by Krish-
namoorthy [223]. Our implementation of the cut-through switching capabilities
are built on top of the prototype described below.
In a MobilityFirst network, data is split into entities called “chunks” before
being transmitted. The size of a chunk can be anything ranging from MTU size
of the link to large values like 64 MB or 128 MB. Each chunk is then made up of
several packets (each packet being of the MTU size, 1500 bytes in case of Ethernet
link). Suppose host1 wants to send a 5 MB file to host2. First, it splits the file into
chunks (let’s assume each chunk is 1 MB). So host1 now has 5 chunks, and each
of those chunks has approximately 700 packets (of 1500 bytes each). When host1
transmits each chunk to MFRouter1, only the first packet of each chunk has the
routing header (as in the destination GUID, service ID, etc.).
In our SDN implementation of MobilityFirst, the network controller is responsi-
ble for finding a path to transmit all the chunks from the source to the destination.
When the first packet of each hop arrives at a switch, there is no forwarding rule
for it. Therefore, the controller must perform several tasks. First, it must use the
destination GUID of the packet to find the destination in the network. Second, it
must compute which switch is the next hop of the path. Third, it must push a rule
into the switch so that all the data of that chunk is forwarded to the next hop. This
process is repeated for each chunk of data.
Finally, we describe briefly the two testing environments: the ORBIT testbed
and the GENI testbed.
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5.2.3 ORBIT testbed
The Open-Access Research Testbed for Next-Generation Wireless Networks (OR-
BIT) [4] is an emulator/field track network testbed [4]. ORBIT emulates wireless
networks with customizable topologies and channel modes. ORBIT is funded by
the NSF and operated by WINLAB, Rutgers University.
Using ORBIT, different users can share the same testbed. Using an online
scheduler, a user reserves a testbed for a period of time. The user can then create
or load an image into the nodes, execute experiments, save the images and then
release the testbed for another user. The measurements of the experiments are
stored in a database that can be queried after running the experiments.
Figure 5.3: Diagram of the SB9 testbed. Figure was redrawn by co-authors (Source:
ORBIT [4]).
One of the testbeds of ORBIT, the SandBox9 (SB9) is dedicated to experiment
with OpenFlow. Figure 5.3 shows the design of the SB9 testbed. All nodes are
connected to a Pronto 3290 switch and one of the nodes can be used as the
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OpenFlow controller.
5.2.4 GENI testbed
The Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) is an NSF-funded
initiative to enable large-scale network experiments. GENI provides a test bed with
nodes across more than 50 aggregates [179]. Hosts deployed in the GENI testbed
can implement any Layer 3 protocol to communicate, as Layer 2 connectivity
is provided between sites. This greatly simplifies the large-scale deployment of
MobilityFirst using GUID-based routing instead of IP.
Before describing our proposed solution, we first survey related work to moti-
vate the need for a routing layer bypass.
5.2.5 Related work
Previous studies have proposed bypassing the IP routing layer to achieve benefits
such as energy savings, bandwidth protection, cost reduction and better network
performance.
Melle et al. [224] describe an optimization of an IP over WDM network
architecture based on bypassing the IP routing layer to save deployment costs. The
authors show how the cost per interface is cheaper at the WDM layer. They argue
that the number of IP-layer interfaces needed can be reduced by bypassing the
IP routing layer when the capacity of intermediate hops is sufficient to make the
bypass cost-effective. Melle et al. show that a bypassing technique does not make
a significant difference when the traffic volume is low (0.15-0.30Tbps) but can save
up to 30% of costs when the traffic volume increases.
Lui et al. [225] address energy saving in IP over WDM networks through
IP routing bypassing. The authors design an energy-minimized IP over WDM
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network by combining lightpath bypass and router-card sleeping techniques. They
argue that turning off ports on a port-by-port basis is more complex than turning
off an entire router card (which makes all ports in that card sleep). By creating
bypasses at the WDM layer, it is possible to turn of a router card and the authors
show how the energy consumption can be reduced by 40%.
Karol [226] proposes a distributed algorithm to set up maximal-length circuits
to bypass IP routers. These circuits can be created dynamically or in advance. The
algorithm minimizes the number of IP routers needed, reduces the network energy
requirements and reduces the end-to-end packet latency.
Although MobilityFirst does not use IP as the routing protocol, these studies
show some of the advantages of bypassing the routing layer in terms of cost
and energy saving, as well as performance. Although the related work suggests
implementing the bypass at the optical layer, for convenience we use an electronic
switching-layer approach using OpenFlow. A detailed explanation of the solution
is provided in the next section.
5.3 Bypassing the routing layer
In this section we discuss how to bypass layer 3 routing in MobilityFirst. First we
describe the challenges of a bypassing technique. Next, we explain how to bypass
the routing layer using layer 2 VLAN switching.
5.3.1 Challenges and design goals of a bypassing technique
Several challenges must be considered to bypass the routing layer in MobilityFirst:
when to setup circuits and for how long; how many circuits are needed and their
granularities and how to implement automated circuit creation in the MobilityFirst
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context.
• Mobility: It is important to keep in mind that nodes are assumed to be
mobile. A circuit reservation solution cannot assume that a node will remain
at the same location.
• Efficiency: The overhead of setting up circuits should be low and the circuits
should significantly improve the performance of end-to-end deliveries.
• Scalability: The MobilityFirst architecture should be able to support a large
number of users. The delay of setting up circuits must remain low for a large
number of users and the number of circuits reserved should be able to scale
as well.
• Reliability: A successful delivery must be ensured, even if a circuit exists and
the node location changes or the link fails.
Figure 5.4: Example of a bypass in MobilityFirst.
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5.3.2 Bypassing L3 using Layer 2 VLAN switching
One way to bypass Layer 3 routing is to create Layer 2 circuits using VLAN tags.
Recall that MobilityFirst works on a hop-by-hop basis. A MobilityFirst router sends
the data to the next router and this is repeated until the destination is reached.
Using this bypassing technique, a circuit can be created at L2 between the host and
the destination. In order to do this, a path must first be found at the first hop to
the destination. Next, a forwarding rule must be added in all forwarding elements
so that the traffic is automatically forwarded to the next hop.
To identify each flow, a VLAN tag can be used. Since VLAN tagging faces
well known scalability issues, a more scalable solution can be implemented using
Virtual eXtensible Local Area NetworkS (VXLAN) [227]. VXLAN was proposed
to meet an important requirement of virtualized data centers: to have a layer 2
infrastructure that can scale at the datacenter scale [227]. In our implementation
we use VLAN tagging because this is supported by OpenFlow, but extending
the protocol to support VXLAN is an alternative to increase the scalability of the
bypassing functionality.
Figure 5.4 shows an example of a bypass. One source is attached to the
MobilityFirst router 1 and another one is attached to the router 2. Since all
destinations are attached to router 5, then a bypass between routers 3 and 5 can be
created. Once the bypass is pushed, no routing operation is performed at router 4.
The way to create this bypass is to add a forwarding rule to router 4 that forwards
all traffic with a given VLAN from router 3 to router 5. In router 3, when we
forward packets belonging to the bypassed flow (source is S1 or S2 and destination
is D1 or D2), we tag them with the same VLAN number. When the data reaches
router 5, routing decisions are taken based on the destination GUID of each packet.
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This ensures that different routes are chosen for destinations D1 and D2.
This design enables flow aggregation. In Fig. 5.4, a single rule in router 4
can be used to send data to multiple destinations. In any scenario where many
destination nodes are connected to the same router, this feature is key to ensure
the scalability of the system. In a more realistic topology, it is likely that end users
are connected to edge routers and these devices are interconnected through other
devices across the network. Flow aggregation enables connecting multiple users
connected to the same edge routers using a small number of rules. By reducing
the number of rules needed at each hop, we significantly increase the scalability of
the network.
As discussed earlier, this solution should also take mobility into consideration.
If a circuit exists and a node changes the location, the delivery must still be
guaranteed. If a bypass is in place and a node disconnects from the network, we
must ensure that the current chunk of data is delivered to a MobilityFirst router
that will find a new route. Also, subsequent chunks of data should not be sent
through the bypass. In the example shown in Fig. 5.4, suppose the destination
node D2 disconnects from router 5 and reconnects to router 4. When the data
reaches router 5, it is still possible to locate node D2. By querying the GNRS
about the location of the GUID of D2, we can learn that the location of the node
has changed. Next, we can forward the packets to the next hop and we can also
remove node D2 from the bypass.
This solution should be efficient as well. There is a trade-off between the time
and resources that it takes to create a circuit to bypass L3 and the delay required
at L3 routing. If a circuit is to be created, the time it takes to set it up should be
significantly shorter than the time saved by bypassing L3. Also, the controller
should require an acceptable amount of resources to detect when and how to
142
create circuits. If the controller’s performance is significantly decreased because of
this, then the solution is not acceptable.
Finally, reliability must be taken into consideration. As we mentioned above,
the delivery of the message must be guaranteed. If one of the links that are part of
the bypass path fails, the data must be forwarded to a MobilityFirst router and the
bypass must be deleted.
Another way to implement this traffic engineering technique would be to use
multi-protocol label switching (MPLS) [228]. Using MPLS, the ingress edge router
computes the route from source to destination, communicates this route to all the
routers involved and inserts a label into each packet. Successive hops can then
forward packets based on the label. Note that this technique does not completely
bypass the routing layer, as packets must still be processed by routers. In our
approach, there is no need for the packets to be processed at the routing layer and
all packets can be forwarded by simple L2 switches.
5.3.3 Deciding when to create a bypass
One of the major challenges of this implementation is deciding when to create a
bypass. We envision two alternatives: proactive and reactive bypass creation. A
proactive implementation is easier, but it requires that the nodes provide prior
notice. A MobilityFirst node could notify that a given number of bytes will be
transferred to a destination. If this information is known, the controller can
create a Layer 2 circuit between the sender and the receiver to ensure a faster
communication. The advantage of a proactive approach is that the rules can be
pushed in advance and the network controller does not need to make dynamic
changes once the data starts flowing. However, a proactive solution only works
when the information of the data transfer is known in advance, which is not always
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the case.
When no previous information is available, the bypass must be created in a
reactive manner. In this case, the controller must dynamically identify for which
flows to create a bypass. One possible approach is for the controller to store
information about the location of devices. If multiple flows for a single destination
are repeatedly forwarded to the same hop, the controller can assume that the node
will not change the location for a period of time. Then, a bypass can be created for
data sent to that device. The advantage of this approach is that it is completely
dynamic and no previous information is required about the characteristics of the
communication. On the other hand, the controller has to do more processing and
this increases the delay. Also, the controller must store additional information and
this can compromise the scalability of the solution.
5.3.4 Deciding when to remove a bypass
We also address how to remove a bypass. Once again, this can be done proac-
tively or reactively. If a bypass was proactively created and we have information
regarding when the data transfer will end, then the controller can automatically
remove the bypass at a given time. However, a reactive solution must exist at any
time, in case a disconnection happens. The controller can monitor which nodes
get disconnected from the network. For each disconnected device, a clean way to
remove the bypass is to maintain the flow rules for the current chunk, so that all
the data of that chunk reaches the destination network device. However, for the
next chunk, the standard data processing is applied and a hop-by-hop route is
used.
In the next section we describe the implementation details of the proposed
solution.
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5.4 Implementation using OpenFlow
In this section we show how OpenFlow can be used to bypass L3 routing using
L2 VLAN switching. We discuss how to push a circuit using OpenFlow and we
discuss how we address the challenges mentioned in the previous section. This
work is built on top of an existing SDN-based implementation of MobilityFirst
[223]. Our contribution consists of adding the bypass functionality to this code.
We begin by explaining how the existing prototype works and next we explain
how we implemented the bypass technique.
5.4.1 Mapping chunks to VLANs
We first describe some technical details of our OpenFlow-based implementation
of MobilityFirst. In MobilityFirst, data is split in chunks and packets include
information to know which chunk they belong to. For each chunk, the first packet
is forwarded to the controller and a flow is pushed into the switch so that all the
remaining packets of that chunk are forwarded to the next hop. To make this
compatible with OpenFlow, the routing header is introduced in the L3 Source
IP Address field. The controller can then parse the data of the first packet and
use the routing information to compute where to forward all the packets of this
chunk. When the next destination has been decided, a new flow rule is pushed to
forward all the packets in this chunk to the next hop. To match all packets to the
inserted rule, the hop ID is used as a VLAN tag. This hop ID identifies all packets
belonging to one chunk across the link. Coming back to the example, for each of
the five chunks, all the 700 packets will have the same hop ID and this hop ID is
also inserted as a VLAN tag in all the packets. If we use incremental hop IDs, then
in the above scenario, all packets in chunk 1 will have hop ID 1, those in chunk 2
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will have hop ID 2 and so on. This helps us identify which chunk a specific packet
belongs to (since the packets themselves do not have any such information, except
for the first packet of the chunk).
The key to achieve the bypass is to push a flow rule into all the switches between
the source and the destination instead of only for one hop. In an OpenFlow-based
network, the controller is aware of the topology. Thus, an end-to-end path can be
found and all forwarding devices can be reached from the controller to push a
new flow rule. To find a path between the host and the destination, we need to
know the Layer 2 MAC address and the input and output ports at each hop. Next,
specific flow entry rules can be pushed at each switch. The VLAN tag is the same
for all the switches, but the source and destination MAC addresses and ports are
different.
5.4.2 Bypassing functionality
In the current OpenFlow-based deployment of MobilityFirst, the entire route
between the host and the destination is computed using the service provided by
the Floodlight controller. Krishnamoorthy also implemented a mapper between
GUID numbers and MAC addresses. Given a GUID, the controller can find the
MAC address associated to that node. Therefore, the information on the entire path
is available. To achieve a bypass, we collect the following information for each hop
between source and destination: VLAN ID, destination GUID, in-port and out-port.
The existing prototype pushes a flow rule to the first switch of the path only. To
implement a bypass, the controller pushes a flow rule into each switch using the
proper port values and keeping the same VLAN id and destination GUID. As a
result, all the packets of the current chunk are forwarded at layer 2 until they reach
the final hop. By creating a bypass, we ensure that the intermediate switches know
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how to handle each packet and do not need to forward data to the controller for
each new chunk.
5.4.3 Discussion: Challenges addressed
We mentioned four key challenges for the bypassing technique: mobility, efficiency,
scalability, reliability.
Next we discuss how our solution addresses those points and what are the chal-
lenges that must still be overcome.
Our solution addresses mobility by routing packets at the end of the bypass. If
a bypass goes from router 3 to router 5, then the data will be received at router 5
and a route will be computed for the GUID or NA. If a node has connected to a
different location of the network, the controller can query the GNRS for the new
NA and find a new route. We expect this to be relatively infrequent since a bypass
should be pushed only when a node is not expected to move. However, if the
device does move, a new route can always be found. One challenge that remains is
to actually be able to push bypasses only when the nodes will remain in the same
location. Otherwise, the delay introduced can become significant.
In terms of efficiency, OpenFlow is a convenient approach to dynamically
manipulate forwarding rules. The application running on the controller can
proactively or reactively modify the flow table of one or more switches. Therefore,
creating or deleting a bypass can be done efficiently. If a bypass is created
proactively, the controller only needs to act at a specific time. If the bypass
is to be created reactively, the controller must incur a delay to process the first
packet of each chunk to decide if a bypass is needed or not. We expect this delay
to be acceptable, as only the first packet of a chunk must be processed. However,
an interesting scenario occurs when there is a failure during the transmission and
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the distance between the start and end of the bypass is far. In this case, the time to
send the contents again can introduce an important delay. This raises the question
of whether to bypass a large number of hops or if it is more convenient to keep
the number of hops small.
Regarding scalability, we discussed earlier how flow aggregation can help the
network scale. Using OpenFlow, we can easily update any flow entry of a device.
If a bypass already exists, the controller can easily modify the rule so that the
bypass includes a new source or a new destination. If a bypass must be created, it
can be done efficiently too. Also, the fact that the controller has a centralized view
of the network allows the application to be aware of changes in the topology fairly
quickly. This simplifies updating a bypass when necessary. On the other hand, the
limited number of VLANs and the size of the flow table are known limitations
in an OpenFlow-based network. It is important to evaluate if these limitations
significantly impact the scalability of this deployment.
Finally, our solution also addresses reliability because the architecture is still
storage-aware. In MobilityFirst, the data is stored at each hop before being
transmitted. If the controller detects that the data is not properly delivered to the
destination router at the end of the bypass, it can use a hop-by-hop delivery. It is
important to evaluate how often does this occur in real-life scenarios, in order to
measure the impact on the performance of the network.
5.4.4 Discussion: Centralized control plane
One key feature of OpenFlow-based networks is that the control plane is centralized.
The advantage of a centralized control plane is that the controller has a network-
wide knowledge of the network. This simplifies reacting to failures and creating
new paths when necessary. The OpenFlow protocol includes features that allow
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a controller to listen to switch events and thus learning about broken links and
connected devices. The main drawback of a centralized control plane is the
scalability challenge, as well as becoming a single point of failure. To overcome
this, distributed control plane architectures such as HyperFlow [229] and ONOS
(Open Network Operating System) [209] have been proposed.
Also, although OpenFlow does not provide support for interdomain circuit
creation, recent proposals such as software defined Internet exchange (SDX) [230]
could enable multi-domain bypass functionality. In SDX, exchange points are devices
in the topology where a network owner could grant access to the forwarding table
to an authorized neighbour operator. In this scenario, multiple controllers operated
by different parties can coordinate to enable a wide-scale SDN-based network.
5.4.5 Expected improvements using OpenFlow 1.4
The implementation described in this section could be improved using the recently
released OpenFlow 1.4 specification. First, the scalability issues of using VLAN
tags can be solved using the IPv6 fields to perform GUID-based addressing and
adding the chunk id. The IPv6 source and destination fields allow for a much
larger number than the VLAN tag. They can be used to store a chunk id, a GUID
or a network address. A distributed control plane is also easier to deploy using
OpenFlow 1.4, since a switch can be connected to multiple controllers at the same
time. One of the main challenges of OpenFlow-based deployments is to deal with
a single point of failure (the controller) and having a distributed control plane
mitigates this problem. Although these improvements were already possible using
OpenFlow 1.3, one addition of OpenFlow 1.4 is the ability to control optical ports.
Two new OpenFlow messages have been added to configure and monitor either
Ethernet optical port or optical ports on circuit switches [231]. This allows for a
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much smarter bypassing technique, capable of deciding whether a bypass is more
efficient at the optical layer or at the Ethernet layer. We expect to explore this in
future work.
In the next section we evaluate the proposed solution in terms of performance
and scalability.
5.5 Results and analysis
In this section we describe two experiments to evaluate the performance of the
bypassing technique. First, we use a simple topology in ORBIT [4] with two nodes
and one single switch and we measure the delays incurred by the controller and
the time it takes to transfer a file en a single-switch topology. Next, we use a
virtual topology in GENI [179] to compare the performance of the network with
and without a bypass.
5.5.1 Single-switch network
We deploy in ORBIT [4] the topology shown in Fig. 5.5. One node acts as the
source and one as the sink. The source node runs a script that sends files of
different sizes using a chunk length of 4MB. Each chunk consists of 4096 packets
and each packet carries a payload of 1024 bytes. A third node acts as the OpenFlow
controller.
Figure 5.6 shows the total transfer time for 20, 100, 400 and 1000 chunks of data.
The transfer time grows linearly at an approximate ratio of 100 chunks per second.
In order to motivate the need for a cut-through technique, we also measure the
total needed by the controller to process the first packet of each chunk. Recall that
the first packet of each chunk goes to the controller and a new flow rule is pushed
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Figure 5.5: Single-switch topology deployed in ORBIT
into the switch. Therefore, for 20 chunks of data, 20 packets go to the controller
and so on. Also, Figure 5.7 shows the sum of all the time that the controller needs
to process first packets. The results grow linearly for an average delay of 688ms
for every 1000 chunks of data sent.
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Figure 5.6: Total transfer time for a varying number of chunks
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Figure 5.7: Total delay at the controller for a varying number of chunks
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Now that we measured the delay incurred by the controller, next we move on
to a multi-switch network where a bypass can be implemented.
5.5.2 Multi-switch network
We deploy in GENI [179] the topology shown in Fig. 5.8. In this topology we use
Open vSwitch instances instead of hardware switches. All resources are deployed
in the Kentucky ProtoGENI aggregate and we use emulab-xen images for all nodes
(all nodes use 64-bit CPUs and run Ubuntu version 12.04). The controller and the
Open vSwitch instances communicate using the OpenFlow 1.0 protocol.
5.5.2.1 Reducing the transfer time
In this experiment, we compare the time needed to transfer a file with and without
a bypass. We implement a proactive bypass that includes all switches between the
source and the sink. Figure 5.9 shows the transfer times with and without bypass
between multiple sources and the sink. The transfer time is faster when a bypass
is created between the source and the destination (average improvement of 10%
when sending 1000 chunks of data).
Figure 5.8: Experimental topology deployed in GENI
Another crucial advantage of bypassing the GUID-based routing layer is that
the number of packets received by the controller is significantly reduced. In our
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experiment, we create a bypass between the first and the fifth switch. By doing
this, we save one packet for each chunk that uses the bypass. Figure 5.10 shows
the reduction in the number of packets received by the controller. The number of
packets decreases because once a bypass is implemented, intermediary switches
do not need to forward the first packet of each chunk to the controller, since the
forwarding rule has already been pushed. To better illustrate this, one can think
that when a bypass is pushed between two switches, then these two devices the
source and the destination of the hop-by-hop transfer and the data travels from
one switch to another without further participation from the controller.
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Figure 5.9: Total transfer time with and without bypass. 95% confidence intervals
are shown.
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Figure 5.10: Number of packet in messages received by the controller with and
without bypass.
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5.5.2.2 Scaling through flow aggregation
Flow aggregation is key to the scalability of our framework. We explained in
Section 3.2 how a single rule can be used to carry multiple flows. In Figure 5.11,
hosts 1, 2, 3 and 4 send data to the sink. Without flow aggregation, the controller
must push a flow rule for each chunk in each transfer. For example, in Fig. 5.8,
when all hosts send 20 chunks to the sink, then the ovs1 switch needs 20 rules for
the traffic coming from host1, but the ovs2 switch needs 40, the ovs3 switch needs
60 and so on, for a total of 280 flows. In this experiment, however, the controller
knows that all traffic is heading to the sink. Therefore, only 20 rules per switch are
sufficient to carry all traffic.
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Figure 5.11: Number of flow rules pushed with and without aggregating flows.
5.5.3 Routing and bypassing in a mesh topology
Lastly, we experiment using a mesh topology to show how the implementation
exploits the services provided by the Floodlight controller to find a route between
the source and the destination. Also, we show how traffic coming from more than
one switch can also be aggregated. The topology is shown in Fig. 5.12.
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Figure 5.12: Experimental mesh topology.
The experiment consists of transferring a file from sources 1 and 3 to the
destination. Our implementation uses the services provided by the Floodlight
controller to find a path between the sender and the receiver. Floodlight finds
that the appropriate routes are: ovs1, ovs2, ovs5, ovs6 to transfer between source
1 and destination, and ovs3, ovs2, ovs5, ovs6 to transfer between source 3 and
destination.
Given that both paths share nodes 2, 5 and 6, next we experiment bypassing
node 5. First, individual bypasses are setup, one for all traffic coming from source
1 and another for all traffic coming from source 3. In this scenario, the gain in
transfer time when the bypass is pushed is similar to the results shown in Fig. 5.9.
Here we focus on analyzing if the number of flows needed can be reduced. In
ovs1, ovs3 and ovs6, the number of flows needed is the same as shown in Fig. 5.11.
However, in ovs2 and ovs5, we achieve a reduction of 50% since the same flows
are used to carry all traffic. Although this topology is small, it clearly shows how
the number of flows can easily be reduced when two paths have more than two
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hops in common.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed an approach to bypass the routing layer in Mobil-
ityFirst using cut-through switching and OpenFlow. The advantage of such a
bypass is to eliminate the delay introduced at that layer. We discussed how to
use OpenFlow to bypass layer 3 routing in MobilityFirst using layer 2 VLAN
tagging. Instead of pushing a flow rule to one switch only (as would be done
to ensure a hop-by-hop communication), we push rules into all the switches of
the path between the source and the destination. By doing this, we ensure that
all data is forwarded at layer 2. We also discussed how this technique enables
flow aggregation. By managing several data transfers using a small number of
forwarding rules, we increase the scalability of the network.
The evaluation using the ORBIT testbed showed that the controller introduces a
delay of 688 milliseconds for every 1000 chunks of data sent, in average. This delay
is due to the first packet of each chunk having to be processed at the controller. Our
experiments using the GENI testbed show how the number of packets processed by
the controller can be significantly reduced by the cut-through technique proposed
in this chapter. Finally, we show how the flow aggregation capability of SDN-based
networks can be used to make this solution scalable. By aggregating flows from
multiple sources to a single destination using the same flow rules, the number of
rules that must be pushed into the switches is also reduced.
Given the performance gains achieved at intra-domain scale, in the next Chapter
we investigate how to implement inter-domain cut-through switching in Mobility-
First.
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Chapter 6
Internet scale: Inter-Domain Routing with Cut-Through Switching in Mobili-
tyFirst
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we investigate how MobilityFirst can benefit from cut-through
switching tunnels across multiple domains, given the benefits of intra-domain
tunnels demonstrated in Chapter 5.
To motivate the need for inter-domain cut-through switching in SDN, we first
model the dynamic creation of inter-domain tunnels as a linear optimization
problem. Particularly, we describe this problem in the context of inter-domain
SDN. The problem minimizes the total transfer time while considering the costs of
creating inter-domain tunnels. Using this problem formulation, we demonstrate
how inter-domain controller latency plays a key role on how tunnels are created.
Indeed, we show how inter-domain tunnels are better when the latency is small,
but intra-domain tunnels are better otherwise. Next, we propose a greedy heuristic
that considers the inter-controller latency to decide how to create tunnels that
scales much better than the optimization problem formulation. To the best of
our knowledge, our work is the first one to formulate and solve the creation of
inter-domain tunnels in SDN.
After that, we propose a routing framework for MobilityFirst that enables
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dynamic inter-domain cut-through switching. The framework is based on the fol-
lowing design requirements: inter-domain topology visibility, naming the tunnels
as network objects and per-flow traffic engineering. We first describe how Mobility-
First uses aggregated nodes and virtual links to share topology information across
domains using network state packets. Next, we propose a novel technique that
names inter-domain tunnels as network objects to simplify how domain controllers
create and maintain tunnel information. Finally, we incorporate the heuristic into
this routing framework to decide when is it beneficial to create a new inter-domain
cut-through tunnels and which flows should be forwarded through the tunnels.
To evaluate the proposed framework, we developed a prototype for Mobility-
First using the GENI testbed based on the implementation described in Chapter 5.
The results show that in-transit packet in messages can be reduced by 75% using
inter-domain tunnels. Furthermore, naming tunnels as network objects scales
better than current protocols such as label distribution protocol (LDP) to setup
tunnels. Finally, we also demonstrate the scalability of the solution by showing
that incoming packets face a small delay even when the traffic load increases to up
to 1000 flow requests.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. We first survey the
related work in Section 6.2. Next we describe the optimization problem and
heuristic in Section 6.3. Next, we describe the routing framework in Section 6.4.
After that, we describe thes traffic engineering techniques using by the framework
in Section 6.5. Finally, we evaluate our work in Section 6.6 and conclude in Section
6.7.
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6.2 Background and related work
In this section we include related work on inter-domain routing using SDN, inter-
domain cut-through switching and inter-domain optimization studies. For an
overview of MobilityFirst, please refer to Chapter 5.
6.2.1 Inter-domain routing using SDN
We first describe previous work on inter-domain routing using SDN. Existing
studies include seamless integration of an SDN-based AS [205], outsourcing of
routing [207] and a framework to evaluate the effect of centralization on the BGP
convergence time [232].
Lin et al. [205] propose how an SDN-based AS can co-exist with IP-based ASes.
The authors proposed a fully SDN-based where the controller communicates with
other domains using BGP. Intra-domain is performed based on MAC addresses
and edge switches match incoming packets based on IP prefixes. There are some
differences between the architecture proposed by Lin et al. and our work. First,
their framework exposes an entire AS as a single router that acts as a single hop
in BGP. We aim for sharing more information about each AS (using aNodes and
vLinks). Second, their AS is fully SDN-based, which means that the controller
can program all network devices in the AS. Their results show that it is feasible to
seamlessly integrate an SDN-based AS to the network.
Another paper by Lin et al. [206] proposes an information exchange mechanism
between SDN controllers in different domains. The authors implement an Inter-
domain Path Computation (IDPC) application and a Source-address based Multi-
path Routing (SMR) application. Their work relies on message exchanging between
controllers, whereas our approach attempts to use the GNRS as much as possible
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to keep the exchange of messages to a minimum.
Konotris et al. [207] go one step further towards centralization. Instead of just
centralizing routing information for a single domain, they argue that the next step
is to outsource routing decisions to an external party. If multiple ASes do this,
then the external party ends up being responsible for the routing mechanisms of
multiple ASes. The authors point out significant advantages of having centralized
control of routing within one or more AS, such as simplified policy enforcement
and security. Although we do not aim at routing outsourcing, collaboration be-
tween ASes is certainly simplified when central entities can exchange information,
as opposed to having multiple routers having to coordinate.
Finally, Ga¨mperli et al. [232] proposed an emulation framework to experiment
with multiple SDN-based ASes. The framework builds on top of Mininet and
incorporates Quagga, a BGP software. As a use case, the authors evaluate the
convergence time of BGP when a centralized control plane is used.
6.2.2 Inter-domain cut-through switching
Next we describe previous work on multi-domain scenarios where a cut-through
switching circuit is created.
Yang et al. [233] present an inter-domain provisioning solution tested over
the Dynamic Resource Allocation via GMPLS Optical Networks (DRAGON) and
the Internet2 Hybrid Optical and Packet Infrastructure (HOPI). This application
provides end users with Ethernet circuits over WDM paths. In the proposed
solution, the negotiation between domains is achieved through network-aware
resource brokers that are also responsible for the path computation. The main
difference with our work is that DRAGON computes paths in a distributed manner,
whereas we have a centralized control plane.
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Guok et al. [234] propose OSCARS (On-Demand Secure Circuits and Advance
Reservation System) [235], a software developed by the Energy Sciences Net-
work (ESnet) [129] to provide end-to-end circuits for high performance networks.
OSCARS relies on a centralized path computation engine to stitch a bandwidth-
guaranteed path across domains. The amount of information shared by each
domain with the path computation engine depends on each network administrator.
This centralized system offers significant advantages, but at an Internet scale, it is
unlikely to have multiple domains being programmed by a central entity. Hence,
our approach is only centralized at an intra-domain scale, while inter-domain
routing is still performed in a distributed manner across controllers.
6.2.3 Inter-domain optimization
Finally, existing studies have considered inter-domain routing as an optimization
problem [236, 237, 238]. Tomaszewski et al. [236] consider the problem of band-
width reservation on inter-domain links for different traffic classes. Roughan et
al. [237] tackle the problem of traffic engineering with limited information shared
across domain. Finally, Chamania et al. [238] explore how to achieve IP routing
stability through dynamic creation of tunnels at the WDM layer. Our model of
tunnels, described in the next section, is based on the formulation proposed by
this work.
6.3 Dynamic creation of inter-domain tunnels
In this section, we model the dynamic creation of inter-domain tunnels as an
optimization problem. The objective function minimizes the total transfer time,
including control plane delays, while considering the different costs of creating
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and maintaining inter-domain tunnels.
Figure 6.1: Sample network with two domains and two cut-through tunnels (3-6
and 4-7).
6.3.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions in the formulation of this problem. First, we
assume that the computation of the tunnels is being performed by the controller
of one of the domains. Moreover, we assume that such controller has visibility into
the bandwidth of all links, including those belonging to other domains. In the
framework described in Section 6.4 we propose a way to achieve this. Second, we
assume that, when the optimization begins, no tunnels exist and there is no traffic
flowing. We leave studying the steady-state scenario for future work. Third, we
assume that the cost of inter-domain tunnels is computed based on the individual
cost of each link traversed by the tunnel. Fourth, we assume that the flow rate
and duration between each source and destination node are known. Finally, we
assume that only one tunnel can exist between two routers, but the tunnel can
carry more than one flow between different sources and destinations.
6.3.2 Settings
Consider a network of V nodes (OpenFlow-compliant routers) belonging to at
least two different domains. The path between all pairs of nodes is known and the
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optimization problem explores all combinations of using links individually or in
tunnels.
We consider the following parameters:
• λs,d: Bit rate in Mbps between source s and destination v ∈ V;
• δs,d: Duration in ms of flow between source s and destination v ∈ V;
• ci,j: Capacity in Mbps of link i, j;
• ψi,jx,y: Link i, j ∈ L is used when a tunnel between x, y ∈ L is setup (boolean);
• φi,js,d: Link i, j ∈ L belongs to the path between s and d ∈ V (boolean);
• bi,j: Time in ms needed to setup inter-domain tunnel when link i, j is used;
• mi,j: Maintenance cost due to inter-domain messages to maintain a tunnel
when link i, j is part of it;
• lx: Latency in ms between switch x ∈ V and the controller it is connected to;
• sx: Time in ms needed by the controller to handle a packet in message sent
by switch x ∈ V;
• ux: Time in ms needed by the initiating domain controller to compute a
tunnel path;
• wx,y: Inter-domain latency in ms between domain controllers to setup a
tunnel between switches x and y ∈ V;
• T: Maximum number of tunnels allowed;
• M: Maximum maintenance cost allowed per domain;
163
• D: A flow duration must be at least D times longer than the time needed to
create a tunnel in order to be routed through that tunnel. This parameter is
used in constraint 6.6 and is explained below in more detail.
Likewise, we consider the following decision variables:
• tx,y: A tunnel between nodes x, y ∈ V is created.
• f s,dx,y: Flow between s, d ∈ V is routed through a tunnel between nodes
x, y ∈ V.
• ri,js,d: Flow between s, d ∈ V is routed through direct link i, j.
We also use two additional parameters to simplify the objective function:
• τx,y: Time needed to setup a tunnel between switches x and y ∈ V. This
parameter is computed as τx,y = ψ
i,j
x,y × lx + ux + wx,y (i.e. the sum of the
switch to link latencies, the inter-domain controller latency and the time
needed by the initiating controller to calculate the path).
• ιi,j: Time needed by the domain controller to handle a packet in message
when a flow is routed through the direct link i, j ∈ V. This parameter is
computed as ιi,j = 2× lj + sj (i.e. the round-trip latency between the switch
and the controller added to the time needed by the controller to handle the
packet in message).
6.3.3 Problem formulation
For each flow, there is a known transfer time δs,d. However, additional delays
happen every time a packet in message is received a rule is inserted in the flow
table of the switch. Similarly, the flow can be delayed if a cut-through tunnel is
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being created. The goal of this problem is to minimize the total transfer time for
all flows combined with the delays caused by the control plane.
Objective function: minimize
∑
s,d∈V
δs,d + ∑
x,y,i,j∈V
ri,js,d × ιi,j + f s,dx,y × τx,y (6.1)
Subject to:
∀i, j ∈ V, ∑
x,y,s,d∈V
λ× (φi,js,d × r
i,j
s,d + ψ
i,j
x,y × f s,dx,y) ≤ ci,j (6.2)
∀i, j, s, d ∈ V, φi,js,d × r
i,j
s,d + ∑
x,y∈V
ψ
i,j
x,y × f s,dx,y = 1 (6.3)
∀x, y, s, d ∈ V, tx,y ≥ f s,dx,y (6.4)
∀x, y ∈ V,∑ tx,y ≤ T (6.5)
∀s, d ∈ V, D× ∑
x,y∈V
f s,dx,y × τx,y ≤ δs,d (6.6)
∀x, y ∈ V,∑ tx,y( ∑
i,j∈V
mi,j × ψi,jx,y) ≤ M (6.7)
The minimization objective function of this problem (Equation 6.1) uses the τ
and th parameters to take into account all the delays. For each direct link used,
the th delay is considered. Similarly, for each tunnel, the τ delay is counted. By
adding these delays to the duration of each flow δs,d, the problem minimizes the
total transfer time.
Constraint 6.2 ensures that the link capacity limit is enforced for all links in
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the network. Constraint 6.3 ensures that all the links {i, j} between a source s and
a destination d are used, either as a single link (φi,js,d × r
i,j
s,d), or as part of a tunnel
that uses that link (ψi,jx,y × f s,dx,y). By making the equation equal to one, we also
guarantee that only zero or one bypass using the link can co-exist, thus eliminating
incompatible tunnels.
Constraint 6.4 is used to ensure that tx,y is true if, for any pair of source s and
destination d, the tunnel f s,dx,y is used at least once. tx,y is then used to keep track of
the maintenance cost of the system, instead of using f values that are specific to
each flow and could thus be duplicated for the same pair of nodes.
Constraint 6.5 guarantees that the number of tunnels created stays below T, the
maximum number of tunnels allowed.
Finally, constraint 6.6 ensures that a flow between source s and destination
d ∈ V only goes through tunnels if the time needed to setup the tunnels is D times
smaller. The goal of this constraint is to avoid tunneling a flow that lasts 5 seconds
if creating a tunnel will take 3 seconds. Instead, a longer flow will benefit more
from the tunnel. Similarly, constraint 6.7 ensures that the maintenance cost of all
tunnels is below the maximum threshold M.
6.3.4 Study of sample topologies
To validate the problem formulation, we ran the optimization for two different
topologies created randomly. Topology 1 is a small topology with 11 nodes, two
domains and 6 flow requests. Topology 2 has 35 nodes, two domains and 15 flow
requests. In our experiments, all flow requests are inter-domain.
First, we note that the inter-domain latency plays a key role in how tunnels are
created. We experimented using Topology 1 for different values of inter-domain
controller latency across domains (w parameter in the optimization problem). The
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of intra-domain and inter-domain tunnels for varying
inter-domain controller latency.
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Figure 6.3: Total delay caused by controller processing with low and high inter-
controller latency for Topology 1.
results in Fig. 6.2 show how the number of inter-domain tunnels created decreases
as the latency increases. Indeed, the benefit of bypassing multiple hops (i.e.
reducing the impact of switch to controller latency at each hop) is only beneficial
as long as the time needed to create a tunnel is reasonable. As a result, for a small
inter-domain latency, the optimization problem tends to create a single tunnel for
each flow. However, when the value increases, the solver tends to create more
edge-to-edge intra-domain tunnels for each domain.
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Figure 6.4: Total delay caused by controller processing with low and high inter-
controller latency for Topology 2.
Such a behavior is confirmed in Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.4. We made a modification
to Constraint 6.5 to enforce an exact number of tunnels instead of just setting
an upper bound T. As a result, we observe the minimum delays obtained for
topologies 1 and 2, when the inter-domain controller latency is 3 or 10 (low and
high in Fig. 6.2). Notice how, for a low latency, the solver creates approximately
one tunnel per flow. In contrast, for a higher latency, on average two tunnels per
flow are created.
Finally, these experiments also show that the maximum delay is obtained when
there are no tunnels. Likewise, once the minimum has been obtained, the increase
in the delay is slow in comparison to how it decreases before reaching the optimal
value. Therefore, we can conclude that the best way to set up the tunnels depends
on the inter-domain controller latency and also having too many tunnels is better
than not having enough tunnels.
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6.3.5 Heuristic
The proposed optimization problem has scalability problems when there are more
than one thousand 15-hop flows. Hence, it is not feasible to simply run the
optimization problem at the domain controller. Therefore, we propose a heuristic
that finds near-optimal solutions to the same problem but scales better.
The key parameter of this heuristic is the inter-domain latency. Indeed, we
showed in Figs. 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 that inter-domain, end-to-end tunnels are pre-
ferred when the latency is small and multiple intra-domain tunnels are preferred
otherwise. For this reason, Alg. 3 compares the inter-domain latency with the
controller-switch latency and decides to create an inter-domain tunnel only when
this ratio is below 30%. Notice also that we consider multiple domain controllers
so that each controller handles the flows that start within its domain.
Figure 6.5: Sample topology used to evaluate the heuristic.
Table 3 compares the performance of the proposed heuristic with the optimal
values found by the ILP solver. For this experiment, we created a larger topology
shown in Fig. 6.5. The results show how the heuristic is capable of finding good
solutions even beyond 800 flows, when the ILP solver starts having scalability
problems.
In a real network, several implementation challenges must be addressed to solve
the problem of inter-domain cut-through switching. For example, we assumed
a known data rate and flow duration, as well as inter-domain link visibility.
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Data: flows: Collection of flows
Data: controllers: All domain controllers
Result: Output how to route each flow
for each controller c ∈ controllers do
boolean latencyOk = true;
for each flow f ∈ flows do
if flow.source ∈ domain c then
for each controller ic ∈ flow.intermediateControllers do
if latencyBetween(c, ic) > THRESHOLD then
latencyOk = false;
end
end
if ¬ flow.tunnel then
if latencyOK then
Create end-to-end inter-domain tunnel;
flow.tunnel = true; //Mark flow as tunneled so that other
controllers know
end
else
Create intra-domain tunnel;
end
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 3: Greedy heuristic to assign segments.
Table 6.1: Comparison of heuristic against ILP solver
Number of
flows
ILP - transfer
time (s)
Heuristic -
transfer time
(s)
ILP - running
time (s)
Heuristic -
running time
(s)
100 6.9 7.1 0.1 0.05
300 22.3 25.1 0.5 0.07
500 34.1 39.2 4.1 0.1
800 54.6 61.3 21.3 0.11
1000 * 81.7 Out-of-
memory
error
0.12
1200 * 9963 Out-of-
memory
error
0.13
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Figure 6.6: Steps needed to setup an inter-domain tunnel across multiple ASes
After demonstrating the importance of inter-domain controller latency in this
section, next we propose a routing framework capable of inter-domain cut-through
switching that simplifies how the tunnels are created and maintained. After that,
in Section 6.5 we will explain how to incorporate the proposed heuristic into the
routing framework.
6.4 Routing framework description
In this section, we first motivate using SDN for the proposed routing framework.
Next, we explain how the framework meets three requirements to implement
dynamic creation of inter-domain tunnels. First, domain controllers need to be
aware of at least part of the topology from other domains (we assumed in the
formulation problem that each domain controller was aware of the bandwidth
of all links in the network). Second, the domain controllers must be capable of
exchanging messages with other domains to setup cut-through tunnels across
domains. The problem of deciding when to create a tunnel and which maps to
forward through each tunnel is addressed in Section 6.5.
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6.4.1 The need for SDN
An SDN-enabled routing framework provides several benefits to the proposed inter-
domain protocol. First, SDN simplifies how to process in-transit traffic within a
single domain. Indeed, managing intra-domain paths from a centralized controller
is simpler than doing it in a distributed manner. For example, finding shortest
paths in a fully known graph is simpler than exchanging topology messages
between routers.
Second, managing the label-based intra-domain table is equally simplified. In
fact, having distributed routers agreeing on multiple labels is possible, but it is
more complex and requires an additional label distribution protocol. Also, the
information at each router is not necessarily complete or up-to-date. Instead,
assigning labeled-paths in a fully known graph becomes a much simpler problem.
Moreover, since the controller is aware of all labels being used across the domain,
it can verify that label-based paths do not collide.
Third, implementing routing policies within a domain is easily implemented
when the controller has full control of routing decisions. Instead of propagating
information across domains, the policies are given to the OpenFlow controller and
they can easily be implemented since the controller is responsible for all routing
decisions. Besides this, the controller can also provide the domain operator with a
human-friendly API where different types of policies can be defined.
Fourth, SDN provides a unique opportunity to perform traffic analysis at the
edge of the network. When the border switch must send data to another domain,
an application running on the controller can use traffic statistics to detect elephant
flows, mice flows or traffic with specific requests by the sender. As a consequence,
SDN allows for fine-grained, per flow analysis that allows the controller to make
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routing decisions for each flow.
Fifth, SDN also allows the integration of the routing mechanisms with lower
layers such as Optical Transport Networks (OTN) or Wavelength Division Mul-
tiplexing (WDM). An SDN-based, integrated control plane can do multi-layer
provisioning based on the behavior of a flow. In particular, flows with large
bandwidth demand can benefit from being sent across multiple domains through
an optical layer tunnel.
Finally, mobility awareness becomes crucial in a routing framework for Mo-
bilityFirst. SDN provides a way to create routing paths that react to mobility.
Using an OpenFlow controller, we can query the GNRS, realize that the destination
has moved to a different network address and re-define how the flow should be
routed. The ability to create mobility-aware, multi-domain tunnels is significantly
enhanced by using an SDN-based routing framework.
6.4.2 Increased visibility between domains
In MobilityFirst, autonomous systems (ASes) have the flexibility to expose their
internal network characteristics in terms of aggregated nodes (aNodes) and virtual
links (vLinks) (see Fig. 6.7). Each AS has the flexibility to decide on the aggregation
granularity and hence the amount of state it wants to advertise. State is announced
and exchanged in the form of a network state packet (nSP) similar to link state
routing (see Fig. 6.8). Each domain controller is responsible of creating the virtual
topology of aNodes and vLinks and it is also responsible of propagating link
information such as bandwidth, availability, variability and latency. The advantage
of sharing information of aNodes and vLinks through nSPs is two fold. On the
one hand, it allows each domain to customize the topology information to be
shared with other domains. On the other hand, it provides useful information to
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other domains that can now decide how to route packets to get a given bandwidth,
availability, variability and latency.
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Figure 6.7: aNode-vLink topology abstraction for an AS.
Msg_Type Hop_to_Src
Neighbor_aNode#1-vLink<B,V,A,L>
Neighbor_aNode#2-vLink<B,V,A,L>
…
Neighbor_aNode#z-vLink<B,V,A,L>
AS_Num:Source_aNode
Internal Topologies:
aNode#1-vLink<B,V,A,L>-aNode#2
aNode#2-vLink<B,V,A,L>-aNode#3
…
aNode#x-vLink<B,V,A,L>-aNode#y
Neighbor Info:
Figure 6.8: Structure of network state packets propagated across domains.
6.4.3 Dynamic creation of inter-domain tunnels using the GNRS
Next we describe a novel technique to setup cut-through switching tunnels across
multiple domains that leverages the globally available name resolution service
(GNRS). The main advantage of having a globally available entity is that the
number of messages needed to be exchanged between domain controllers is
significantly reduced.
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To take full advantage of the GNRS, the routing framework names the tunnels.
In other words, every tunnel created in a MobilityFirst network is an object that
can be identified with a GUID (see Fig. 6.6). When a domain controller initiates a
request for a inter-domain tunnel, it contacts other domain controllers with a setup
request. The request includes a label to identify traffic, as well as the GNRS entry
containing information of the tunnel. When a neighbor domain controller accepts
the request to create a tunnel, it creates a GNRS entry that contains information
about the tunnel to be shared with other domain controllers. As a result, once the
tunnel has been created, the domain controller that initiated the request knows the
GUID of all entries needed to collect information about the tunnel.
Although some initial messages are needed to create the tunnel, one advantage
of this technique is that tunnel maintenance and tear-down do not need further
messaging. First, a domain controller can use the GNRS entry to share tunnel
attributes with other domains, such as available bandwidth or expected time before
having to terminate the tunnel. Second, terminating the tunnel is as simple as
deleting the GNRS entry. Fig. 6.6, suppose AS3 deletes the GNRS tunnel (GC)
entry GT3. The initiating domain controller (AS1) notices that the entry has been
deleted and concludes that AS3 is no longer part of the tunnel. Next, it deletes
the GT entry known to all domains members of the tunnel. Finally, AS2 notices
that the GT entry has been deleted. We evaluate the reduction of inter-domain
messages in section 6.6.4.
In this section we described how the framework implements inter-domain
cut-through tunnels (the how). In the following one, we explain how to decide
when to create a tunnel and which flows to forward through each tunnel (the
when).
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6.5 Traffic engineering techniques used by the framework
In this section we first describe how a domain controller can identify flows that
could benefit from a cut-through tunnel. Second, we describe what is the most
appropriate way to setup a tunnel once a flow has been identified as candidate.
6.5.1 Deciding which flows to forward through a tunnel
The first step consists of analyzing traffic to identify flows that could benefit from
a cut-through tunnel. The first technique detects elephant flows at the edge of
the network. The second takes advantage of the GNRS capabilities and deduces
the mobility of the destination device. The third uses the service type field in a
MobilityFirst packet to allow the sender, or a previous controller, to indicate that a
tunnel should be used.
6.5.1.1 Controller-initiated cut-through based on flow rate and duration
The first technique that we implement and evaluate is a reactive approach. The
decision of whether to send a flow through a tunnel is taken by the domain
controller based on the observed traffic. The goal is to detect large, long duration
flows (also known as elephant flows) that can benefit from cutting through the
MobilityFirst routing mechanisms. The motivation for this technique is that
elephant flows are long enough to benefit from a cut-through tunnel even when a
small overhead is incurred to create the cut-through. Also, elephant flows usually
have a high data rate and reducing the overhead needed to forward data increases
the throughput significantly. Mouse flows (short flows), on the other hand, do not
necessarily benefit from this because the transmission of data could be finished by
the time the bypass is created, or not long enough to actually benefit.
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Previous studies have addressed elephant flow detection using packet sampling
techniques [239, 240, 241]. Psounis et al. [241] propose SIFT, a detection algorithm
based on biased sampling. The intuition behind the algorithm is to sample with
a low probability. Using this method, when a probability of p = 0.01 is used, all
flows with more than 100 packets are detected and the probability of sampling a
mouse flow is low. We implement the SIFT algorithm to detect elephant flows.
To detect large flows, traffic statistics must be observed. Although the OpenFlow
protocol provides ways to query each switch for traffic statistics, this solution is
too slow (data can only be obtained every five seconds). We use sFlow [211] to
counter this problem and sample traffic every second. sFlow is a packet sampling
tool used to monitor network usage. sFlow agents are deployed in network devices
such as switches or routers and the information gathered is sent to a centralized
collector. sFlow-RT is a monitoring framework that incorporates the sFlow analytic
engine to provide real-time visibility in Software Defined Networking (SDN) [242].
A script running on the domain controller server obtains the metrics collected by
sFlow-RT using the REST API. Using this data, the biased sampling technique
proposed by the SIFT algorithm is used to detect large flows. When a flow has
been labeled as elephant, the script uses the REST API of the Floodlight controller
to find a route between the source and the destination and create a layer-2 circuit.
6.5.1.2 Controller-initiated cut-through based on mobility
The second technique is also reactive and leverages a specific feature of Mobility-
First: the GNRS server. In MobilityFirst, every device connected to the network
should register to the GNRS to notify the current attachment point. This notifica-
tion is achieved through an update message that contains the GUID and the new
set of NAs to which the device is attached. Therefore, the GNRS offers a unique
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opportunity to track the mobility of all devices attached to a set of NAs.
To implement the controller-initiated cut-through based on mobility, we first
expand the GNRS server so that it also keeps track of the number of updates issued
by each device. With our implementation, when the GNRS receives a query for a
given GUID, the response contains a timestamp of all update messages received
by the GNRS for the given GUID.
Next, we leverage the SDN controller to dynamically process the timestamps
and determine the degree of mobility of the destination device. To measure the
degree of mobility, the controller takes into consideration the number of updates
sent by the device in the last hour. If the device has remained attached to the same
access point for more than an hour, it is considered static and the controller can
initiate a cut-through tunnel for this flow. If the number of updates is larger than
zero, then the node is considered mobile and a tunnel is not created for the flow.
6.5.1.3 Sender-initiated cut-through
The third technique is a proactive approach that can be used by the sender of
data to ask for a cut-through tunnel to be used. Unlike the previous two, this
approach is proactive because the sender device requests the network to use a
cut-through tunnel. Thus, the controller does not react to traffic observations or
GNRS responses but to a request introduced by the sender in the network packets.
This method makes use of the service type field of MobilityFirst packets. This
field encodes the requested processing or delivery service(s). In MobilityFirst,
it was designed to allow the user to request different delivery methods, such as
unicast or multicast. By setting the service type to a specific value, a sender asks
the network to forward all packets in that flow through a tunnel.
Since this decision is based on a notification from the sender, the controller
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does not actually decide if a bypass should be used or not, it only creates it
assuming that the sender knows why a bypass can be beneficial. Note that this is
an advantage but also a risk. Certainly, this technique is the easiest to achieve by
the controller (no traffic observation or timestamps parsing needed). On the other
hand, the sender assumes all the responsibility of sending data through a bypass
and this could be detrimental if the destination is highly mobile.
6.5.2 Deciding how to setup a tunnel
Once the controller has identified a flow that could benefit from a tunnel using the
described techniques, the next step is to decide what is the best way to setup such
tunnel. To do this, we use the insights learned in Section 6.3 that showed how the
inter-domain latency plays a key role on the optimal creation of tunnels. Therefore,
we incorporate into the framework the ability to create inter-domain tunnels only
if the inter-controller latency is low, and to use intra-domain tunnels otherwise.
6.5.2.1 Combined technique
To consolidate the three techniques and the heuristic, we propose a method that
combines them all. The main goal of this combined technique is to admit a flow
into a tunnel when at least two of three ‘conditions’ exist: long flows, low mobility
or user-requested tunnel. Each flow has candidate points to be accepted in a
bypass tunnel. An elephant flow earns three points and a tunnel request from the
user also earns three points. Finally, a static destination adds four candidate points
to a flow. To ensure low mobility and another condition, this technique works by
creating tunnels only to flows that have at least seven candidate points.
Another feature of the combined technique is that it allows to upgrade or
downgrade flows as candidates for a tunnel. Suppose a flow has been sending
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high traffic rates for a long time and the destination was static. Therefore, this flow
had seven points and was part of a bypass. Later, if the destination stops being
static or if the data rate is reduced, this flow can be downgraded and removed
from the bypass. Similarly, it can be added again if the conditions change again.
Finally, the combined technique also considers the inter-controller latency to
decide if a single end-to-end tunnel should be created, or if an intra-domain tunnel
should be used instead.
Algorithms 4, 5 and 6 show how the combined traffic engineering technique
operates. First, incoming flows are analyzed to identify the mobility degree
and service type (Algorithm 4). Next, traffic is periodically sampled to identify
elephant flows and update mobility degrees (Algorithm 5). Finally, Algorithm 6 is
responsible for creating the tunnels or mapping flows to existing tunnels.
Data: new flow f
//New flow, check mobility and service type
serviceType = getServiceType();
mobilityDegree = getMobilityDegree();
if serviceType = bypass then
f.candidate += 3;
end
if mobility = low then
f.candidate += 4;
end
Algorithm 4: Combined technique applied to incoming flows.
6.6 Experimental evaluation
We first demonstrate that the framework is capable of detecting elephant flows
and mobile destinations using the combined technique shown in Section 6.5. After
that, we focus on demonstrating how inter-domain tunnels reduce the number of
packets that must be handled by domain controllers. We also compare the number
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Data: flows: collection of all existing flows
//Monitor rate and mobility of existing flows
for each flow f in flows do
//Update elephant flow status
elephant = isElephantFlow(f);
if f.elephant = false and elephant = true) then
f.elephant = true; //flow becomes elephant
f.candidate += 3;
end
if f.elephant = true and elephant = false) then
f.elephant = false; //flow stops being elephant
f.candidate -= 3;
end
//Update mobility status
mobility = getDestinationMobility(f);
if f.mobility = high and mobility = low) then
f.mobility = low; //destination stopped moving
f.candidate += 3;
end
if f.mobility = low and mobility = high) then
f.mobility = high; //destination started moving
f.candidate -= 3;
end
if f.inBypass = true and f.candidate ¡ 7) then
removeFromBypass(f); f.inBypass = true;
end
if f.inBypass = false and f.candidate ¿ 7) then
addToBypass(f); f.inBypass = true;
end
end
Algorithm 5: Combined technique applied to existing flows.
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addToBypass (Flow f)
src = f.source;
dst = f.dst;
if tunnel exists between src and dst) then
Add tunnel VLAN tag to f;
end
else
for each controller ic ∈ flow.intermediateControllers do
if latencyBetween(c, ic) > THRESHOLD then
latencyOk = false;
end
end
if latencyOK then
Create end-to-end inter-domain tunnel;
end
else
Create intra-domain tunnel;
end
Add tunnel VLAN tag to f;
end
serviceType = getServiceType();
mobilityDegree = getMobilityDegree();
if serviceType = bypass then
f.candidate += 3;
end
if mobility = low then
f.candidate += 4;
end
Algorithm 6: Combined technique applied to incoming flows.
of messages needed by the framework to create tunnels against a known protocol
such as label distribution protocol (LDP) [243]. To do so, we provide results of the
implementation on the GENI testbed [122] using the parameters shown in Table
6.2 and the topology shown in Fig. 6.12. Finally, we evaluate the scalability of the
framework by emulating a large topology in Mininet.
To generate MobilityFirst traffic, we used the same host stack implementation
as in Chapter 5 to use the ping and file transferring tools. For the Floodlight
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controller, we worked on top of the implementation described in Chapter 5 and
we added two components. The first one is responsible for creating aNodes and
vLinks for each domain and exchange nSPs between controllers. The second one
is responsible for implementing the traffic engineering techniques described in
Section 6.5.
6.6.1 Elephant flow detection
First, we show how the techniques described can be used to create tunnels within a
domain, taking traffic behavior and mobility into consideration. The experimental
topology (fig. 6.9) was deployed in the GENI testbed. Virtual machines are used for
the GNRS, controller, senders and receiver. OpenFlow switches are implemented
using Open vSwitch instances. In this topology, nodes A, B and C are connected
to the network through intra-domain switch intra 1. To transmit inter-domain
packets, switch intra 1 forwards packets to its default border router, border 1. In
this example, border 1 routes packets to border 2.
In these experiments, we test how the controller chooses between path 1 (going
through intra-domain switch intra 2 or through intra 3. The decision of which
path to use is based on the following policies. First, tag flows as elephant if they
maintain a traffic rate of 100,000bps during at least 10 seconds. Second, use path
2 (through intra 3) for large flows. Third, do not use path 2 if the destination is
highly mobile, regardless of the traffic rate of the flow.
In the first experiment (fig. 6.10), senders A, B and C do the following steps.
At time 5, sender A starts a flow at 608bps. At time 11, sender B starts a flow at
1344bps. At time 18, sender C starts a flow at approx 700,000bps. At time 28, the
controller tags flow C as elephant and sends it through path B. Sender C sends
large amounts of data during 10 secs. At time 37, sender C reduces the rate to
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Figure 6.9: Experimental topology. Sender nodes are connected to switch intra 1
and the destination device is in another domain.
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Figure 6.10: Detection of a large flow. When sender C starts a large flow, the
controller tags it at elephant. Next it removes the tag when the load is reduced.
688bps.
The results show how flows from senders A and B stay on path 1 as expected.
When the large flow by sender C starts, it stays on path 1 for 10 seconds, as defined
by the policy. After that, the controller tags it as elephant flow and moves it to
path 2. The red, dashed line shows how traffic from sender C is going through
path 2 but the first two flows stay on path 1. When sender C lowers the rate at
time 37, the controller waits for 10 seconds and then removes the elephant flow
tag and traffic is moved to path 1.
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6.6.2 Mobility-aware routing
In the previous experiment, we did not take the mobility of the destination into
consideration. In the following one, we show how our framework is capable of
mobility-aware tunneling.
The experimental setup is as follows. We start with an elephant flow that has
already been detected and has been routed through path 2, a fast path for large
flows. Meanwhile, another mouse flow is forwarded through path 1. The first
50 seconds of Fig. 6.11 show the two flows on paths 1 and 2. After 45 seconds,
we simulate the mobility of the destination device by sending a message to the
GNRS indicating that the GUID is now attached to a different access router. As a
consequence, the controller detects that the destination is mobile and downgrades
the flow using the combined technique (see Alg. 5). Figure 6.11 shows how traffic
on path 2 stops and the large flow is now routed through path 1.
There are several parameters in this technique that can be customized by the
domain operator. First, the controller needs to query the GNRS to know the
mobility of the destination devices of existing flows. The frequency of such GNRS
lookups can be modified. Second, the threshold to decide that a destination
shows enough mobility to be removed from a path can also be changed. In this
experiment, we removed the flow from a path with a single GNRS update detected.
However, for some scenarios this value could be larger.
Table 6.2: Summary of components and key parameters used in the experiments
Type of switch Open vSwitch version 1.9.3
Controller version Floodlight 1.0
Controller host Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
Controller host processor Intel(R) Xeon(R), 2.67GHz
End-user OS Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
Link bandwidth 100 Mbps
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Figure 6.11: Downgrading a large flow due to destination mobility. When the
destination becomes mobile, the flow is switched to a different path.
Figure 6.12: Experimental topology. Three SDN-based domains are deployed with
end-nodes on ASes 1 and 3 and traffic going through an in-transit domain (AS2).
6.6.3 Inter-domain tunneling and flow aggregation
Next we show how multiple domains agreeing on an inter-domain label-based
tunnel reduces the number of packet in messages received by transit controllers.
Table 6.3 shows in average how many packets must be forwarded to the controller
by the switch when such packet does not match any rule in the flow tables.
The experimental setup is as follows. We create 25 flows originating in AS1
with different destinations in AS3. Since the destination is different for each flow,
then the controller must process the first packets of all flows. Out of these 25 flows,
six send data at rates above 1000000 bps, six at rates above 100000 bps, seven at
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Table 6.3: Number of packet in messages received by the controller based on the
traffic rate.
Traffic rate Packet in messages per flow
1000000 10
100000 7
10000 3
1000 2
rates above 10000 bps and six transmit data at lower rates. Out of these 25 flows,
18 are sent from AS1 to AS3 through a previously setup tunnel. The remaining
seven flows are forwarded un-labeled between each domain.
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Figure 6.13: Accumulated number of packet in messages received by the AS2
domain controlle with and without inter-domain tunnels.
Figure 6.13 shows the number of packet in messages received per second by
the controller. When all traffic is forwarded without using an inter-domain cut-
through tunnel, the controller receives a total of 128 messages (top curve). However,
when inter-domain tunnels are created for some of the flows, the total number of
messages is reduced to 33 (bottom curve), for a 75% reduction. These results are
specific to this topology and flow demands, but our goal is just to demonstrate
how the creation of inter-domain tunnels can reduce the control plane delay. In
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total, 17 flows are being aggregated.
6.6.4 Reduction of label distribution messages
Next we demonstrate how combining SDN with tunnel naming reduces the number
of messages needed to create and maintain inter-domain tunnels. To do this, we
briefly describe how all the functionality of LDP used in MPLS is implemented
by our framework and we compare the number of messages needed to setup
inter-domain tunnels.
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Figure 6.14: Number of messages needed to setup inter-domain tunnels using LDP
or our framework.
Some benefits are due to using SDN. First, note that by using SDN, the num-
ber of intra-domain messages between peers is unnecessary. Instead, the SDN
controller is responsible for pushing forwarding rules to the switches. Therefore,
there is no need for intra-domain discovery messages. Second, session messages
exist between domain controllers as opposed to peering routers. This reduces the
number of messages needed because the only links carrying these messages are
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those between edge routers of neighbor domains. Third, advertisement messages
are reduced for two reasons. On the one hand, intra-domain advertisement is not
necessary because the domain controller is network aware. On the other hand,
inter-domain advertisement is already achieved using the network state packets
described in Section 6.4.2. For this reason, advertising messages are only needed to
request a new tunnel creation, as described in Section 6.4.3. Table 6.4 summarizes
the key differences between messaging in LDP and the proposed framework.
Table 6.4: Message equivalency between LDP and SDN-GNRS
Message type LDP SDN-GNRS
Discovery Peer-to-peer between
routers
No additional messages
required, since this is
achieved using network
state packets
Session Peer-to-peer between
routers
A session between do-
main controllers is re-
quired regardless of
tunnels. No additional
messages required.
Advertisement Peer-to-peer between
routers
Controller-to-controller
and controller-to-GNRS
messages are required
Notification Peer-to-peer between
routers
Controller-to-controller
messages are required
Flow rule injection Not required Controller-to-switch
messages are needed to
push forwarding rules
to the switches. Figure
6.14 does consider
these messages in the
comparison.
Other benefits are due to naming the tunnels as network objects. First, the
GNRS provides a common platform to exchange information between domain
controllers. In MobilityFirst, the GNRS plays a key role in how packets are routed,
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so we can assume that it is a highly available entity and a session between each
controller and the GNRS will exist. This reduces the complexity of establishing
sessions between multiple domains. Second, relying on the GNRS reduces the
number of inter-domain messages needed when more than two domains are
involved. Suppose in Fig. 6.12 that AS3 needs to communicate with AS1. There is
no need for AS2 to be involved in the communication and the GNRS provides a
direct way for AS1 and AS3 to exchange information.
These benefits can be appreciated in Fig. 6.14. First, notice how in LDP the
number of messages grows independent of the number of domains traversed by
the tunnel, as it requires three pairs of messages between peering routers in all
cases. In contrast, when using SDN and the GNRS, the major factor for increase in
the number of messages is the number of domains traversed. For a single domain,
there is no need for the GNRS and the plot only includes messages needed to insert
forwarding rules in the forwarding tables of the switches. Next, as the number
of domains increases, we need more controller-to-controller messages as well as
controller-to-GNRS messages. However, notice how the total number of messages
stays below that of LDP for tunnels with four or more hops.
6.6.5 Scalability
Finally, we focus on evaluating the scalability of the proposed framework. To do so,
we emulate in Mininet the same topology (Fig. 6.5) used to evaluate the heuristic
in Section 6.3. To run MobilityFirst traffic on Mininet, we collect traffic traces from
our experiments on the GENI testbed and replay them from the Mininet hosts.
Using the same input as in Section 6.3, we measure the average delay faced by the
first packet of a flow given different traffic demands. In Fig. 6.5, we attach five
hosts to every router in Domain 1 and we randomly select a source attached to
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router 20 in Domain 4. As a consequence, in this experiment there are 15 hosts
capable of sending packets at different rates and all flows require an inter-domain
data transfer between domains 1 and 4.
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Figure 6.15: Total delay encountered by the first packet of each new flow.
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
Total number of flows
N
um
be
r
of
tu
nn
el
s Framework
ILP solver
Figure 6.16: Total number of tunnels created by the framework and the ILP solver.
Fig. 6.15 shows the average delay faced by each packet given different traffic
rates. This delay includes the switch-to-controller round-trip latency as well as the
processing time at the controller. Given that the latency remains fairly constant,
the low increase is due to the controller having to process more packet in messages
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at the same time. However, notice that this delays remain very small, since the
running time of the traffic engineering algorithm is short.
Another interesting finding is that the optimization problem creates more
tunnels than our routing framework, as shown in Fig. 6.16. The reason for this
is because our traffic engineering techniques only pick some flows as candidates
for tunnels and leave others out due to mobility or low bit rate. Although this
increases the total delay in the network, some flows do benefit from hop-by-hop
transmissions to improve content delivery.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed an SDN-based routing framework that enables inter-
domain and intra-domain cut-through switching in the MobilityFirst architecture.
Our framework tackles specific challenges of this FIA network, such as inherent
mobility support and per-flow decision making based on flow behavior. Particu-
larly, three aspects are novel in this framework. First, domain controllers advertise
multiple paths to the same destination, with link information such as bandwidth,
variability, availability and latency for each hop to ensure edge-awareness and
efficient content delivery. Second, our framework provides mobility-aware, cut-
through mechanisms using label-based forwarding at both intra-domain and
inter-domain scale to ensure efficiency in the core network. Third, our framework
implements granular, per-flow decision making to ensure appropriate routing
based on flow behavior and mobility.
Our evaluation results show that the domain controller is capable of routing
elephant flows through a faster path while remaining mobility-aware (flows with
a highly mobile destination are routed through a different path to ensure efficient
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delivery). We also show how a proactively created cut-through tunnel across three
domains reduces the number of packets that need to be processed by the transit
controller by 75%. Furthermore, we show how the proposed framework scales
better than LDP when creating these tunnels. Finally, we demonstrate that the
framework is scalable and capable of handling up to 1000 flows without adding
any significant delay to incoming packets.
Our work also contributes to the deployment of SDN at Internet-scale by
proposing a novel mechanism to exchange routing information across domains.
Our work differs from other studies that have addressed inter-domain routing
SDN in two aspects: first, our network is designed to inherently support mobility,
a key requirement for the future Internet. Second, our architecture leverages a
centralized name resolution system (GNRS in the specific case of MobilityFirst)
that significantly reduces the complexity of the messages that need to be exchanged
between network controllers to agree on inter-domain cut-through switching.
As future work, we will complete the implementation of the prototype and in-
tegrate it into the MobilityFirst deployment. We also plan to evaluate the proposed
mechanisms on a larger scale using experimental scenarios which incorporate
high-speed optical switching components.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and future directions
The frameworks proposed in this dissertation, as well as a plethora of related work,
show how SDN can be used to simplify network management at all scales. By
decoupling the control plane from the data plane, SDN-based networks provide
a clear separation between network applications and the underlying topology
and this benefit has been instrumental in making networks simpler and more
manageable. SDN has renovated research in topics such as multi-layer integration,
network abstraction and network function virtualization. SDN has also been
widely adopted by both vendors and providers. The implementation of SDN is
not standardized yet. However, the adoption of a paradigm where an operation
system stands between the devices and the applications has been accepted as a
new way of deploying both local and wide area networks.
When OpenFlow was proposed in 2008, it triggered a large amount of research
and publications in all areas of networking using SDN. However, OpenFlow was
considered as a hype by some and the challenge was to convince readers of the
advantages of decoupling the control plane from the data plane. Clearly, networks
can be operated without SDN. Therefore, the initial motivation of our work was
to demonstrate how SDN can simplify network management and what are the
advantages of using an SDN centralized controller instead of distributed data
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plane protocols.
Given that OpenFlow was been proposed for LANs and data centers, in Chapter
3 we proposed OpenSec, an OpenFlow-based security framework that allows a
network security operator to create and implement security policies written in
human-readable language. Using OpenSec, the user can describe a flow in terms of
OpenFlow matching fields, define which security services must be applied to that
flow (deep packet inspection, intrusion detection, spam detection, etc.) and specify
security levels that define how OpenSec reacts if malicious traffic is detected. We
implemented OpenSec on the GENI testbed and demonstrated its functionality
using two use cases applied to campus networks: housing network control and
science demilitarized zone deployment. Our results demonstrate that up to 95%
of attacks in an existing data set can be detected and 99% of malicious source
nodes can be blocked. Likewise, we show that our policy specification language is
simpler while offering fast translation times compared to existing solutions.
Next, we focused on demonstrating the advantages of using SDN in transport
networks. In these networks, two challenges exist that are not as important in
LANs: WAN virtualization and multi-layer provisioning. Network virtualization
has become one of the driving applications of SDN. Providing a virtual software
layer between devices and external applications is hard to achieve using distributed
protocols only. Multi-layer provisioning using SDN, however, is a more challenging
task. Indeed, OpenFlow was designed for standard Ethernet devices and flow-level
management but optical devices are analog and proprietary.
To investigate if SDN could be used to make transport networks more flexible,
in Chapter 4, we proposed XTEF to enable application-driven traffic engineering
and provision transport network resources using on-demand WDM tunnels. XTEF
proposes a solution to the two challenges mentioned above: network virtualization
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and multi-layer provisioning. First, we used OneSwitch to abstract the entire WAN
as a single virtual switch. By doing this, we proposed a solution to the problem of
allowing external tenants to program paths across the WAN without revealing the
network topology. Second, we proposed the DTS algorithm as a novel technique
to increase network capacity using dynamic, short-term WDM tunnels through
available wavelengths. As a result, we demonstrated how SDN can be used by
network providers to manage a multi-tenant WAN. Our results show that 10%
additional flows can be granted the requested bandwidth using the tunnels and
this is possible without requiring the intervention of a network operator.
To further demonstrate how SDN enables flexible large scale networks, we
investigated how MobilityFirst can benefit from it. This FIA proposes several
techniques to ensure edge-awareness and efficient delivery to mobile devices.
Our contribution to the project consisted on exploring how SDN can be used to
efficiently forward flows that do not require mobility support using cut-through
switching. To this end, we first proposed in Chapter 5 an SDN-based control plane
for MobilityFirst. In this work, we introduced a general bypass capability within
the MobilityFirst architecture that provides better performance and enables both
individual and aggregate flow-level traffic control. Furthermore, we presented an
OpenFlow-based proof-of-concept implementation of the bypass function using
layer 2 VLAN tagging. We also ran experiments on the ORBIT and GENI testbeds
to evaluate the performance and scalability of the solution. By implementing the
bypass functionality, we were able to significantly reduce the number of messages
processed by the controller as well as the number of flow rules that need to be
pushed into the switches.
Given the benefits achieved at intra-domain scale using cut-through switching
in MobilityFirst, in Chapter 6 we investigated how to implement this functionality
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across multiple domains. First, we proposed and solved an optimization problem
that minimizes the total transfer time using inter-domain tunnels. Second, we
proposed an SDN-based routing framework for the MobilityFirst architecture
capable of dynamically creating such tunnels. The main novelty of this framework
is to name tunnels as network objects to simplify how tunnels are created and
maintained. To validate our framework, we implemented on the GENI testbed a
prototype for the MobilityFirst architecture. Our experiments with the optimization
problem showed that the inter-domain latency between controllers plays a key role
on how tunnels are setup. Furthermore, our implementation experiments showed
that the control plane delay can be reduced by 75% when using inter-domain
tunnels. Finally, we showed how our framework needs fewer messages than
current protocols such as label distribution protocol (LDP) to setup intra-domain
and inter-domain tunnels.
This dissertation addressed and proposed solutions to the following problems
using SDN: policy-based management, network virtualization, multi-layer inte-
gration, WDM tunneling, intra-domain cut-through switching and inter-domain
routing with cut-through switching. All these problems can be solved without
SDN, but we have demonstrated how SDN can simplify the solutions.
While our work proposes solutions for different types of networks, it is reason-
able to think of integrating our contributions as part of the same architecture. For
example, OpenSec can be modified to enable policy-based security across domains
when managing inter-domain cut-through switching. In this scenario, a domain
administrator can implement policies that enable different levels of trust across
domains. Using OpenSec, the operator can specify which domains are allowed to
initiate cut-through switching requests that should be accepted by the controller.
Likewise, a policy could be used to limit the resources available for inter-domain
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tunnels, such as the number of tunnels or which routes can be used by these
tunnels. Another example would be to integrate XTEF with cut-through switching.
Indeed, we did not address the problem of inter-domain bandwidth provisioning
and the usage of inter-domain cut-through switching is a natural next step in that
direction.
7.1 Future directions
Each chapter of this dissertation provides opportunities for future work. At
campus scale, we would like to pursue two directions. First, OpenSec can be
extended to provide a framework for Cloud-based security, where flow processing
is done in the Cloud instead of locally. Indeed, we foresee security becoming a
routing problem where flows must be sent to the processing units, as proposed
in OpenSec. The advantage of decoupling the control plane and the routing from
the security mechanisms is that exporting the security devices to remote locations
is simpler to deploy. As a consequence of this, we also plan to secure OpenSec
from external attacks to prepare the framework for such a Cloud-based scenario.
In a multi-tenant deployment with devices deployed in the Cloud, a model threat
would include a compromised network application, a data plane attack and other
scenarios that should be considered. Therefore, securing OpenSec from these
attacks is a necessary step before deploying the framework.
In chapter III we described several challenges for scientific networks, such as
WAN virtualization, scalability, multi-domain circuits, security and interoperability
and multi-layer provisioning. In this dissertation we addressed WAN virtualization
and multi-layer control. As future work, we first plan to investigate what is the
most efficient way to achieve inter-domain circuits using SDN domain controllers.
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While current solutions such as OSCARS already provide multi-domain circuit
reservation, novel techniques must be designed so that circuits can be created
without requiring as much trust among domains as OSCARS does. Secondly, we
plan to investigate the security implications of having a multi-tenant WAN with
automated application controllers programming the network. We are interested in
designing mechanisms to identify compromised application controllers and ensure
separation between tenants.
In chapters IV and V we described a routing framework with cut-through
switching for MobilityFirst. While this framework provides efficient data transfers
across domains, we are interested in better supporting mobility. In our current
mathematical formulation and implementation, the cut-through tunnels created
have static end-points. We are mainly interested in creating mobile tunnels that
adjust the end-points to “follow” the mobile destination nodes. Furthermore, the
problem formulation can be extended into many variations. In particular, we plan
to investigate the steady-state scenario where traffic and tunnels exist when the
optimization problem starts. This adds the additional challenge of having to tear
down tunnels efficiently and measuring its effect on the network performance.
While SDN has been a widely accepted technology, the discussion on the
appropriate southbound API is still open. OpenFlow 1.0 proved to be an excellent
experimentation tool for researchers and for small scale deployments in campus
networks and datacenters. However, larger scale deployments across WANs or
domains have shown how OpenFlow 1.0 lacks of some necessary features such as
path protection, recovery, management plane protocol or support for layers below
L2. Newer versions of the OpenFlow protocol, such as OpenFlow 1.3 attempted to
solve this by adding several features to make the protocol usable in production
networks. The improvements included IPv6 support and Quality of Service (QoS),
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for example. Also, the usage of multiple flow tables and buckets greatly increases
what switches can do without contacting the controller. The downside of this
innovation is that OpenFlow 1.3 is much harder to comply to in comparison to
OpenFlow 1.0.
As a consequence, interoperability problems arise because deployments work-
ing on a specific hardware usually do not function well on different devices. As
the innovation and implementation of the OpenFlow protocol continues, network
vendors have looked at other options such as XMPP (Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol), BGP-LS (Border Gateway Protocol - Link State) or PCEP (Path
Computation Element Protocol). These protocols bring advantages such as provid-
ing a management plane (which is not provided by OpenFlow) and the ability to
support legacy hardware during the transition to SDN. Similarly, different vendors
provide different solutions for the control plane. Although OpenFlow was first
proposed to standardize SDN, in reality vendors are still trying to push their own
hardware combined with their own software.
Finally, the east-west interface between controllers is also at an emergent state
only. We described in the related work of Chapter 6 how very little work has been
done on inter-domain SDN. Although we proposed a framework for inter-domain
routing, this problem is not completely solved yet and is likely to receive major
attention.
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